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I. MOVIES AND TELEVISION
A. Copyright
1. Substantial Similarity
a. "Greatest American Hero" Not Substantially Similar
to "Superman"
In Warner Brothers, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.,I the
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment after con-
cluding that its television show, "The Greatest American Hero" was
not substantially similar to the motion pictures, television series and
comic books featuring the character Superman.
The dispute began in 1981 when American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.
(ABC) presented the pilot to a comedy series called "The Greatest
American Hero".2 In it, Ralph Hinckley, a bumbling, somewhat inept
superhero (sharing some of the same characteristics as Superman) first
appeared on television.' Warner Brothers, Inc. (Warner Brothers), the
owner of the copyright to various "Superman" works, brought an ac-
tion against ABC for copyright infringement and unfair competition; it
claimed that: 1) Ralph Hinckley was substantially similar to the Super-
man character; 2) ABC had violated section 43 (a) of the Lanham Un-
fair Competition Act;4 3) ABC was guilty of unfair competition; and
4) ABC was guilty of violating the New York General Business Law. 5
Warner Brothers' attempt to obtain a temporary restraining order
and a preliminary injunction enjoining the broadcast of the pilot of
"The Greatest American Hero" failed.6 After the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed this denial,7 ABC moved for summary
1. 530 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), af'd, (2d Cir. 1983), 1983 Copyright L. Rep.
(CCH) 25,584.
2. Warner Brothers, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 523 F. Supp. 611, 614
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
3. Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
5. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d (Consol. 1968).
6. Warner Brothers, 523 F.Supp. at 618. In this action, Judge Motley applied Learned
Hand's "ordinary observer test," a test for determining the extent of substantial similarity. It
states that there will be substantial similarity where "the ordinary observer, unless he set out
to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard this aesthetic ap-
peal as the same." Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Werner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960). Thus, the court focused on the similarities, not the differences and concluded
"'The Greatest American Hero' has a very different appeal from 'Superman'... and plain-
tiffs have not sufficiently proven it will reduce the demand for the movies . . . bearing the
Superman image." Warner Brothers, 523 F. Supp. 611, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
7. 654 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1981).
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judgment. The motion was denied on the ground that the court could
not ascertain whether a reasonable jury could find that no substantial
similarity existed because the court had not seen all of the plaintiffs' or
defendants' works.
After Judge Motley viewed Warner Brothers' movie "Superman
II," and seven additional episodes of "The Greatest American Hero,"
the court concluded that no issue for the jury existed and, therefore,
summary judgment was appropriate on all counts.'
The court first looked to what it considered the ideas common to
both works. These included the characters' superpowers (such as
superstrength, supervision, and the ability to fly), their costumes and
their encounters with alien beings.9
The court's conclusion that Superman's powers are ideas and not
an expression of a more fundamental idea of a superman who fights
evil, is questionable, as is the court's conclusion that Superman's en-
counters with alien beings are not eligible for copyright protection.'
These encounters in no way seem to be a necessary corollary to a
superhero who fights evil. In this case, a reasonable juror could con-
clude that an encounter with alien beings is not an idea, but rather an
expression of the more fundamental idea of a superhero who fights evil.
Since reasonable people could differ as to this point, an issue for the
jury exists and summary judgment is therefore inappropriate in this
situation.
After comparing these "ideas," the court changed its inquiry into
what it considered to be the expression of these ideas."I It defined the
issue as "whether 'the similarities are sufficiently particular and con-
crete' to permit a jury to find 'an appropriation of the protected expres-
sion of the plaintiffs' works.' '"2 In order to answer this question, the
8. Warner Brothers, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 530 F. Supp. 1187, 1190
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). In choosing to grant ABC's motion for summary judgment, the court re-
lied on Musto v. Meyer, 434 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979).
In Musto, the court held that "if after assuming copying, the court finds that any similarity
between the works is insubstantial. . . then a motion for summary judgment is appropriate.
Id. at 36.
9. Warner Brothers, 530 F. Supp. at 1190-92. The court considered super-strength,
super-hearing, super-vision, super-speed, super-breath, invulnerability, the ability to fly,
close encounters with alien beings, alter-ego and costume to be common to both works.
10. "Superman is himself superhuman, and for him contact with beings or images of
beings from other planets is to be expected." Id. at 1191. This conclusion is reached without
any explanation whatsoever. I disagree with the court that "this can only be considered a
common idea in the most general way." Id. I think it is just as plausible to say that it is an
expression of the idea of a superhero who fights evil.
11. Warner Brothers, 530 F. Supp. at 1192.
12. Id. (citing Warner Brothers, 654 F.2d at 209).
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court compared the works in contention.
The thrust of the court's analysis had nothing to do with a detailed
comparison of the two works. Rather, it seemed to place great empha-
sis on the courts' decisions in the earlier phases of the litigation. In
particular, it relied on the court of appeals' contention that "plaintiffs
cannot seriously contend that . . . [defendants' pilot] and 'Superman,
The Movie' . . . are substantially similar. Quite to the contrary...
the 'total concept and feel' of the two works greatly differ."' 3 Further-
more, since the court concluded that ABC's pilot did not differ greatly
from the seven additional episodes of "The Greatest American Hero,"
it concluded that there was no issue for the jury. 4
The court next compared the characters in the two works. Citing
Nimmer, the court stated that the proper analysis requires two steps:
"First, was the character as originally conceived and presented suffi-
ciently developed to command copyright protection, and if so, secondly
did the alleged infringer copy such development and not merely a
broader more abstract outline."' 5 As to the first step, the court con-
cluded that since Superman has existed and developed for forty years,
the character was well defined and thus deserved copyright
protection. 16
Once the court determined that the Superman character was eligi-
ble for copyright protection, the next question became: was defendant's
character substantially similar to plaintiffs' character? In considering
this question the court employed a reasonable man test.' 7 "If a reason-
able juror could find that defendants' character is substantially similar
to Superman as the latter is portrayed in the movies. . . comic books
. . . or the television series, there would be an issue for the jury."' 8
Judge Motley went on to say that the characters at issue were no more
similar than those held insubstantial in the earlier phases of the litiga-
tion-"he is the same bumbler he was in the pilot. . . Just as no rea-
13. Id. at 1192-93 (citing 654 F.2d at 211).
14. Id. at 1193. "The proof... is in the viewing, and a viewing of the works reveals
that defendants' expression of the ideas . . . is, at most, insubstantially similar."
15. Id. at 1193.
16. Id. "Cases in this circuit recognize that characters may be protected out of the con-
text of the story line or lines in which they appear in a copyrighted work or works." Id.
This view is not in accord with that taken by the Ninth Circuit. In the Ninth Circuit charac-
ters are not copyrightable unless they are the story being told. See Warner Brothers Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954). In either case, however,
it is likely the character Superman would be eligible for copyright protection because there
is a strong argument that Superman is the story being told.
17. Warner Brothers, 530 F. Supp. at 1193.
18. Id.
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sonable jury could find the character in the pilot was substantially
similar to Superman, no one could find the character in the sequels to
be substantially similar . . . (He) is a 'mirror image' of the Superman
character. . . while Superman is often lost without his powers, Hinck-
ley is somewhat lost with his."19
Warner Brothers further alleged that defendants' work violated
section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act, and that it constituted unfair compe-
tition. In order for an action in unfair competition to lie, the court
must conclude that in viewing both works, there is a likelihood of con-
fusion or a likelihood that the viewers will be misled.2" Relying on the
fact that the character Superman and the character Ralph Hinckley are
very different, the court, for the same reasons elucidated previously,
correctly concluded that there is no basis of confusion: "not only are
the works themselves greatly different, but the 'total concept and feel'
of the works and promotion of the defendants is entirely different from
that of the plaintiffs."
2 1
Based upon this reasoning, the court correctly granted summary
judgment on the common law unfair competition and the New York
General Business Law claim.22
One who has viewed a Superman movie, an episode of the "Great-
est American Hero," and the television show "Superman," would agree
with Judge Motley's decision that both works are not substantially sim-
ilar. Although both characters are superheroes who possess superpow-
ers and work towards the common good, each is very different.
Superman is much more serious in his approach; he is confident and
assured. Ralph Hinckley, on the other hand is somewhat inept, a com-
mon person who is not in control of his uncommon powers. As it was
pointed out in an earlier stage of the present litigation, Ralph Hinckley
is more akin to a parody of the Superman character than he is a com-
petitive superhero. "The story of Ralph Hinckley . . . pokes fun at
Superman and other characters in the Superhero genre. As a comedy
that parodies American superheroes, 'The Greatest American Hero'
has a very different appeal from Superman, a real superhero ... 23
This appears to be the crux of Judge Motley's decision. Notwithstand-
ing the fact that both are superheroes sharing similar characteristics,
19. Id. at 1194.
20. Warner Brothers, 530 F. Supp. at 1197.
21. Id. at 1198.
22. Id. at 1198-99.
23. Warner Brothers, 523 F. Supp. at 617.
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the key factor seems to be that "The Greatest American Hero" is a
comedy, aiming at a very different audience appeal than Superman.
Although the conclusions reached by the court are sound, I do not
feel that summary judgment was appropriate. I think in matters such
as these, where one must rely on vague, subjective criterion, the jury
should be the ultimate trier of fact. Nonetheless, we are left with an
example of where the court concludes that the similarities were so in-
substantial as to make it unnecessary for the issues to be presented to
the jury. Given the present facts however, I am unsure whether this
case will provide much guidance for future litigants.
Jeffrey S. Sacharow
b. "Star Wars" v. "Battlestar Gallactica" May
Proceed to Trial
Quiet on the set! Star Wars v. Battlestar Galactica take one!
Lights, Camera, Action! Actually, "take four" would more aptly de-
scribe the current status of the legal battle between Twentieth Century-
Fox and Universal Studios.' The case has been subject to several deci-
sions since its initial filing in 1978 and has already been to the appellate
court twice, though it has not yet been to trial. The controversy centers
around the issue of whether Universal's Battlestar Galactica movie in-
fringed the copyright to Fox's Star Wars movie. The latest decision in
the case was delivered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals when it
reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Universal,
clearing the path for the monumental copyright infringement suit to
proceed to trial. The appellate court held that the question of whether
Battlestar Galactica is substantially similar to Star Wars to amount to
copyright infringement "is a close enough question that it should be
resolved by way of trial."
2
In 1977, Twentieth Century-Fox (hereinafter "Fox") produced
and distributed the highly successful motion picture Star Wars. The
following year Universal Studios Inc., a subsidiary of MCA, Inc., re-
leased Battlestar Galactica as both a motion picture and television se-
ies. Universal produced and owned the rights to Battlestar Galactica,
and ABC televised the Battlestar Galactica space saga.
In 1978, Fox filed suit against MCA, Universal, and ABC (collec-
tively referred to as Universal) in the Federal District Court in Los
1. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1983).
2. Id. at 1329.
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Angeles alleging that Battlestar Galactica was an illegal knock-off of
Star Wars and thus infringed its copyright.' Shortly thereafter,
Universal filed a counterclaim against Fox alleging that Star Wars was
itself an infringement on Silent Running, a science fiction film Univer-
sal had released in 1972. The basis of Universal's counterclaim was
that Star wars' R2D2 robot character was substantially similar to Uni-
versal's robot characters, Huey, Duey, and Louie, the three main char-
acters in Silent Running.4
In 1979, the district court dismissed Universal's counterclaim in
response to Fox's pre-trial motion for summary judgment.' Judge Hill
ruled that "no one has a monopoly on the use of robots in works of art
dealing with space. That is an idea, and the idea has apparently been
around for a very long time. No one possesses proprietary rights in
that idea."6 Moreover, Judge Hill found that the robots in the two
films were "greatly different in appearance and in the style and method
of locomotion. R2D2 communicates in sound, whereas the three robots
in Silent Running do not. The whole relationship of the robot to the
picture and to the actors is different in the two movies." 7 R2D2 does
not embody the "total concept and feel" of the three robots in Silent
Running, Judge Hill explained. He stated that "it is just impossible to
say that Star Wars has . . . infringed the expression of ideas in Silent
Running."8
Universal immediately appealed that decision. In a very brief, two
and one-half page memorandum opinion, the court of appeals affirmed
the district court's dismissal of Universal's counterclaim. The appellate
court simply stated that its review of the two films satisfied it that Judge
Hill had correctly concluded, as a matter of law, that they contained no
substantial similarity of expression.9
3. Id. at 1328. Fox also alleged state unfair competition and federal Lanham Act
claims which were stayed pending this appeal.
4. Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Twentieth Century-Fox v. MCA, Case No. 79-3342
(9th Cir. 1981).
5. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Twentieth Century-Fox v. MCA, Case No.
CV-78-2437-IH (C.D. Cal. 1979). Judge Hill delivered an oral opinion from the bench.
6. Id. at 14.
7. Id. at 16.
8. Id.
9. Twentieth Century-Fox v. MCA, Case No. 79-3342 (9th Cir. 1981). Universal's con-
tention on appeal was that Judge Hill had incorrectly applied the legal test for similarity
which the appellate court itself had enunciated in Sid & Marty Krofti Television Produc-
tions, Inc. v. MacDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162-65 (9th Cir. 1977). Judge Hill himself
had voiced his concern about the ambiguous language in Krofft in describing what the re-
quirements for substantial similarity are when he dealt with Universal's counterclaim. Re-
porter's Transcript at 7-8, Fox v. MCA, Case No. 78-2437-IH (C.D. Cal. 1979). However,
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In 1980, about one year after dismissing Universal's counterclaim,
the district court dismissed Fox's original complaint in response to Uni-
versal's pre-trial motion for summary judgment on the copyright claim.
The dismissal of Fox's complaint came even before the appellate court
had affirmed the previous dismissal of Universal's counterclaim. Judge
Hill noted that the leading case in the area is Krofft Television Produc-
tions, Inc. v. MacDonald's Corp. , o which held that in cases of this kind,
courts must first determine whether there is substantial similarity in
ideas of the two works involved, and if so, whether there is substantial
similarity in the expression of that idea." Before applying the Krofft
test to the present case, Judge Hill voiced his concern as to the suitabil-
ity of the test to more complex works as involved in the present case. '
2
Judge Hill stated that the "facts involved in the Krofft case lent them-
selves much easier than the facts of this case to an analysis of idea and
expression of ideas."' 3 The Krofft case dealt with television commer-
cials lasting thirty or sixty seconds. However, in the present case, "we
deal with much more complex works than were involved in Krofft. We
are dealing with feature-length motion pictures, taking over two hours
to exhibit."' 4 Judge Hill stated that he found it "almost impossible to
reduce such a complex work to one idea."' 5
Notwithstanding the above concerns, Judge Hill found himself
bound to apply the Krofft test to the present case. Judge Hill reviewed
Battlestar Galactica, Star Wars, and a montage of earlier science fiction
films. He stated that in its most basic form both Star Wars and Battle-
star Galactica could be said to involve the same idea-a struggle be-
tween good and evil in space. However, Judge Hill explained that
when applied to full-length motion pictures, the term "idea" must en-
compass more than a basic concept; "idea" must be defined to include
something about plot and characters. The Judge therefore ruled that in
his opinion the story lines and central characters of the two films were
"substantially different" as to ideas. 6
Moreover, Judge Hill found that even if the ideas of the two mov-
the appellate court did not take this opportunity to explain or amplify the similarity test
expressed in Krofft, but merely concluded that Judge Hill had correctly applied the test.
10. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
11. Id. at 1162-65.
12. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 6-7, Fox v. MCA, Case No. CV 78-2437-IH
(C.D. Cal. 1980). See infra footnote 9 as to Judge Hill's similar expression of concern when
applying the Krofft test to Universal's counterclaim.
13. Id. at 7.
14. Id. at 8.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 10.
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ies were the same, the "total concept and feel" of the two are "vastly
different" as to the expression of that idea.'7 He explained that Star
Wars is a pure fantasy and morality play. Its central characters, Luke
Skywalker and the Princess, are flawless and purer than life. On the
other hand, Battlestar Galactica is neither a morality nor a fantasy play.
"It puts very human people, with all their weaknesses and feelings, in a
situation we can all relate to, except that the scenes all take place in a
space setting. . . . Battlestar Galactica could just as well be the cow-
boys and the Indians except that it is in space garb." 8 For these rea-
sons and others, Judge Hill found that Star Wars and Battlestar
Galactica "are as different as apples and oranges."'
' 9
Fox immediately appealed the dismissal of its complaint. After
viewing the Star Wars and Battlestar Galactica movies for itself, the
appellate court came to a different conclusion than had Judge Hill.
The appellate court concluded that the films "do in fact raise genuine
issues of material fact as to whether only the Star Wars idea or the
expression of that idea was copied."20 In the opinion of the appellate
court, the issue of whether Battlestar Galactica is substantially similar
to Star Wars "is a close enough question that it should be resolved by
way of trial."'" In a footnote to the opinion, the appellate court re-
ferred to Fox's allegation of at least thirty-four similarities, and also
listed thirteen of these alleged similarities for "illustrative purposes."22
The court went on to say that its holding makes no opinion as to
whether the two films are substantially similar as to either idea or ex-
pression, but simply that "reasonable minds could differ on those key
factual issues."' 23 For this reason, the appellate court ruled that sum-
mary judgment should not have been granted.24
The appellate court has now had two opportunities in this case to
clarify or provide guidance as to what factors should be considered in
17. Id. at 13.
18. Id. at 15.
19. Id.
20. 715 F.2d at 1329.
21. Id.
22. Id. at n. 5.
23. Id. at 1329.
24. Id. at 1329-30. The court stated that its holding does not imply that summary judg-
ment is never appropriate in copyright actions, referring to three appropriate instances:
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
841 (1980); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1366, 1369
(S.D.N.Y.), affid, 415 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1969); and Rose v. Connely, 38 F. Supp. 54, 55-56
(S.D.N.Y. 1941) (none of which were found applicable to the present case in the opinion of
the appellate court).
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determining whether one movie is substantially similar to another. In
its first opportunity the appellate court simply stated that the district
court had correctly applied the Krofft test and that the appellate court
agreed with the district court's decision.2 5 The appellate court offered
no explanation as to what factors in particular led it to decide that no
substantial similarity existed between Silent Running and Star Wars.
In its second opportunity the appellate court noted that although the
district court had applied the correct test, Krofft, the appellate court
disagreed with the conclusion reached by the district court.2 6 The ap-
pellate court simply concluded that the question of substantial similar-
ity between Battlestar Galactica and Star Wars was a close enough
question that it should go to trial.27 Again the appellate court offered
no explanation as to what factors led it to decide that it was a close
question. In summary, although Krofft dealt specifically with commer-
cials, lasting thirty or sixty seconds, the appellate court did not feel it
necessary to provide guidance as to how to apply the Krofft test to more
complex full length motion pictures. Thus the lower courts are left
applying Krofft as best they can, subject only to a subjective case-by-
case review by the appellate court as to whether a movie is or is not
substantially similar to another. This ad hoc decisionmaking approach
by the appellate court makes it even more difficult for lawyers to deter-
mine whether a movie may be found to be substantially similar to
another.
As Judge Hill pointed out and as most copyright lawyers will at-
test, the Krofft test does not lend itself easily to an analysis of substan-
tial similarity between full length motion pictures. The complexity of
these types of works cannot simply be reduced to a "total concept and
feel" analysis. Krofft's "total concept and feel" approach will take into
account many similarities which are not even protectible under copy-
right law such as items in the public domain or scenes a faire. The
better view might be to dissect the movies into parts when analyzing
idea and expression, using experts if necessary, and having the lawyers
argue the similarity issue on each part. Then submit the evidence to
the jury and have the judge instruct the jury as to the protectability of
each of the similarities found in the dissected works. This would guar-
antee that unprotectable parts of a movie are not being relied on to
determine substantial similarity, providing a more reliable and objec-
25. Twentieth Century-Fox v. MCA, Case No. 79-3342 (9th Cir. 1981).
26. 715 F.2d 1327.
27. Id. at 1329.
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tive test than the current method of simply analyzing the expression of
a movie based on its overall concept and feel.
James Nanko
c. "'Jaws" Promoters Enjoin Distributors of "Great
White"
While the purpose of copyright law is to reward an author's crea-
tivity, copyright law also imposes limitations on what is copyrightable
in order to protect other authors and the public at large. To this end
copyright protection extends only to the expression of an idea and
never to the idea itself.' The real task in a copyright infringement ac-
tion then, is to determine when there has been copying of the expres-
sion of an idea.2 [N]o one infringes, unless he descends so far into what
is concrete [in a work] as to invade [its] expression.3
In June, 1975, plaintiff Universal City Studios, Inc. (Universal) re-
leased the motion picture "Jaws," a fictional story about a great white
shark that terrorizes inhabitants of a town on the Atlantic seaboard.4
In March, 1982, Film Ventures Inc. (Film Ventures) released the mo-
tion picture "Great White" to approximately 300 theatres in the United
States. "Great White" is also a story about a shark that terrorizes in-
habitants in a town on the Atlantic seaboard. Shortly before the na-
tionwide release of "Great White," Universal fied a civil action against
Film Ventures for copyright infringement, trademark infringement,
trademark dilution and unfair competition. In connection with this
case,6 Universal moved to enjoin Film Ventures from continuing to ex-
hibit and promote "Great White."
The central issue before the court in the preliminary injunction
action was whether there was a significant likelihood7 that a jury apply-
ing the intrinsic ordinary observer test would find the protectible ex-
pression of ideas in "Jaws" infringed upon by the motion picture
I. Sid and Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir.
1977).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Film Ventures Int'l Inc., 534 F. Supp. 1134, 1136
(C.D. Cal. 1982).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1134.
7. Id. at 1139. In a preliminary injunction action for copyright infringement plaintiff
must prove: 1) likelihood of success on the merits in trial; and 2) irreparable injury. Upon a
showing of a prima facie case of copyright infringement, irreparable injury will be pre-
sumed, and a preliminary injunction will issue.
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"Great White."' For purposes of the preliminary injunction, defendant
Film Ventures conceded the general idea was the same in both "Jaws"
and "Great White." 9
The essence of Universal's motion was that similarities in basic
story points, major characters, sequence of incident, and development
and interplay of the major characters and story points were so substan-
tial as to amount to an appropriation of its copyrighted work "Jaws."' 0
"Jaws" revolves around five major characters. They are the shark,
who is a principal character in his own right, the mayor, a concerned
local police chief, an English accented salty skipper and a shark
expert."
The film's primary focus is on the attempts of the police chief,
skipper, and shark expert to kill the shark, who is portrayed as a de-
monic and maniacal beast attacking people and boats for reasons be-
yond satisfying hunger.' 2 An important secondary theme in "Jaws" is
the struggle between the shark hunters who wish to inform the town-
speople of the dangers of the shark, and the mayor who is initially
more concerned about the effect news of a shark attack would have on
tourism than about the safety of the town's inhabitants. This struggle
culminates when the mayor refuses to warn beachgoers on a major
tourist weekend, the Fourth of July weekend, to stay out of the ocean. '
3
Similarly, the major characters in "Great White" include a ruth-
less shark, a politician (a gubernatorial candidate), and an English ac-
cented skipper. There is also a shark expert, who, the court in
Universal concluded, is a combination of the shark expert and local
police chief in "Jaws."' 4
In "Great White", the action revolves around the shark's attacks
on people in the water and the attempts of the skipper and expert to kill
the shark. Another recurring theme concerns the efforts of the guber-
natorial candidate to downplay the news of the shark attacks for the
sake of the local windsurfing regatta and the attempts of the shark ex-
pert to warn the town of the dangers."
The court in Universal concluded that there is a significant likeli-
hood that a jury applying the intrinsic ordinary observer test would
8. Id. at 114041.
9. Id. at 1137.
10. Id. at 1141.
11. Id. at 1137.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1137-38.
15. Id. at 1137.
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find the expression of ideas in "Jaws" and "Great White" substantially
similar. 
16
The court relied primarily on Sid & Marry Krofft Television v. Mc-
Donald's Corp. ," the leading Ninth Circuit case on copyright infringe-
ment. In reviewing the Kroft case, the court reiterated the prima facie
elements of copyright infringement-ownership and copying. 8 Copy-
ing is composed of two parts: (1) circumstantial evidence of defend-
ant's access to the copyrighted work; 9 and (2) substantial similarity
between the copyrighted work and defendant's work.2 °
The Krofft court established a two-part test to determine substan-
tial similarity. The first part of the test is to determine if there is sub-
stantial similarity between the general ideas of the two works. If this
step is satisfied, the second inquiry is whether there is substantial simi-
larity in the expression of the ideas.21
The first part of the test is described as an extrinsic test. It is ex-
trinsic because it depends not merely upon the observations and im-
pressions of the trier of fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed
and analyzed.22 Expert testimony can be introduced in court.
2 3
The second prong of the test is an intrinsic test. Unlike the extrin-
sic test, it is inappropriate to use external criteria and analysis to deter-
mine similarity. This prong rests solely on the response of the ordinary
reasonable person.24
In determining whether there was significant likelihood a jury
would find substantial similarity, the court in a sense deviated from
Krofft. Noting the intrinsic test in Krofft is uniquely suited for a jury,25
the court in Universal did not merely place itself in the shoes of the
ordinary observer. Rather than simply relying on impressions and vis-
ceral response, the court adopted plaintiff Universal's analytical ap-
proach to determine similarity. Universal's approach was to compare
basic story points, major characters, sequence of incident and develop-
ment and interplay of the major characters and story points. The court
16. Id. at 1139.
17. 562 F.2d 1157.
18. The issue of ownership was not in dispute before the court.
19. The question of defendant's access to plaintiffs work was also not in issue.
20. 534 F. Supp. at 1140.
21. Id.
22. 562 F.2d at 1164.
23. 534 F. Supp. at 1140.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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adopted this analysis and found "Great White" substantially similar to
"Jaws" in every category.
A non-inclusive list of similarities found by the court in addition
to similarities previously mentioned are:
1. In the finale of "Jaws", the skipper is eaten by the shark and
the police chief then kills the sharp by exploding a canister of com-
pressed air which the shark has swallowed. 6 In the finale of "Great
White", the skipper is eaten by the shark, and then the shark expert
kills the shark by detonating dynamite which the shark has
swallowed.27
2. Both films open with teenagers playing on the beach. Then in
"Jaws" there are underwater shots of a swimmer. Bass tones build up
tension and indicate the approach of a shark. The swimmer becomes
the shark's first victim. 28 In "Great White", after the shots of the teen-
agers, there are underwater shots of a windsurfer. Bass tones build ten-
sion and indicate the approach of a shark. The windsurfer is the first
victim of the shark.
29
3. In "Jaws", two bounty hunters, seeking a monetary reward,
decide to lower raw meat off a pier as shark bait. The shark grabs the
bait and breaks off part of the pier. One of the men falls off the pier
and into the water, but manages to swim back to shore before the shark
attacks.3° In "Great White" a local newsman and his cameraman, in
order to obtain publicity, decide to lower raw meat off a pier as shark
bait. The shark grabs the bait, breaking off part of the pier. People fall
off the pier; some manage to reach shore as the shark attacks.3 1
In using plaintiff Universal's test, the court did not substitute this
test for the Krofft test. Rather, the court must have reasoned that in
order to know how a reasonable ordinary person, a juror, might viscer-
ally respond to the two movies, the court needed to use an analytical
approach.
In keeping with its analytical approach, the court looked at addi-
tional extrinsic evidence. The court noted defendant's film "Great
White" was originally titled "The Last Jaws." Also, the major charac-
ter in "Great White" is named Peter Benton. Peter Benchley is the
26. Id. at 1137.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1138.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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author of "Jaws."32 While the court stated this was not evidence of
substantial similarity, the court said it showed an attitude on the part of
the film's creator to be closely connected with "Jaws." Yet this obser-
vation must have weighed in the court's decision.
While the court recognized that Krofft is the leading case in the
Ninth Circuit, by implication it found the second prong of the Krofft
test inadequate to decide the issue at hand. It appears that judges will
be compelled to use an analytical approach to determine substantial
similarity at the preliminary injunction level.
Query, if it is useful to use analysis at the preliminary injunction
stage, why is analysis improper at the trial stage? Use of expert testi-
mony and analytical dissection might greatly assist a jury in determin-
ing whether two works of art are substantially similar, especially when
the works being compared are in a medium as complex as film. Such
use might also lend to greater consistency in judgments.
Michele Carmeli
d. "Blue Lagoon's" Move to Enjoin Paradise Fails
In Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Embassy Pictures,,
Columbia Pictures Industries Inc., (Columbia) claimed its copyright of
the film "Blue Lagoon" had been infringed by Embassy Pictures and
RSL Films, Ltd. (Embassy) by the exhibition of Embassy's film
"Paradise."
Columbia filed a civil action in May, 1982, against Embassy for
copyright infringement, trademark infringement, trademark dilution
and unfair competition.2 Columbia sought preliminarily to enjoin the
exhibition and distribution of "Paradise." Columbia also sought to
enjoin the advertisement and promotion of "Paradise" in the print
media through the use of injunction and temporary restraining order.3
In order to obtain the preliminary injunction, Columbia had to
prove either a combination of probable success on the merits and the
possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and
the balance of hardships tips sharply in their favor.4 The parties
32. Id. at 1141.
1. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Embassy Pictures, No. CV 82-2376-Kn, May
27, 1982; CCH Copyright Law Reports, P25, 440; 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 497.
2. 218 U.S.P.Q. 497. The issue of trademark infringement trademark dilution and
unfair competition will not be discussed in this note.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 498.
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focused mainly on proving probable success on the merits. As with
Universal,5 in order to prove probable success on the merits, Columbia
had to prove the prima facie elements of copyright infringement-
ownership, access, substantial similarity of ideas between the films and
substantial similarity in the expression of the ideas.6
Defendant Embassy argued as a preliminary matter that the scope
of protection to be afforded Columbia was in question because the
book "Blue Lagoon" was already in the public domain.7 Only that
which was new and original in Columbia's motion picture was entitled
to protection. However, the court determined that it need not decide
the scope of Columbia's copyright. The judge opined that even if the
entire film was entitled to copyright protection, Columbia would be
unsuccessful on the merits of their suit thereby making this issue moot.
8
The court in Columbia also relied primarily upon Krofft9 to
establish the distinction between an idea and the expression of an idea.
Unlike Universal, the court in Columbia found no substantial
similarity in ideas between the films "Blue Lagoon" and "Paradise."' 0
While the court admitted several similarities existed, the court held the
general ideas of the movies were different.
According to the court, the general idea in "Blue Lagoon" is the
development of a relationship between a boy and a girl marooned in an
idyllic setting. The two young children mature to adolescence, cope
with problems, discover each other, fall in love, have a child and
commit suicide while adrift at sea."
The court found "Paradise" had two main ideas. Paradise is both
a chase film and a love film. The pursuit of the girl by a jackal brings
the girl and boy together. Their relationship matures while they are
being chased. The girl becomes pregnant but does not give birth. The
two finally return to civilization.' 2
The distinctions according to the court are two-fold. First, while
both films revolve around the relationship of the boy and girl, the idea
is more fully developed in "Blue Lagoon" and dominates the film.' 3
5. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Film Ventures Int'l Inc., 534 F. Supp. 1134 (C.D. Cal.
1982).
6. 218 U.S.P.Q. at 498.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Sid and Marty Kroffi Television v McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
10. 218 U.S.P.Q. at 498-99.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 499.
13. Id.
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Also of compelling distinction is the general idea of chase and pursuit
found only in the "Paradise" film.'
4
It may be that Embassy found a profitable caveat in copyright
infringement law. As stated by Nimmer 5 , a defendant may
legitimately avoid infringement by intentionally making sufficient
changes in a work which would otherwise be regarded as substantially
similar to that of the plaintiff's.
As the court found no substantial similarity of ideas, the court did
not need to proceed to the second prong of the Krofft test, the intrinsic
test.
The court did however address this issue briefly. It determined
that the question of substantial similarity in the expression of the
general ideas was too close for a finding that plaintiff would likely
succeed on the merits.'6 At a minimum, these differences would
present a question for the trier of fact.' 7
Unfortunately for entertainment law attorneys, very little guidance
is afforded by this opinion. There was no mention whether the judge
relied on expert testimony and analysis, or whether he went strictly by
his impression and observations. However, the Ninth Circuit
specifically explained that this part of the Krofft test, the extrinsic test,
could be decided as a matter of law' 8 and it appears that the judge did
just that.
Michele Carmeli
e. "Coming Home" Successful Against Copyright
Infringement Challenge
In a copyright infringement case, the essence of a cause of action
lies in the unsanctioned use of particular expressions of general themes
through similarities of treatment, details, scenes, events and charac-
ters.' This fundamental principle of copyright law is based on the the-
ory that the protection granted to an original work of authorship
extends only to the praticular expression of an idea rather than the idea
14. Id.
15. 2 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 13.03[B] at 13-37 (1983), quoted with
approval in Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, 654 F. Supp. 204, 211
(2d Cir. 1981).
16. 218 U.S.P.Q. at 499.
17. Id.
18. 562 F.2d 1157, 1164.
1. 547 F. Supp. 722, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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itself.2
In February 1972, plaintiff George Davis published a novel enti-
tled Coming Home. In February 1978, defendants, United Artists,
Inc.,3 released a motion picture also entitled "Coming Home." 4 U.A.
moved for summary judgment on three causes of action alleged by Da-
vis: copyright infringement in violation of 17 U.S.C. section 501; false
description in violation of the Lanham Act 15 U.S.C., section 1125(a);
and unfair competition in violation of New York law.5
For purposes of this motion, U.A. conceded Davis' ownership of
the registered copyright in the novel Coming Home.6 The trial court
noted two basic issues for consideration: (1) whether there were sub-
stantial similarities between the two works as viewed by an ordinary
observer, and if so, (2) whether U.A. improperly appropriated Davis'
expression.7 The court answered the first question in the negative,
therefore never reaching the second.8
The essence of Davis' claim of infringement is based on his per-
ception of the similarities between his novel and the defendants' mo-
tion picture.9 In particular, Davis points to the fact that both plots
center on the Vietnam War and its effects on the lives of the story's
three main characters.' °
The novel's story revolves around three Air Force pilots stationed
in Thailand during the Vietnam War. These three major characters are
Ben, Childress (both of whom are black), and Stacy (a white man).'
The novel follows the plight of the three friends as they leave Thailand
and return to the United States. The novel illuminates the growing tide
of racism prevading the war in Vietnam and in American society. 2
The novel's secondary characters are three women: a prostitute;
Rose, who is Ben's wife; and Roxanne, Stacy's girlfriend.13 Interwoven
in the plot are love triangles that develop between the prostitute, Ben
2. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
3. Also named as defendants were: Jerome Hellman Productions, Inc., Jane Fonda,
Bruce Gilbert, Nancy Dowd, Waldo Salt, Robert C. Jones, National Broadcasting Com-
pany, Inc., Home Box Office, Inc., and Cinema I.
4. 547 F. Supp. at 723.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 725.
9. Id. at 728.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 725.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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and Childress and a second triangle between Rose, Ben and Chil-
dress.' 4 Meanwhile Stacy, who is still overseas, hears that Roxanne is
having an affair with Childress, which is not true. Stacy becomes de-
spondent over this news and commits suicide during a flying mission.'5
The motion picture also centers on three main characters: Bob, a
marine officer in Vietnam; Sally, his wife who remained at home; and
Luke, a Vietnam veteran who has returned home from the war a para-
plegic.' 6 While Bob is away on duty, Sally volunteers to work in a
veterans' hospital where she meets Luke, an old high school class-
mate.'7 They become friends and eventually lovers. 8 During their re-
lationship, Luke struggles to overcome his handicap while Sally gains
independence and becomes active in the anti-war movement.19
At the end of the film, Bob returns home from Vietnam and learns
of Sally's love affair-unaware that Sally has already ended her rela-
tionship with Luke.2" Emotionally disturbed as a result of the war, Bob
swims out into the ocean, apparently committing suicide.2
A. Infringement
The court, in applying the substantial similarity test, concluded
that the similarities between the novel and the motion picture were
"merely similarities of ideas and general concepts."22 It is a fundamen-
tal principle of copyright law that protection extends only to the partic-
ular expression of an idea and not to the idea itself.23
The court relied primarily on Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. '4
to establish the distinction between an idea and an expression as
follows:
Upon any work. . . a great number of patterns of increasing
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 726.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
24. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902, 51 S. Ct. 216, 75 L. Ed. 795
(1931). This was an action brought by the author of the play "Abie's Irish Rose," claiming
that defendant's film "The Cohens and the Kellys," infringed on her work. The court found
that the common elements of the two stories, "a quarrel between a Jewish and an Irish
father, the marriage of their children, the birth of grandchildren, and a reconciliation," was
not protected because it was too generalized.
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generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the inci-
dent is left out. . . [T]here is a point in this series of abstrac-
tions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the
playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which,
apart from their expression, his property is never extended.
25
In the present case, the court noted the following differences in the
methods of expression used in the novel and in the motion picture.
First, Davis' novel, although focusing on the Vietnam War, is primarily
concerned with the war's effect on servicemen and is set mainly in the
war zone. 6 U.A.'s motion picture focuses primarily on the war's effects
on those at home, and is set in California.2" Second, none of the film's
major characters are black, and racism was not addressed.28 Third, the
novel does not contain a seriously injured serviceman analogous to the
paraplegic character of Luke.29 Fourth, the court found that the char-
acters' personalities in the novel were so completely different from
those in the film as to be devoid of legal significance.3" The court noted
additional insignificant similarities, but labeled them scenes afaire in
that they are sequences of events which necessarily follow from a com-
mon theme.3'
B. The Lanham Act
Davis further claimed that the use of the title "Coming Home" by
U.A. constitutes a false description or representation in violation of the
Lanham Act. The Lanham Act provides:
Any person who shall. . . use in connection with any goods
a false description or representation, including words
• . . tending falsely to describe or represent same, and shall
cause such goods . . . to enter into commerce . . . shall be
liable to civil action by any person. . . who believes that he is
likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description
or representation. 15 U.S.C., section 1125(a).
The Act has been construed to provide protection to a title of a
creative work in the limited situation where: (1) the title has acquired
25. 547 F. Supp. at 726 (quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. 45 F.2d 119, 121
(2nd Cir. 1930)).
26. 547 F. Supp. at 726.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 727.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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"secondary meaning," i.e., that the public identifies the title with the
plaintiff and his work; and (2) there is a "likelihood of public confu-
sion," i.e., that the public will be misled into believing that the defend-
ant's work originated or is associated with or sponsored by plaintiff
because both works bear the same title. 2
On this issue, the court found that Davis had failed to raise genu-
ine issues of fact regarding the elements of secondary meaning and
likelihood of public confusion.33 The only evidence on this point was
an unsworn statement made by Davis alluding to various conversations
with third parties who believed that the film was adapted from Davis'
novel.34 The court held that this multiple hearsay statement did not
raise genuine factual issues sufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.35
Davis, in seeking to prevent a summary judgment, submitted the
affidavit of a literary expert who opined that the two works shared sub-
stantial similarities in the specific areas of plot, theme, mood, time,
character development, setting and pace. 36 The court, relying on Nich-
ols,3 and Sid and Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDon-
ald's Corp. ,38 held that the expert opinion would not be admissible in a
motion for summary judgment. The court, in excluding the expert tes-
timony, adopted the reasoning set forth in Costello v. Loew's Inc. , that
no amount of expert or lay testimony as to fancied similarities could
change the obvious content of the exhibits.
The significant point behind the court's decision lies mainly in the
fact that granting a summary judgment motion in a copyright infringe-
ment case is an acceptable procedure. The court, in citing the general
rule as set forth in Arnstein v. Porter,' that generally there should be
trials in plagiarism suits, recognized that there are cases in which the
32. Id. at 727-28.
33. Id. at 728.
34. Id.
35. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (e) requires that affidavits on a motion for summary judgment
"shall be made on personal knowledge" and "shall set forth such facts as would be admissi-
ble in evidence."
36. 547 F. Supp. at 724.
37. 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930); (expert opinion in copyright cases ought not to be
allowed at all).
38. In, Sid and Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164-65
(9th Cir. 1977), the court held that expert testimony is admissible on the question whether
two works are based on similar ideas but not whether they share similarities of expression.
The affidavits submitted here by the plaintiff addresses the issue of similar expression be-
tween the two works and thus should not be considered.
39. 547 F. Supp. at 724, n. 8.
40. 154 F.2d 464, 474 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
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absence of similarities is so blatant, that a summary judgment for de-
fendant would be proper.4'
In light of the facts presented in this case, the court was correct in
granting a summary judgment for U.A. In the more recent case, Jason
v. Fonda,42 a summary judgment motion was granted for the defend-
ants in a similar fact situation. Jason was an action brought by the
author of the novel Concomitant Soldier-Woman and War, against
Jane Fonda and eight other defendants claiming copyright infringe-
ment, unfair competition, misappropriation, and breach of implied
contract in defendants' motion picture "Coming Home. 43 In a one
and one-half page opinion, the court affirmed the district court's grant
of summary judgment and held that Jason had failed to establish more
than a "bare possibility" that defendants had access to her work, and
that no substantial similarity existed between the two works.'
In the last several years, courts have become more willing to grant
summary judgment motions in copyright infringement cases. By
adopting a strict rule prohibiting the use of hearsay evidence or expert
testimony in support of a summary judgment motion, courts are ex-
pressing a reluctance to reach out to find genuine issues of fact on
which to proceed to trial. Furthermore, the courts' narrowing interpre-
tation of the "substantial similarities" test, will make it more difficult
for plaintiffs to state successful causes of action where the facts are sim-
ilar but only because they follow from a common theme.
Carolyn Cole
f. Relieffor Innocent Creators
Until recently, charges of substantial similarity' between an
allegedly infringing work and the plaintiffs work have customarily
41. 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 967.
44. Id.
I. A defendant's copying may be inferentially established by proving access to the
copyrighted work and a substantial similarity between the two works. Novelty Textile Mills,
Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977). The determination of the
extent of similarity which will constitute a substantial and therefore infringing similarity,
however, "presents one of the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one which is the
least susceptible of helpful generalizations." 2 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright,
§ 13.03[A (1983).
Copyright infringement actions are brought under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301
(1976).
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involved questions of fact, appropriately dispensed with at trial.2
However, the court in Giangrasso v. CBS, Inc. ,' in granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment, may have opened the way for the easy
resolution of substantial similarity actions.
In Giangrasso, plaintiffs work, copyrighted in August, 1976,
consisted of two parts: a promotional presentation and a radio play
script. The first part, intended as a presentation to sell future episodes
of the radio show on a syndicated basis, introduced the station WHY-
53 and its staff. It exposed the audience to such characters as Curt
Curtis and Steve Stevens, the station's "crack news staff;" Thomas
Thompson, the behind-the-times owner who was in part responsible for
the station's poor ratings; and "Medicine Man" Larry Lee Lawrence, a
smooth-talking morning disc jockey.4
The second part was a pilot episode of WHY-53. The setting was
Larry Lee's "remote" broadcast at the grand opening of the
Consolidated Bank. The plot revolved around a bank robbery that
occurred during the broadcast. Larry Lee, blithely engrossed in his
role as the "Medicine Man," unknowingly put a bewildered bank-
robber on the air and engaged him in some of the disc jockey's manic
fun and games. In the end, the robber left with a jar holding the radio
station's "WHY Win Nickel Contest," Lee all the while ignorant of the
fact that the robber was not just "another happy WHY listener." The
broadcast then broke to Curt Curtis' news report of the bank hold-up.
Curtis' closing aside was: "too bad we didn't have someone there to
cover the story."
How similar was plaintiffs work to defendant's "Hold-Up"
episode of the popular television show "WKRP in Cincinnati?"
"Hold-Up," broadcast in October, 1978, centered around Bob Bruner,
who, as an out-of-work disc jockey previously rejected by the station,
attempted to gain recognition by hijacking disc jockey Johnny Fever's
remote broadcast at Del's stereo store. Bruner's armed hijacking of the
broadcast, all for the sake of publicity, aroused Fever's sympathy.
Fever gave Bruner a few radio tips, and when Bruner showed remorse
at using a gun, fearing he had ruined all his hopes for radio fame
because he was likely to be arrested, Fever let himself be seized by the
police as the program's hijacker. A news postscript ended the show.
Fever appeared on the screen and a voice-over described his release
and the drawing of Bruner that the police had made from the
2. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980).
3. 534 F. Supp. 472 (E.D. N.Y. 1982).
4. Id.
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description Fever provided. The drawing turned out to be a picture of
Richard Nixon.
The Giangrasso court, as a preface to its comparative analysis of
the works before it, attempted a review of the "methods" others have
developed to judge whether an expression of an idea, rather than
merely the idea itself, has been copied.5 From Judge Learned Hand's
"abstractions test" 6 the court jumped to Professor Chafee's explanation
of the protectible "pattern 7 as it defied the all-too-common legal
conclusion that "decisions must . . . inevitably be ad hoc."8
With the knowledge that "the essence of infringement lies in a
taking not of a general theme but in its particular expression through
similarities of treatment, details, scenes, events and characterization," 9
the court began a closer examination of the works in order to determine
whether there was any genuine issue that they could be substantially
similar.'° Clearly there was not. The "WKRP in Cincinnati" episode,
explained the court, involved an out-of-work radio announcer's
attempt to hijack a remote broadcast in order to publicize himself, and
the sympathetic participation he received from the show's disc jockey."
In plaintiffs "WHY-53" show, however, a bank robber was unwillingly
engaged in some on-the-air games by a disc jockey ignorant of the
goings-on about him.' 2  The plots are obviously dissimilar, a
conclusion the court could not escape:
Even assuming that defendant may have copied the idea of a
5. Id. at 476. The review, however, was not inclusive; omitted was the "ordinary
observer" test used by the court in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) ("ordinary reasonable person" standard).
6. Id.
Upon any work . . . a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit
equally well as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may be no more
than the most general statement of what the work is about, and at times might
consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they
are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his
'ideas,' to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.
(citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)).
7. Id. Professor Chafee stated that "[n]o doubt the line does lie somewhere between
the author's idea and the precise form in which he wrote it down . . . the protection covers
the 'pattern' of the work. . . the sequence of events, and the development of the interplay of
characters." ChafeeReflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 513 (1945).
8. Id. (Citing Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960)).
9. Id. (Citing Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.
1977)).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 477.
12. Id.
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remote broadcast interrupted by a robber with a gun, such
copying .. .is not actionable because it is only of an idea,
and the handling, scenes, details and characterization used by
plaintiffs and defendants in their works based on this idea are
unquestionably not substantially similar.'3
Furthermore, the court reasoned that plaintiff's characters were too un-
developed to permit protection,14 and the only insignificant similarity
that could be claimed was in the general roles they played (station own-
er, engineer).
The court was thus faced with the following dilemma: though
substantial similarity is ordinarily a close question of fact and therefore
"an issue not readily susceptible to disposition on summary judg-
ment,""5 this particular case clearly dealt with apples and oranges. So-
lution? Nothing but applesauce for the plaintiffs. The court held that
the lack of substantial similarity between the works had been suffi-
ciently established on the record, making a full trial of the issue
unnecessary. 6
In bypassing trial and allowing the record to seal an open-and-
shut case, the Giangrasso court may have opened an escape hatch for
innocent creators burdened with unwarranted claims of infringement.
Though granting a defendant's motion for summary judgment is, in
such a situation, not a completely novel procedure, 7 it has been by no
means a very common one, and there is the hope that other courts will
follow the Giangrasso court's expedient disposition of clearly losing
claims.
Alejandro N Mayorkas
2. Fair Use
a. Work Not Protected as Parody
"Frankly, my dear, I do give a damn," said the plaintiffs in MGM
v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Productions (Showcase Atlanta), fol-
lowing a dress rehearsal of defendants' production "Scarlett Fever."
13. Id. at 476.
14. Id. at 478. "The characters in plaintiffs' short work are primarily 'types' with little
limning or development beyond their positions at the station." It is clear that the less devel-
oped the characters, the less they can be copyrighted. Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d
at 121.
15. 534 F. Supp. at 478. (Citing Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d at 977).
16. 534 F. Supp. at 478.
17. 3 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, supra note i, at § 12.10.
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The ensuing action resulted in a favorable decision for plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment.' The court held that defend-
ants' work was not a fair use of "Gone With the Wind," as "Scarlett
Fever" was not a parody of the copyrighted work; even if the produc-
tion qualified as a parody, the amount of material used from the origi-
nal was more than was necessary to "conjure up the original."2
One week later, following trial to the court, a final judgment was
entered enjoining defendants from any further productions of "Scarlett
Fever."3 In its order, the court held that plaintiffs had not abandoned
their copyright by failing to prosecute other infringements.4
Plaintiffs were the owners of the copyright to the novel "Gone
With the Wind," and of several derivative copyrights and interests
thereof.5 Defendants were the owners, producers, and creators of a
musical production entitled "Scarlett Fever." Defendant Showcase
Cabaret customarily presented light, musical entertainment in an inti-
mate surrounding.
In the three-hour, three-act production, the names of the major
characters were changed (for example, Katie Scarlett O'Hara, the apple
of her father's eye, was transformed to Shady Charlotte O'Mara; Rhett
Butler to Brett Studler and Scarlett's beloved home to Tiara), but the
play essentially tracked the story, and included most of the major epi-
sodes from the film.
"Scarlett Fever" was to have opened on September 21, 1979. After
attorneys representing the Mitchell interests attended a dress rehearsal
on the 19th, they filed for and obtained a temporary restraining order,
issued on the 21st.
The district court, in a memorandum opinion, granted the prelimi-
1. MGM v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Productions, 1981 Copyright L. Dec.
(CCH) 25,313 at 16,775 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 1981).
2. Id
3. MGM v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Productions, 1981 Copyright L. Dec.
(CCH) 25,314 at 16,778 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3, 1981).
4. In the Sept. 3 decision the court also ruled that plaintiffs were not estopped from
bringing the present action, applying reasoning similar to that used in deciding the abandon-
ment issue. Damages of $500 were held to be sufficient to recompense plaintiffs, as only one
performance of "Scarlett Fever" had taken place. Id at 16,780.
5. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. owns the screen rights and copyright for the film,
"Gone With the Wind"; The Macmillan Company, Inc. is the holder of the copyright for the
novel, "Gone With the Wind;" Stephens Mitchell and Trust Company Bank in their capac-
ity as Trustees for certain heirs of Margaret Mitchell own certain residual interests in the
copyrighted works and derivatives thereof, including the stage rights. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Productions, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 354, n.1
(N.D. Ga. 1979).
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nary injunction sought by plaintiffs.6 The court found that "substantial
similarity" existed between "Scarlett Fever" and "Gone With the
Wind," and that plaintiffs thereby had established a prima facie case of
copyright infringement.
The court reviewed the fair use defense asserted by defendants and
concluded that (1) "Scarlett Fever" was neither satire nor parody with
respect to fair use protection;7 (2) even if "Scarlett Fever" was a parody
or satire, it failed to qualify as a fair use as defendants had used more
of the original than necessary to "conjure up the original;"8 and (3) in
applying the functional test,9 "Scarlet Fever" was found to fulfill the
same function as "Gone With the Wind" and therefore would be
"likely to harm the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.''  The court rejected defendants' other defenses."
Based on the conclusion that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on
the merits with their arguments against the fair use defense, and on the
prerequisite finding of irreparable injury, the court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction.
Aided by the court's articulation of the fair use defense, plaintiffs
brought a motion for partial summary judgment on that issue. In re-
sponse, defendants asserted three arguments as to matters of legal and
factual dispute: (1) Any artistic or literary parody is automatically a
parody within the protection of the legal concept of fair use; (2) "Scar-
6. 479 F. Supp. 351 (order granting preliminary injunction).
7. The "fair use" defense is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1977) which states in pertinent
part: "Fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright."
8. The "conjure up" test was born in Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964), in which the court concluded that "At the very least,
where, as here, it is clear that the parody has neither the intent nor the effect of fulfilling the
demand for the original, and where the parodist does not appropriate a greater amount of
the original work than is necessary to 'recall or conjure up' the object of his satire, a finding
of infringement would be improper."
9. Nimmer explains the "functional test" as follows: "If both the plaintiff's and de-
fendant's works are used for the same purpose, then under the functional test the defense of
fair use should not be available since the defendant's work serves the same function as that
of the plaintiffs . . . The scope of fair use is then constricted where the two works in issue
fulfill the same function in terms of actual or potential consumer demand, and expanded
where such functions differ." 2 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05[B] (1979).
10. 479 F. Supp. at 361.
11. The First Amendment argument was summarily discounted-since "Scarlett Fever"
was neither parody or satire, it was not the type of critical comment intended for protection
under the First Amendment. Both the abandonment and estopped defenses were foreclosed
by the finding that "Scarlett Fever" was not a parody. Additionally, defendants failed to
show the intent necessary to establish abandonment, and the necessary showing for estop-
pel-intent and knowledge on plaintiffs' part and defendants' right to rely thereon-was not
made. 479 F. Supp. at 362.
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lett Fever" did not incorporate more of "Gone With the Wind" than
was permissible; and (3) "Scarlett Fever" did not fulfill the same func-
tion as "Gone With the Wind," and thus there existed a factual dispute
as to the amount of harm "Scarlett Fever" would cause to any author-
ized theatrical production of "Gone With the Wind."
In response to the first contention, the court completely disagreed
with such a broad definition of parody as fair use. 2 Rather, the court
stressed that the crucial element of parody which justified its protection
under the copyright law, "consists of an original expression, which has
social value by commenting upon the work being parodied."' 3 This
concept of a "crucial element" was first formulated in Berlin v. E. C
Publications:4 "For, as a general proposition, we believe that parody
and satire are deserving of substantial freedom-both as entertainment
and as a form of social and literary criticism."' 5 In support of its deci-
sion, the court cited several other opinions which relied on this lan-
guage from Berlin. 16
The court did find that portions of "Gone With the Wind" were
parodied in "Scarlett Fever," but that those parts were so small that the
work taken as a whole did not meet the test of parody.
The defendants' second contention-that "Scarlett Fever" did not
incorporate more material from "Gone With the Wind" than was per-
missible-was rejected by the court. To support this contention, de-
fendants relied on a footnote from Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National
12. Language from Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), af§'d, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980), seems to support defendants' argument:
"In addition, even if it were found that 'I Love Sodom' did not parody the plaintiff's song
itself, that finding would not preclude a finding of fair use. Under the holding of Berlin v.
E.C. Publications, Inc., supra, and the criteria set down in... 17 U.S.C. § 107, the issue to
be resolved by a court is whether the use in question is a valid satire or parody, and not
whether it is a parody of the copied song itself." 482 F. Supp. at 746.
13. 1 25,313 at 16,776.
14. 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
15. Id at 545.
16. In MCA, Inc. v. Wilson the court stopped short its analysis of the case upon deciding
that the defendant's work, "Cunnilingus Champion of Co. C" was not a burlesque or parody
of the copyrighted work, "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy," but rather was intended as a bur-
lesque of sexual mores, using the Andrews Sisters' style of singing. 425 F. Supp. 443
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
In Walt Disney Productions v. Mature Pictures, the court stated: "While defendants
may have been seeking in their display of bestiality to parody life, they did not parody the
Mickey Mouse March but sought only to improperly use the copyrighted material." Walt
Disney Productions v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397, 1398 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
These cases are discussed in the instant case at 16,776-77.
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Broadcasting Company :17
We note that the concept of 'conjuring up' an original came
into the copyright law not as a limitation on how much of an
original may be used, but as a recognition that a parody fre-
quently needs to be more than a fleeting evocation of an origi-
nal in order to make its humorous point. (citation omitted) A
parody is entitled at least to 'conjure up' the original. Even
more extensive use would still be fair use, provided the par-
ody builds upon the original, using the original as a known
element of modem culture and contributing something new
for humorous effect or commentary.' 8
The court disagreed with the defendants' interpretation of the lan-
guage in the Elsmere footnote, expressing the view that the language
merely "amplified the meaning" of the "conjure up" concept.' 9
Defendants also cited Walt Disney Productions v. The Air Pirates,
20
an action brought by Walt Disney Productions in response to the de-
fendants' use of several Disney characters, including Mickey Mouse
and Minnie Mouse, in drug culture comic books. The decision in Air
Pirates rested on a determination that the defendants had taken more
than was necessary even under the Berlin test. "By copying the images
in their entirety, defendants took more than was necessary to place
firmly in the reader's mind the parodied work and those specific attrib-
utes that are to be satirized.'
The court dismissed these arguments, without bothering to counter
them. The decision merely stated that both Air Pirates and Elsmere
were "not inconsistent with the analysis used in this Court's order of
October 12, 1979. "22
The court noted that extensive copying from "Gone With the
Wind" might have been permissible had defendants produced a parody
of the entire original work. However, since only a minor portion of
"Scarlett Fever" met the test of parody, the bulk of the work was
merely copying, and "Scarlett Fever" thus failed to meet the "conjure
17. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Company, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.
1980).
18. Id at 253, n.1.
19. MGM v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Productions, Copyright L. Rep. (CCH)
25,313 at 16,777.
20. Walt Disney Productions v. The Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
21. 581 F.2d at 757.
22. 25,313 at 16,777.
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up" test.23
Defendant's third argument was that "Scarlett Fever" did not ful-
fill the same function as "Gone With the Wind," and that there was a
factual dispute as to the amount of harm "Scarlett Fever" would cause
to an authorized theatrical production of "Gone With the Wind.
24
The court agreed with defendants that the function of "entertainment"
as categorized in the order granting the preliminary injunction was too
broad and should be considered on the basis of the type of entertain-
ment-for example, comedy, melodrama, etcetera.25
Notwithstanding the court's concurrence with defendants' third
contention, summary judgment was granted on the issue of fair use
based on the first two issues-"Scarlett Fever" was not a parody for
fair use purposes and the production incorporated more of the original
than was contemplated under accepted tests of fair use.26
In the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law issued the
following week, defendants' primary argument was that plaintiffs had
effected a "limited abandonment" of their copyright by not objecting to
every "humorous treatment" of "Gone With the Wind."27 Sufficient
evidence was not cited to support the argument of "limited abandon-
ment" and the concept was rejected.28 The court found that the plain-
tiffs had been diligent in policing their copyright,29 so that even if
occasional infringements had slipped through the net, the intent neces-
sary to establish abandonment could not be shown.3 °
The significance of Showcase Atlanta lies in its consideration of
the defendants' contention that any artistic or literary parody is auto-
matically parody within the protection of the legal concept of fair use.3'
First, the court considered the nature of parody in order to deter-
mine whether a particular work should qualify for the protection from
23. Id
24. Id
25. 25,313 at 16,778.
26. Id
27. $ 25,314 at 16,778. Also in this ruling, defendants' estoppel argument was dismissed
as "equally unconvincing" as the argument for "limited abandonment". Id at 16,780.
28. Id. at 16,780.
29. Defendants presented evidence that plaintiffs had not objected to a Carol Burnett
Show production entitled "Went With the Wind." Id at 16,779.
30. Nimmer discusses abandonment as follows: "Abandonment of the copyright by the
plaintiff . . . obviously constitutes an effective defense in an infringement action. ...
Abandonment occurs only if there is an intent by the copyright proprietor to surrender rights
in his work. There is, moreover, strong authority holding that an overt act evidencing such
an intent is necessary to establish abandonment. Under this view mere inaction would not
constitute a manifestation of an intent to abandon." M. Nimmer, supra note 9, § 13.06.
31. See note 12.
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infringement provided by the fair use defense. Since this defense is an
exception to the otherwise exclusive protection against copying granted
to the copyright holder, the court is to be commended for requiring a
social justification for the protection of parody.
In an article arguing for a critical effect test for parody, author
Susan Linehan Faaland commented:
Only one court has fully recognized the importance of par-
ody's critical effect. In Metro- Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase At-
lanta Cooperative Productions . . . the court. . . recognized
that mere humor was an insufficient ground for allowing fair
use. The court defined parody and satire as 'art forms involv-
ing the type of original critical comment meant to be pro-
tected by § 107. The court thus recognized that parody's
privilege depends on a rationale which distinguishes it from
other forms of derivative work.
3 2
Faaland's praise is deserved as to that point. However, the court fell
short of a complete recognition of the role of parody as illustrated by its
insistence that in order to qualify as a parody, a work must comment
on the actual work being parodied. 33 This limitation does not take into
consideration works such as those involved in MCA v. Wilson 34 or Walt
Disney Productions v. Mature Productions,35 in which the parodies pur-
portedly sought to make some social comment or criticism in general,
but were not specifically a critique of the work used as the springboard
for the parody. Since these situations could achieve the "critical ele-
ment" of parody upheld in Berlin v. E. C Publications,36 the definition
of parody should not be so limited as to preclude such uses. One recent
decision of the Second Circuit, Elsmere Music v. NBC,3 7 specifically
discounted any requirement that the parody must comment on the
original work to qualify for fair use protection.38 The court in the in-
stant case stated that it was in complete disagreement with the analysis
and conclusion of the Elsmere court.3
9
The defendants in Elsmere had used portions of plaintiffs adver-
tising jingle in a "Saturday Night Live" skit. "I Love New York" be-
32. Faaland, Parody and Fair Use. The Critical Question, 57 Wash. L. Rev. 163, 184
(1981).
33. 25,313 at 16,775.
34. See supra note 16.
35. Id
36. 329 F.2d 541.
37. 482 F. Supp. 741.
38. Id
39. 25,313 at 16,777.
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came "I Love Sodom." The court held that defendants had taken a
significant portion of plaintiff's work, but that the song "I Love
Sodom" fell within the definition of parody. Plaintiffs asserted that the
work was not a parody of the original work and therefore fell short of
the MCA and Mature Pictures criteria, and was therefore not a fair use.
The court dismissed this assertion by stating that the song "I Love
Sodom" was a parody of the song as well as of the total ad campaign.
In dictum, the Elsmere court went on to say:
In addition, even if it were found that 'I Love Sodom' did not
parody the plaintiffs song itself, that finding would not pre-
clude a finding of fair use. Under the holding of Berlin v. E. C
Publications, Inc., . . . and 17 U.S.C. § 107, the issue to be
resolved by a court is whether the use in question is a valid
satire or parody, and not whether it is a parody of the copied
song itself. To the extent that either MCA or Walt Disney
[Mature] can be read to require that there be an identity be-
tween the song copied and the subject of the parody, this
Court disagrees.'
It is difficult to agree with the limitations placed upon the range of
parody by the Showcase Atlanta decision, especially when the Second
Circuit view as expressed above in Elsmere Music v. NBCal provides a
logical and appealing alternative view. To limit parody to commenting
only on the original work hinders a valuable tool for social commen-
tary and critique.
Nancy Wagner
b. Television News' Use of Chaplin Film
In Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. ,' de-
fendant television network was unsuccessful in defending its unauthor-
ized telecast of plaintiffs' compilation of Charlie Chaplin film clips on
the evening news.
The "Compilation" is a thirteen minute assemblage of memorable
moments from Chaplin classics. Plaintiffs are the owners of statutory
copyrights in the original films. The Compilation was designed by sev-
eral noted artists2 as a tribute to Charlie Chaplin, and was shown in
40. 482 F. Supp. 741 at 746.
41. See supra note 37.
1. 672 F.2d 1095 (2nd Cir. 1982).
2. Bert Schneider, director Peter Bogdanovich, and film editor Richard Patterson, to-
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connection with Mr. Chaplin's appearance at the 1972 Academy
Awards ceremony. Subsequently, plaintiffs completed a feature length
film tribute to Chaplin entitled "The Gentleman Tramp," incorporat-
ing many of the same highlights used in the Compilation.'
Meanwhile, defendant CBS was assembling its own film retrospec-
tive of Chaplin's life to be shown at his death. CBS requested permis-
sion from plaintiffs to use footage from the same Chaplin films used in
the Compilation. Plaintiffs refused, explaining that they wished to re-
tain their copyright advantage for their planned exploitation of "The
Gentleman Tramp." Plaintiffs twice offered to sell CBS a license to use
the Compilation, but defendant refused.4
The dispute arose when, at Mr. Chaplin's death, defendant de-
cided to televise plaintiffs' Compilation rather than their own retro-
spective composed largely of public domain footage.5
Plaintiffs charged defendant's broadcast of the Compilation in-
fringed their statutory copyrights in the films, that the use of the clips in
the particular form of the Compilation infringed a common law copy-
right in the Compilation itself as an independent creation, and that the
broadcast competed unfairly with plaintiffs' own Chaplin tribute "The
Gentleman Tramp."6
The district court held for plaintiffs on all counts, awarding com-
pensatory and punitive damages totaling $307,281.00 and $410,000.00
respectively.' Defendant on appeal contended that its action was pro-
tected by the first amendment, that plaintiffs had no common law copy-
right in any of the works at issue, that plaintiffs' tort claim of unfair
competition was preempted by federal copyright law, and that the
damages awarded were excessive.8
Defendant first argued that its televising of the Compilation was
indistinguishable from the reporting of a newsworthy event, and there-
fore, was protected expression under the first amendment. Defendant
was suggesting that "the 1972 Academy Awards ceremony, at which
gether selected and edited scenes from classic Chaplin films, planned the sequence and tim-
ing of the scenes, and produced the Compilation. Id at 1098.
3. Id
4. Id
5. Defendant CBS obtained a copy of the Compilation from NBC. NBC had kept a
video tape of the Compilation from its telecast of the Academy Awards ceremonies of 1972.
Defendant then compiled its own film obituary to Chaplin, incorporating with minor edit-
ing, the Compilation. Id
6. Id
7. Id at 1098-99. See Roy Export Co. v. CBS, 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
8. 672 F.2d at 1097.
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the Compilation received its single public showing, was an 'irreducible
single news event' to which the showing of the Compilation was
integral."9
The appellate court, while allowing that it might one day be con-
fronted with a situation where "the informational value of a film can-
not be separated from the photographer's expression,"'" concluded that
the showing of plaintiffs' copyrighted films was not essential to suffi-
ciently memorialize Mr. Chaplin's death. The court added that the
showing of the Compilation was likewise not essential to CBS's news
reporting of the 1972 Academy Awards ceremony. Quoting the district
court, the appellate court opined, "[t]he audiovisual news event, if there
was one, was Chaplin's appearance, not the showing of his work, and
certainly not the precise means through which his films were showcased
[in] (the Compilation).""l
Defendant also argued that the one-time airing of the Compilation
on the 1972 Awards show divested plaintiffs of their common law copy-
right in that work. Defendant proposed that because the Academy of
Motion Picture Arts and Sciences (AMPAS), had affixed a copyright
notice in its name to the awards telecast, AMPAS thereby acquired a
statutory copyright in the entire show, including the Compilation. De-
fendant further contended if AMPAS did not have such a statutory
copyright, then either plaintiffs had a statutory copyright, or the Com-
pilation was in the public domain.'
2
The court, upon careful consideration, rejected this reasoning.
The court concluded that even assuming the telecast of the awards cer-
emony was sufficient to invest AMPAS with federal copyright protec-
tion as to the awards show, AMPAS could not secure copyright
protection for the preexisting components that it did not create. The
court stated, "the statutory rights AMPAS may have acquired in the
telecast can extend only to its original contribution to that collective
work, not to the preexisting Compilation."' 3
The court further held, "[elven if the telecast was an 'investing'
publication sufficient to confer statutory rights to the collective work
upon AMPAS, in whose name the copyright notice appeared, that one-
time showing of the Compilation was only a 'performance,' which can-
9. Id at 1099.
10. Id. at I 100.
1i. Id.
12. Id. at I100-01.
13. Id at 1103.
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not constitute a 'divesting' publication."' 14
Although the court recognized the general rule that publication of
a collective work is a publication of its preexisting component parts, it
stressed that historically courts have required less to find a "publica-
tion" has occurred where mere investiture is involved, than where an
individual stands to lose all of his copyright protection.' 5
Thus, the court also rejected defendant's contention that plaintiffs
had unintentionally exchanged their common law copyright protection
for a statutory copyright. The court held that because the 1972 Awards
telecast was not a "divesting" publication, plaintiffs' common law
rights were not disturbed. 16
CBS further contended that plaintiffs could not maintain a claim
that the CBS retrospective unfairly competed with plaintiffs' plan to
license "The Gentleman Tramp." Defendant argued to the court that
plaintiffs' claim, although "nominally based on misappropriation of the
Compilation, ultimately rests on appropriation of federally copyrighted
materials,"' 7 and is therefore preempted by federal law.
The court, however, ruled that defendant's use of the Compilation
was unfair competition under New York law. The court also held that
the act of taking the Compilation, as an entity apart from the films,
defines a distinct offense, causing distinct damage apart from the use of
the copyrighted films and, therefore, the claim is not subject to preemp-
tion defense.'
8
The court stressed that the New York tort of unfair competition is
both "adaptable and capacious."' 9 The court held, "CBS unquestiona-
bly appropriated the 'skill, expenditures and labor' of the plaintiffs to
its own commercial advantage."2 In addition, the court stated that the
misappropriation of the Compilation was "commercially wrongful in a
more serious way than use of film excerpts would have been."21 The
court explained:
A decision to use isolated film clips to memorialize Chaplin's
14. Id at 1104.
15. The court noted that courts have consistently required more when finding publica-
tion necessary to divest an author of common law copyright without acquisition of statutory
protection, than when finding a publication sufficient to merely invest an author with statu-
tory copyright protection. Id at 1102-03.
16. Id. at 1104.
17. Id at 1105.
18. Id at 1106.
19. Id at 1105.
20. Id
21. Id at 1106.
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life could perhaps have been viewed as an act done in the
good faith belief that such use was fair; but the additional de-
cision not only to use the film clips, but to use them in a dis-
tinct and original form whose commercial potential, as CBS
knew, reflected someone else's effort and creativity, prelcudes
any thought of good faith.22
Finally, the court rejected defendant's assertions that the punitive
damages awarded against it on the two common law claims were con-
trary to law and public policy, and that the awards were excessive, du-
plicative, and the result of passion and prejudice.
2 3
The court noted that New York law permits punitive damages
where a wrong is aggravated by recklessness or willfulness, whether or
not it is directed against the public generally.2" The court added that
because plaintiffs' action was based on state law, the policies prohibit-
ing punitive damages in federal infringement actions are not applica-
ble.25 Lastly, the court refused to reduce the lower court's award of
punitive damages as the court found the award neither grossly exces-
sive nor duplicative.
2 6
Brenda Adams Bissett
c. Nonprofit Organization's Use of Videotapes
Recent technological advancements simplifying the use of video-
recording devices such as Sony's Betamax have presented the courts
with novel and unsettled issues in copyright infringement actions.'
22. Id
23. Id
24. Id (citing Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 61 A.D.2d 491, 495,
402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (1978); Borkowski v. Borkowski, 39 N.Y.2d 982, 355 N.E.2d 287, 387
N.Y.S.2d 233 (1976)).
25. 672 F.2d at 1106.
26. Id at 1106-07.
1. As the Supreme Court began its 1983-84 term, it turned promptly to reconsider the
highly publicized case of Universal Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963
(9th Cir. 1981) (holding that videotaping of copyrighted televised shows and movies for
private, in-home noncommercial use constituted infringement and did not constitute fair
use), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982). The Court tried to settle the case in the 1982-83
term, but on the final day they postponed a decision and ordered a new hearing in the
current 1983-84 term. Upon hearing argument in October 1983, the Court hinted at its re-
luctance to settle the issue this term also when it asked counsel if Congress could deal with
the case. See L.A. Times, October 4, 1983 § 5 (Business) at 1, col. 2. However, in January
1984 the Court decided 5 to 4 that manufacturers of videotape recorders may not be held
liable under federal copyright law when the devices are used by consumers merely to record
television shows for viewing at home at a more convenient time. The court concluded that
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Confronted with such an issue, the court in Encyclopedia Britannica Ed-
ucational Corp. v. Crooks2 held that the defendants' highly organized
and systematic practice of making off-the-air videotapes and derivative
copies of plaintiffs' televised copyrighted works constituted infringe-
ment and did not constitute fair use.
Plaintiffs4 were three profit motivated corporations, primarily in-
volved in the production and distribution of educational works which
were marketed to educational institutions, related organizations, and
television networks.' Plaintiffs individually owned valid copyrights to,
or were the exclusive licensees of, nineteen copyrighted works claimed
to be infringed in the present action. Each of the nineteen works con-
tained a copyright notice which was prominently displayed when the
work was broadcasted.
The defendants constituted the Board of Cooperative Educational
Services ("BOCES"), a nonprofit organization funded by nineteen
school districts serving over 100 schools.6 To establish an instructional
television service for the schools in its district, BOCES began videotap-
ing televised programs of educational value.7 BOCES videotaped sev-
eral of plaintiffs' copyrighted works, including plaintiffs' copyright
notice in each work, from the various televised broadcasts, and created
master videotapes of these copyrighted works. BOCES maintained a
library of these master videotapes and used them "for making and dis-
tributing videotape copies for several years and, in some instances, for
up to ten years."8 Upon request, BOCES would provide a subscribing
school with a videotape copy of the master videotape.9 BOCES did not
private taping of a TV program by consumers for viewing at a later time constituted "fair
use" and thus not a copyright infringement. See L.A. Times, January 1, 1984, § 1, at 1.
2. 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
3. Id at 1185. The court also held that defendants' use was not protected by the First
Amendment, nor was it insulated by the doctrine of estoppel.
4. Plaintiffs include Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corporation (EBEC), Learn-
ing Corporation of America (LCA), and Time-Life Films, Inc. To avoid confusion, the term
"Plaintiffs" will be used throughout the note.
5. 525 F. Supp. at 1158.
6. Id at 1159. It should be noted that none of the individual schools or school districts
was a party to this action.
7. Id at 1162. Seventeen of the 19 works in question here were broadcasted by station
WNED, a public television station which also functions as an instructional television station.
Since 1972 WNED has been funded by the state of New York. Prior to this time, WNED's
funding was derived from schools, school districts, and BOCES itself. Id at 1164.
8. Id at 1184.
9. Id at 1162-63. BOCES distributed approximately 4000 copies of its 345-page cata-
log to teachers in the subscribing school districts. The catalog listed some 5,000 videotapes
which were available from the BOCES library. Each of plaintiffs' 19 copyrighted works
involved in this lawsuit was listed in the BOCES catalog. When a teacher from a subscrib-
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require these copies to be returned, or to be erased after classroom use.
Some schools even maintained their own library of the videotapes they
had received.
Plaintiffs had several marketing methods by which educational
services could avail themselves of plaintiffs' copyrighted works.' °
Plaintiffs had their works available in videotape and also offered licens-
ing agreements permitting a wide range of video-recording use by edu-
cational institutions. Furthermore, plaintiffs even permitted schools to
make off-the-air videotapes of the copyrighted works from the instruc-
tional television broadcasts and use them for up to seven days. No
payment was required for the limited use; however, the videotapes
were to be erased after the seven days and not stored in a library for
future use.
BOCES did not attempt to utilize any of the methods which plain-
tiffs had established to avail educational organizations of their copy-
righted works. BOCES never obtained permission from any of the
plaintiffs to make and distribute videotapes of their works, and no fees
were paid to plaintiffs by BOCES. Moreover, BOCES did not erase
any of the videotapes after seven days, but to the contrary, maintained
an extensive library of the videotapes for several years.
Plaintiffs instituted the present action against BOCES claiming
that BOCES had infringed on at least nineteen of plaintiffs' copy-
righted works." BOCES' central position was that their videotaping
practices constituted "fair use" under copyright law. 2
In determining whether fair use applied, the court relied on section
107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, which was intended to be a codifica-
tion of pre-existing law on fair use.'3 Section 107 lists four major fac-
tors to consider: (1) the purpose and character of the use including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
ing school district wanted to use a videotaped program, the teacher would merely complete
the written request form provided in each catalog and have it sent to the BOCES' videotape
service. In return, BOCES would process the request and distribute the videotapes as
requested.
10. Id at 1164-66. Although the methods for permitting use of the copyrighted works
were similar between all plaintiffs, some differences did exist between the options offered by
each individually. Id
11. Id at 1166-67. See also supra note 7.
12. Id
13. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976); see 542 F. Supp. at 1168.
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for or value of the copyrighted work.' 4 The court emphasized that
these factors merely provide guidance, and that ultimately what con-
stitued fair use would be a question of fact. 5
The first factor considered by the court was whether BOCES' vide-
otaping practices caused harm to plaintiffs' potential market for their
copyrighted works. To answer this question the court focused on con-
siderations such as whether BOCES' use tended to "diminish or
prejudice the potential sale of plaintiffs' work,"' 6 whether the use
tended to "interfere with the marketability of the copyrighted work,"' 7
or whether the "cumulative effect" of the use tended to diminish the
potential market for plaintiffs' copyrighted works.' 8
Finding that plaintiffs had been harmed by BOCES' use, the court
reasoned that "[ilt is totally unreasonable to expect educational institu-
tions to pay for licensing agreements or videotape copies marketed by
plaintiffs when these same works can be obtained and copied with the
proper equipment for nothing."' 9 Thus "the cumulative effect of
BOCES' massive videotape copying indicates that there would be no
market whatsoever for plaintiffs' videotape sales or licensing agree-
ments if off-the-air videotaping of plaintiffs' work is permitted to con-
tinue in an unregulated fashion."20
The second factor considered by the court was the purpose and
character of BOCES' use. Although recognizing that the doctrine of
fair use has been more liberally applied in nonprofit educational situa-
tions, 2' the court nonetheless found it difficult to reconcile BOCES'
large-scale copying with .the fair use doctrine and the potentially great
14. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
15. 542 F. Supp. at 1168. The House Report itself states that these factors are illustra-
tive, not definitive or determinative, but are simply to provide guidance. See generally H.R.
Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 65-67 (Sept. 3, 1976).
16. 542 F. Supp. at 1169.
17. Id
18. Id
19. Id
20. Id at 1169-70. BOCES contended that plaintiffs had a sufficient marketing alterna-
tive to recoup any losses from lost videotape sales in that they could charge increased licen-
sing fees to the broadcasters. This argument was based on the findings of the court in
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 452 (C.D. Cal.
1979). The court in the instant case rejected this argument based on the fact that plaintiffs
had no commercial sources available to them to overcome the losses which would be caused
by the unregulated copying by BOCES because the major broadcaster, WNED, was a pub-
licly funded station and the necessary increase in fees would be prohibitive for any instruc-
tional television station to pay. Forcing plaintiffs to decide on whether to allow unlimited
videotaping or abandon the educational television market could not be seen as a reasonable
marketing alternative, the court explained. Id at 1173-74.
21. Id at 1168.
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injury which threatened plaintiffs' market. Referring to the liberal in-
terpretation given fair use when there is an unauthorized use of educa-
tional work, the court stated that educational motive is not conclusive
of fair use. The nonprofit educational use should be weighed along
with other factors,22 but ultimately fair use will depend upon the rea-
sonableness of the use.2 3
The court relied on the Congressional Reports of the 1976 Copy-
right Act to determine the acceptable fair use limits in educational set-
tings. 24 Concerning multiple copying, the Senate Report suggested a
consideration of whether the number of copies "reproduced was lim-
ited to the size of a class, whether circulation of the copies was permit-
ted beyond the classroom, and whether the copies were recalled or
destroyed after temporary use.'"25 Applying these factors, the court rea-
soned that the purpose and character of BOCES' use was not contem-
plated to be considered fair use under the 1976 Act. BOCES was
clearly engaged in a general plan of copying plaintiffs' copyrighted
works. The number of copies produced and distributed was limited
only by the amount of teacher requests received by BOCES. Further-
more, there was no provision requiring return of the copies to BOCES,
and no provision required erasure after the classroom use. In one in-
stance, "a videotape copy was circulated beyond the classroom, since it
was made for a profit-making, non-educational institution. ' 26  The
court stressed that the "massive scope" of BOCES' videotape copying
and the "highly sophisticated methods" used by BOCES in producing
and distributing these copies was unreasonable "even under the most
favorable light of fair use for nonprofit educational purposes.
27
The third factor considered by the court was the nature of the
copyrighted works, which "generally refers to the type of material used
and whether distribution of the material would serve the public inter-
est."28 BOCES argued that Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States
29
22. Id. at 1174.
23. Id at 1175.
24. Id (citing S. Rep. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 63 (Nov. 20, 1975)). The Senate
Report states that the fair use doctrine would apply to a teacher who acts individually in
making one or more copies for temporary use in classroom teaching but that -(a) different
result is indicated where the copying was done by an educational institution, school system,
or larger unit or where copying was required by the school administration, either in special
instances or as part of a general plan." Id at 63.
25. 542 F. Supp. at 1175 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 63 (Nov. 20,
1975)).
26. Id.
27. Id
28. Id at 1177.
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was "strongly analogous to the educational nature of the works at issue
in this case."' 30 The court in the present case distinguished Williams,
stating that the significant reason for the fair use holding in that case
was the unavailability of older issues of medical journals from journal
publishers. In Williams, "the court expressed concern that medical and
scientific personnel would be denied access to the important knowledge
which the articles contained unless photocopying was permitted as fair
use." 3 1 In the present case, "there are no factual characteristics neces-
sary to justify fair use based upon the unavailability of the specific
copyrighted works"32 since these works were available through the nor-
mal channels.
The court also stated that the public interest in the dissemination
of information must be balanced with both the exclusive right of a
copyright holder as well as the author's motivation to create new
works.33 The court found that the Williams case was in "sharp contrast
to the [present case]" 3 4 when the balancing test is applied. In Williams,
the authors were not paid for their works and they were not interested
in financial return for their works. Furthermore, an author's motiva-
tion to create new works may even have been enhanced by the copying
of the type of works involved in Williams.35 However, in the present
case, the educational nature of plaintiffs' works contemplated a na-
tional distribution, and the financial return from successful works
would be used to produce additional works to be sold in this national
market. "[T]he motivation to create new works could well be stifled or
eliminated altogether if the extensive copying practices of BOCES were
to continue in an unregulated fashion."36
The final factor considered by the court was the substantiality of
29. 487 F.2d 1345 (1973), affdper curiam, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). In Williams, a publisher
of medical journals brought suit alleging that the practice of a government medical research
organization and its library in making photocopies of articles in medical journals constituted
copyright infringement. The Court of Claims held that the photocopying constituted fair
use for the following reasons: (1) the federal nonprofit institutions were devoted solely to
the advancement and dissemination of medical knowledge; (2) copying was normally re-
stricted and limited in its scope; (3) library photocopying had been going on ever since the
1909 Act was adopted; (4) medical science would be seriously hurt if such photocopying
were stopped; and (5) there was no showing of economic injury to the publisher. Id at 1354-
58.
30. 542 F. Supp. at 1177.
31. Williams, 487 F.2d at 1356.
32. 542 F. Supp. at 1177.
33. Id. at 1178.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id
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BOCES' use-"the quality and quantity of the copyrighted material
appropriated by the defendnts. . . Generally, the more substantial the
appropriation from the copyrighted work, the less likely fair use will be
considered a defense. . . . Within the framework of reasonableness,
. . . substantial and verbatim copying has usually precluded a finding
of fair use."37 Applying these principles to the present case, the court
noted that BOCES had conceded its off-the-air videotaping of entire
programs. However, the court found most significant the fact that
BOCES kept and used several of plaintiffs' copyrighted works for up to
ten years and "the videotape copying amounted to a virtual substitu-
tion for the purchase or license of the plaintiffs' works. Such substan-
tial use and appropriation cannot be considered fair use in relation to
the plaintiffs' copyrighted works.
38
The essence of the decision in this case is that under the fair use
doctrine, wholesale, unrestricted, or unlimited videotaping will not be
permitted, regardless of its nonprofit educational purpose. However,
the court itself noted the possibility that a limited or temporary use of
plaintiffs' televised works could be considered fair use under the 1976
Act. 39 The court did not elaborate as to what it might consider as fair
use, but merely stated that had BOCES proposed some guidelines lim-
iting use or explained how a more limited use would minimize the ef-
fects on plaintiffs' copyrighted works, the court would have considered
such proposal.4" This statement suggests that the court might permit a
more extensive use than the guidelines expressly provided for in the
legislative reports, though not so extensive as the unrestricted use in the
present case. Thus, the question remains as to what degree of use will
be permitted as fair use.
The House Report to the 1976 Copyright Act states that the prob-
lem of off-the-air taping for nonprofit educational use of copyrighted
televised programs has proved to be difficult to resolve.4 The commit-
tee responsible for establishing the fair use guidelines continued its
analysis of the problem, and in October 1981, the committee adopted
more liberal guidelines than those previously adopted in the original
37. Id at 1178-79.
38. Id
39. Id at 1188.
40. Id
41. Levine, Fair Use, Photocopying and Taping, Current Developments in Copyright
Law 1982, at 693, 747. This annual publication compiles materials presented at the annual
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary Property seminar sponsored by the Practicing
Law Institute. This edition included a copy of the new guidelines to be adopted into the
official record for determining acceptable standards of fair use in educational settings.
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House Report. 42 These guidelines were to be inserted in the record to
provide for their widest possible dissemination.
The most important part of these guidelines is that they would per-
mit off-the-air taping and retention of such tapes by nonprofit educa-
tional institutions for a period not to exceed forty-five days. After such
period, the tapes must be immediately erased or destroyed. Further,
the guidelines would limit the number of copies which could be made
from each off-air recording, and would not permit recording in antici-
pation of teacher requests.43
Whether BOCES had the above information available to it at the
time of trial, whether the proposed guidelines are what the court was
referring to when it suggested the possibility of allowing a use more
limited than BOCES', or whether a more extensive use than the pro-
posed guidelines will be permitted as the outer limit of fair use, remains
to be seen. Ultimately, the degree of fair use allowed will be a question
of fact since the guidelines provided by the legislature are simply
that-guidelines.
Although it remains unclear as to what degree of limited use will
be permitted, one thing that is clear from this decision is that wholesale
videotaping will not be permitted regardless of the "fair use" holding in
the Sony Betamax case. 44  Two important distinctions between
Betamax and the present case are that Betamax dealt with individuals
videotaping for private in-home use, whereas the present case hinged
on the massive, large-scale videotaping practices of an organization
specifically designed to provide large groups with free access to copy-
righted works. The Betamax case left unsettled the question of
whether infringement might be found where someone has used a vide-
orecorder to sell copies of copyrighted programs to other persons.
The second distinction is that in Betamax there was no legislation
on whether such in-home videotaping should or should not be permit-
ted. However, in the present case there was certainly legislation as well
as specific legislative intent which directly evidenced Congress' desire
to prevent videotaping to the extent practiced by BOCES. Thus re-
gardless of whether the Supreme Court permits individuals to continue
to videotape programs in the privacy of their own homes, the present
42. Id at 747.
43. Id at 748-49.
44. 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982); see infra note 1.
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case illustrated a videotape practice which will not be permitted given
the present state of the law.
JR. Nanko
3. Derivative Works
a. Hopalong Cassidy Movies-Exclusive Ownership in
TV Rights A warded
With greater frequency, the courts are raising the limits to which
they hold those who infringe one's copyright accountable. In William
Boyd Enterprises v. T V National Releasing Corporation,' the court
awarded to the plaintiff approximately $1,300,000 ($960,000 plus inter-
est). This was one of the highest statutory awards ever to be granted in
a copyright infringement case.2
The court reached this figure by holding that a contract granting
rights in the infringing motion pictures constituted one infringement
for each picture licensed. In exercising its discretion, the court awarded
the maximum statutory penalty of $5,000 dollars for each of 192 sepa-
rate infringements. The court further held that the active corporate of-
ficers of T.V. National Releasing Corporation were personally liable,
jointly, for the entire amount.
A brief synopsis of the facts will be helpful as a background to this
discussion. Between 1907 and 1935, Clarence E. Mulford wrote and
copyrighted twenty-six "Hopalong Cassidy" books.3 Pursuant to an
agreement with Doubleday Co. (the publisher of these books) Mulford
expressly reserved the motion picture and dramatic rights to his literary
material. In 1935 Mulford entered into an option contract with Pru-
dential Studios whereby they obtained motion picture rights to the
books; Mulford expressly reserved both stage and television rights.
Shortly thereafter, Paramount Pictures, in conjunction with Prudential
Studios (and Estes Production Inc., Prudential's successor) made and
copyrighted twenty-three Hopalong Cassidy motion pictures.4 The
1. At the date of this writing, this case had not yet been published. Because Defendant
Zouray is the president of both T.V. National and Filmvideo Releasing Corporation, and
thus they are interrelated, the names of both corporations are used interchangeably through-
out the text of this article.
2. Bruce Springsteen was awarded $2,150,000.00 in statutory damages against a bootleg
record company in 1980. This appears to be the highest award to date. C.B.S., Inc. v. Wa-
ters, Case No. CV-79-2559-MML (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 1980). See Entertainment Law Reporter,
Feb. 15, 1981, at 7.
3. Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
4. Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 446 F. Supp. 725, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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copyrights in these pictures were not renewed and expired during the
1960's. Mulford's estate renewed the copyrights in the Hopalong Cas-
sidy books and this copyright is effective today.5
On April 4, 1947, William Boyd, who played the lead role in the
Hopalong Cassidy motion pictures, obtained the exclusive television
rights to the movies and the exclusive rights to the books. Under this
license, Boyd had, for thirty years, been engaged in the exclusive distri-
bution of the Hopalong Cassidy motion pictures for television use in
the United States.
6
Prior to 1973, Boyd had access to the negatives of the twenty-three
Hopalong Cassidy motion pictures, which he had previously purchased
and stored at Deluxe Laboratories. Dr. Brown, who acquired the right
to distribute the films outside the United States for theatrical use only,
also had access to the negatives for the purpose of making additional
prints of the movies.7
In 1973, Filmvideo acquired from Brown the right to distribute the
Hopalong Cassidy motion pictures for foreign theatrical use. Immedi-
ately thereafter, they utilized this power to remove seventeen of the
negatives from the laboratory, thus depriving Boyd of access to his own
negatives.8 Starting about 1975, Filmvideo began to promote and sell
Hopalong Cassidy motion pictures for television use at prices
equivalent to about thirty per cent of the prices previously charged by
Boyd. This virtually destroyed Boyd's business since Boyd could no
longer grant exclusive rights to television stations.9
In 1975, Filmvideo commenced an action seeking a declaratory
judgment that the renewal copyrights in Mulford's books were invalid
(and thus in the public domain), and in the alternative, that the motion
pictures were in the public domain and without restriction for use on
television. Mulford's estate counterclaimed, seeking an injunction re-
straining Filmvideo from using the motion pictures and damages for
copyright infringement.' ° Because of the complexities involved, the
court ordered that the issues be adjudged at separate trials. In a series
of cases which followed the court concluded:
1) Each of the copyrights of the twenty-six Hopalong Cassidy
books had been renewed, were currently valid and plaintiffs (David H.
5. Id
6. Findings of Fact, William Boyd Enterprises v. T V National Releasing Corp., at 4.
7. Id at 3-4.
8. Id at 4.
9. Id
10. Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 426 F. Supp. 690, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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Hastings II and Peter G. Hastings, administrators of the Mulford es-
tate) were the proprietors of the copyrights in the Hopalong Cassidy
books;
2) All television rights to the Hopalong Cassidy books and the
Hopalong Cassidy movies (only where there is a substantial similarity
between the books and pictures) had been retained by and resided with
Mulford's estate;
3) The Hopalong Cassidy motion pictures constituted infringe-
ments of the Hopalong Cassidy books (these infringement were limited
to television uses);
4) Filmvideo was enjoined from using or licensing any of the
twenty-three motion pictures (including general and television use and
homeviewing via video cassettes). "
Thus, not only did the court declare that the renewal copyrights
were valid and not available for unrestricted use on television, but the
court went on to find for William Boyd Enterprises, the owner of the
television rights, and awarded damages to the company pursuant to its
counterclaim for copyright infringement.
In order to ascertain William Boyd's damages, the court initially
had to determine the number of times that T.V. National (and Film-
video) infringed plaintiff's copyright. Relying on Celestial Arts Inc., v.
Neyler Color-Lith Co., Inc. , 2 the court concluded that each contract,
pursuant to which T.V. National granted television rights in the
Hopalong Cassidy motion pictures, constituted one infringement for
each picture licensed.' 3 Though this conclusion seems sound, it is diffi-
cult to find any guidance in Celestial Arts which would support this
conclusion. Nonetheless, the court held that T.V. National had unlaw-
fully licensed the Hopalong Cassidy movies 192 times.14
Because this action arose prior to 1978 this case falls under the
ambit of the 1909 Copyright Act. Accordingly, the court relied on sec-
tion 101(b) in determining damages.' 5 Section 101(b) authorizes the
court to calculate damages based on either proven profits or damage to
the plaintiff's copyright. The court, in its discretion, may award plain-
tiffs the greatest amount of: (a) defendants' profits; (b) plaintiffs' dam-
11. Id. at 5 (citing 426 F. Supp. 690, 446 F. Supp. 725, aff'd without opinion, 594 F.2d
852, 509 F. Supp. 60, aft'd by stip. opinion).
12. 339 F. Supp. 1018, 1019 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
13. Conclusions of Law, William Boyd Enterprises v. T V National Releasing Corp., at 7
[hereinafter cited as Conclusions of Law].
14. Id
15. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b)(1909).
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ages; or (c) statutory "in lieu" damages. The statutory "in lieu"
damages provide for a minimum of $250.00 to a maximum of $5,000
per infringement. 16
In attempting to assess T.V. National's profits, William Boyd of-
fered evidence of defendants' gross receipts, showing that T.V. Na-
tional made either $235,298 or $285,423.1"
T.V. National made a poor and questionable showing of their di-
rect costs.' 8 Thus, it was William Boyd's contention that because T.V.
National failed to meet the burden placed on them, the gross receipts
represented the defendants' profits.' 9
Plaintiff estimated that William Boyd's damages from T.V. Na-
tional's use of the Hopalong Cassidy movies was $631,810.20 Despite
evidence of defendant's profits and plaintiffs damages, the court
awarded William Boyd $960,000, the statutory limit of $5,000 times the
192 infringements.
This article is based upon the court's conclusions of law and plain-
tiff's post-trial memorandum. The court made no mention of defend-
ant's profits or plaintiffs damages when considering the applicability of
"in lieu" damages. However, as was illustrated previously, the court
was presented with evidence suggesting that T.V. National gained at
least $235,298 and William Boyd lost approximately $631,810.
What is troublesome is the court's reliance on Shapiro v. Bern-
stein.2I Shapiro stands for the proposition that if neither profits nor
actual damages are ascertained, "in lieu" damages are mandatory. The
difficulty here is that evidence was presented of both T.V. National's
profits and William Boyd's damages. Perhaps the court felt that these
figures were too speculative (and hence unascertainable), and thus con-
cluded it had no choice but to award "in lieu" damages. Whatever the
reason, the award of statutory damages was proper, for although it was
16. Id.
17. Plaintiff's Post Trial Memorandum, at 21-27. The $50,125 discrepancy results from
money owed to T.V. National pursuant to various contracts in which they unlawfully li-
censed the Hopalong Cassidy movies; T.V. National, however, did not admit receiving this
money.
18. Id. at 27-31.
19. Id at 27-28. In reaching this conclusion plaintiff correctly relied on Russell v. Price,
612 F.2d 1123, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1979) and F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc.,
344 U.S. 228, 230 (1952).
20. Plaintiff's Post Trial Memorandum, at 32. Plaintiff showed that T.V. National li-
censed the films for approximately thirty percent less than what William Boyd charged for
their licenses. This figure was computed by estimating what plaintiff would have charged in
those situations in which T.V. National unlawfully licensed the movie.
21. 367 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1966).
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not mandatory, it was within the court's discretion.22
The next question becomes based on these facts, did the court
abuse its discretion? Based on a reading of the early phases of this
litigation, it is not surprising that the court chose the upper limit. One
gets the impression from reading these opinions that Filmvideo had
very little ground to stand on; it seems that every step of the way, the
court rejected their arguments. Similarly, William Boyd was deprived
of a valuable right-that of exclusive distribution. The court appears
to be reacting to what it perceived as a malicious infringement, a theft
of one's possession. The award is more easily seen, then, as punitive
and a message to would-be infringers that the stakes are high.
The court also held that the corporate officers of Filmvideo were
jointly and severably liable for the entire damage award.23 The court
reached this conclusion stating that copyright infringement lies in tort
and as such, defendants may be jointly and severally liable for dam-
ages.24 In so holding, the court correctly relied on Screen Gems-Colum-
bia Music, Inc. v. Metis & Lebow Corporation .2 However, in order to
pierce the corporate veil and reach the officers of a corporation one
must show that the corporate officers: 1) personally participated in the
manufacture or sale of the infringing articles, 2) used the corporation to
carry out willful and deliberate infringement, 3) were the dominant in-
fluences determining the policies which result in the infringement or
4) derived financial benefits as a major shareholder of the corpora-
tion. 26 In the present case plaintiff met almost every ground;27 accord-
ingly, the court was correct in finding Zouary and Corradine, two
corporate officers of Fimvideo, liable.
22. "[I]f either profits or actual damages or both are ascertained, the court, in its discre-
tion, may award statutory 'in lieu' damages" Sid & Marty Kroffi Television v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1178 (9th Cir. 1977).
23. Conclusions of Law, at 8.
24. Id. (citing Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Metlis & Lebow Corp., 453 F.2d
552, 554 (2d Cir. 1972)).
25. 453 F.2d 552, 554 (2d Cir. 1972).
26. Conclusions of Law, at 8 (citing 3 Nimmer on Copyright, § 12.04[a], pp. 12-40, 41).
27. Conclusions of Law, at 8-9.
Plaintiff has proven that Zouary [a corporate head of Filmvideo and T.V. Na-
tional] meets almost every independent ground upon which personal liability of a
corporate officer will be found. He did participate personally in manufacturing the
infringing property as he testified in connection with the 'accounting,'. . . He uti-
lized Filmvideo and the other corporations to carry out deliberate infringement, he
was the dominant influence in determining the infringing policies and, as the sole
shareholder, he stood to derive substantial benefit out of any successful activities
which infringed plaintiffs rights.
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This holding is significant as it is a strong message to corporate
officers who enjoy immunity in a variety of situations. If you willfully
infringe, you will be personally liable and as this case suggests, liability
may approach well over one million dollars. Corporate officers and
individuals alike, should think long and hard before contemplating in-
fringement; liability seems to be increasing substantially.
Jeffrey S, Sacharow
4. Copyrightability
a. Person Has No Copyright in a Real Life Social
Service Program
Although the idea-expression dichotomy has long been recognized
by the courts,' Copyright Act Section 102(b) accorded this dichotomy
express statutory recognition for the first time.
"In no case does copyright protection for an original work of au-
thorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such a work."
'2
In Rowe v. Golden West Television Productions,3 the Superior
Court of New Jersey concluded that an individual does not have a
copyright in a "real life" social service program even though he
originated as well as helped to carry out such project.4 Such conclusion
logically seems to follow the Copyright Act Section 102(b), as this pro-
gram actually did stem from an idea or concept, etc.
Sometime in January, 1976, while an inmate at Rahway State
Prison, Richard Rowe began a project at the prison known as the "Ju-
venile Awareness Program." The purpose of this program was to give
juveniles who had begun experiencing "difficulties" with the law an
opportunity to attend confrontational sessions conducted by inmates
who were themselves serving life sentences.5 The main thrust of these
1. Eg. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). InMazer, the respondents were engaged in
the manufacture and sale of electric lamps. One of the respondents created original works
of sculpture. From these sculpture models, china statuettes were made. These statuettes
were then used as bases for the fully equipped electric lamps, which the respondents sold.
The respondents submitted these statuettes, without any lamp components added, for regis-
tration under the copyright law as "works of art" or reproductions thereof. The Supreme
Court held that these statuettes were copyrightable.
2. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.S. § 102(b) (emphasis added).
3. 184 N.J. Super. 264, 445 A.2d 1165 (1982).
4. 445 A.2d at 1170.
5. Id. at 1166.
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sessions was for these juveniles to be "scared straight" by being ex-
posed to the realities of prison life.6 Each session depicted the harsh-
ness and brutality of the prisoner's incarceration in an uncensored and
most frightening manner.7
Although the sessions were spontaneous, Rowe "instructed the in-
mates as to the contents of their talks with the juveniles as well as the
method of conveying these thoughts to the juveniles."8 Each session
differed from the other, depending upon the reactions of the youths in
attendance.9 The sessions were unscripted, however sometimes re-
hearsals were held in order to insure that the "correct" message would
be delivered to the children.' °
About two years after the program's inception, upon reading about
the Juvenile Awareness Program in the Reader's Digest, Arnold Sha-
piro asked for the permission of the prison officials to film one of the
sessions. He also received the consent of some of the inmates who were
participants in the program. However, Arnold Shapiro never asked
Richard Rowe for his permission to film one of the sessions." In
March, 1979, an hour long documentary which came out of these ses-
sions was first broadcast on television. This documentary eventually
won an Academy Award for Best Feature Documentary, 1978.
Subsequently, with Shapiro as producer, CBS entered into an
agreement with Golden West Television Productions to produce a
television film which was inspired by the documentary. In November,
1980, "Scared Straight-Another Story" aired on CBS.
Richard Rowe, maintaining that he had a common law copyright
in the Juvenile Awareness Program, brought a three count complaint
against Golden West Television Productions, Columbia Broadcasting
System (CBS), Arnold Shapiro (Director of Program Development for
Golden West) and Frank Bindhammer (an employee of Golden West)
seeking compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief.'2
The first count alleged that Golden West and Arnold Shapiro had in-
fringed Rowe's common law copyright' 3 in the Rahway Prison Juve-
6. Id at 1167.
7. Id at 1166.
8. Id at 1167.
9. Id at 1166.
10. Id. at 1167.
11. Id
12. Id at 1166.
13. Until the advent of the Copyright Act of 1976, the American Law of copyright had
been the subject of a dichotomy between federal and state law. Automatically a person's
unpublished works were protected by state law, which was referred to as common law copy-
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nile Awareness Program by making a television documentary entitled
"Scared Straight." The second count alleged that Frank Bindhammer
had committed a fraud upon the public by representing himself as the
founder of the Juvenile Awareness Program. The third count alleged
that CBS had infringed Rowe's common law copyright as well as his
right of privacy by making a television movie based on the "scared
straight" theme.
The trial judge granted defendants motion for summary judg-
ment, 14 and held that Rowe did not have a common law copyright in
the program. Because this type of show contained no script, the partici-
pation of the inmates changed with each presentation as well as the
reaction by the juveniles. 15 Therefore it "was not a concrete expression
of an idea of plaintiffs that rose to the level of a tangible product de-
serving of a common law copyright."' 6 Further, as Rowe was neither
mentioned, referred to or depicted, he had no privacy claim.' 7
The New Jersey Court of Appeals was called upon to determine
whether the common law copyright protection which is afforded under
New Jersey law to "literary property" which is the result of "mental
labor" and which has been embodied in some "material form" could
serve as a protection to the Juvenile Awareness Program.'"
The court pointed out that in a common law copyright action "our
courts have never extended protection to the ideas contained within the
copyright material."' 9 So that even if the court determined that Rowe's
project should be granted the more inclusive common law copyright
protection rather than statutory protection which is more limited, none-
theless this common law right still does not extend to the mere ideas
contained within. It must be embodied in writing or some other mate-
rial form.
right. This protection lasted only from the moment of creation until publication. After pub-
lication, protection was available (if at all) only through federal law, known as statutory
copyright. However as of January 1, 1978, common law copyright ended for all works that
are the subject of federal preemption.
14. Defendant Bindmanner was never served in this action due to the unascertainability
of his whereabouts. The motion for summary judgment was thus brought on behalf of the
remaining defendants. Since Bindhammer was not a party to the summary judgment mo-
tion, the trial judge preserved the second count of the complaint. In order to perfect an
appeal, plaintiff subsequently moved for voluntary dismissal of the second count without
prejudice. That motion was granted.
15. Rowe, 445 A.2d at 1168.
16. Id
17. Id at 1177.
18. Id at 1167.
19. Id
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After defining common law copyright2" and statutory copyright2'
the court noted that regardless, Rowe's claim must fail as "New Jersey
law does not protect literary property which is not in tangible form.
22
Quoting the trial judge's finding, it appears that the court agreed that
"plaintiff's concept was never sufficiently fixed or frozen" to warrant
any type of copyright protection. 23 Although Rowe originated the idea
for this real life program, there was no one concrete expression of the
idea.24 Even every session was different from the one preceding it, de-
pending on the participants involved.
25
Further, even if afforded common law copyright protection, "New
Jersey's common law copyright action is clearly equivalent to its fed-
eral counterpart, requiring only the act of copying to trigger its protec-
tion."'26  However, Rowe's common law copyright has not been
preserved. 27 As reasoned by the court, this is because a state law action
will be preempted by the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.S. Section
101 et seq., if it meets a two-prong test.
28
Part one of this test preempts the state law action if the nature of
the work of authorship in which rights are claimed comes within the
subject matter of copyright as defined in sections 102 and 103.29 Part
two of the test preempts the state law action if the rights granted under
state law are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as defined by section 106.30 When this two-prong
test was applied to Rowe's claim for copyright infringement, the court
20. Aronson v. Baker, 43 N.J. Eq. 365, 367, 12 A. 177 (ch. 1887).
[Elvery new and innocent product of mental labor, which has been embodied in
writing, or some other material form, while it remains unpublished, is the exclusive
property of its author, entitled to the same protection which the law throws around
the possession and enjoyment of other kinds of property. Whether the product of
such labor consists in literary, dramatic or musical compositions, or designs for
works of ornament or utility, planned by the mind of an artist, they are equally
inviolable while they remain unpublished, and their owner may exercise the same
supreme dominion over them that the owner of any other species of property may
exercise over it.
21. Uneeda Doll Co. v. P & M Doll Co., 353 F.2d 788, 789 (2d Cir., 1965). In the area of
Statutory Copyright it is well settled that protection is afforded only to the tangible expres-
sion of an idea, and not to the idea itself.
22. Rowe, 445 A.2d at 1168.
23. Id
24. Id
25. Id
26. Id. at 1169. Common law copyright encompasses a much broader scope than does
statutory copyright.
27. Id. at 1170.
28. Id. at 1169.
29. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.S. §§ 102, 103.
30. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.S. § 106.
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found it "clear that that action has been preempted by federal law."',
The court concluded its reasoning by emphasizing the fact that
Rowe made no statutory copyright claim, nor could he have because of
his failure to comply with the registration requirement of 17 U.S.C.S.
section 411 (a).3 2 But of most importance, even if Rowe had a common
law copyright in the Juvenile Awareness Program, his claim was pre-
empted by federal law.33
The purpose of the Copyright Act is to encourage people to devote
themselves to intellectual and artistic creation by granting authors the
exclusive right to the fruits of their labor.34 However, the decision in
Rowe v. Golden West implies to the entertainment industry that real life
events or programs should not lend themselves to the granting of such
exclusive rights. This does not necessarily imply, however, that a real
life event cannot be considered an intellectual or artistic creation.
Although the copyright provides a financial incentive to those who
would add to the corpus of existing knowledge by creating original
works, the protection afforded the copyright holder has never extended
to history, be it documentary fact or explanatory hypothesis.35 The ra-
tionale for this doctrine is that the cause of knowledge is best served
when history is the common property of all, and each generation re-
mains free to draw upon the discoveries and insights of the past.36
A similar rationale that applies to the copyright of historical events
can be applied to the copyright of real life events, or programs such as
the Juvenile Awareness Program. The public learns from as well as
reaps other benefits from exposure to such types of programs. For in-
stance, children or adults not yet experiencing difficulties with the law,
but perhaps having a tendency to eventually do so, could possibly be
31. Rowe, 445 A.2d at 1169.
32. Id at 1170. 17 U.S.C.S. § 411 (a) provides: "[S]ubject to the provisions of subsection
(b), no action for infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registra-
tion of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title."
33. Rowe, 445 A.2d at 1170.
34. Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 581 (D.C.D.C., 1981).
35. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1980). In
Iloehling, the court of appeals held that historical interpretation, which was contained in
copyrighted work concerning the triumphant introduction, last voyage and tragic destruc-
tion of the Hindenburg, the colossal dirigible constructed in Germany during Hitler's reign,
and which contained the hypothesis that a "rigger" on the Hindenburg crew sabotaged the
Hindenburg to please his lady friend, a suspected communist dedicated to exploding the
myth of Nazi invincibility, whether or not such interpretation originated with the plaintiff
was not protected by copyright. Therefore, it could be freely used by subsequent authors
such as the individual and corporate defendants.
36. Id
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"scared straight" before actually robbing a bank, raping a teenager or
killing a child. In other words, society would be placed at a severe
disadvantage if deprived of the kinds of lessons real life events can
teach us. Many times a dramatization of these real life events is the
only way to expose society to them, and absent wholesale usurpation of
another's expression it does not appear that copyright laws can easily
stand in the way. In the case of Rowe, having no one session nor one
script, there could not even possibly be a copying verbatim or whole-
sale usurpation of another's expression.
Knowledge is expanded by granting writers and producers of doc-
umentary and educational programs a relatively free hand to build
upon the work of the inventors of the real programs of life. It would be
far from beneficial if the progressive laws of copyright were allowed to
have a stifling effect upon any individual's gaining of knowledge.
Joni Greenberg
b. "Exclusive Story" Must Be Original and
Substantiated
The mysterious death of the King of rock and roll, Elvis Presley,
still breeds controversy in the New York courts today. Recently, in
Sellers v. American Broadcast Co. (ABC)', the parties presented a con-
troversy over the legal rights to an investigative story discussing the
cause of Presley's death. The plaintiff Larry J. Sellers claimed he was
entitled to legal protection for an exclusive story he had given to the
defendants Geraldo Rivera and ABC.2 Sellers filed suit on the grounds
of breach of contract, copyright infringement and misappropriation.3
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied Sellers recovery af-
ter concluding that his story did not meet the minimum requirements
for breach of contract or misappropriation.' The court stated that an
idea or theory must be both concrete and original before it is afforded
the protection of the New York laws.5 Upon evaluation, the court held
that Sellers' agreement with ABC was vague6 and that Sellers' theory
1. Sellers v. American Broadcasting Co., 668 F.2d 1207 (1982).
2. Id. at 1208.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1210.
6. This defeated Sellers' contract claim since under New York law the fact that an
essential element is vague will make a contract unenforceable. Id
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that Presley died from an interaction of drugs, was not novel.7
In 1978, the plaintiff Sellers contacted the defendant Rivera, an
investigative reporter for the co-defendant ABC, to inform him of his
"exclusive story" regarding the death of Elvis Presley.8 Prior to disclos-
ing this information, Sellers required Rivera to sign a contract entitling
Sellers to all copyright privileges and public credit by ABC for the dis-
covery of the true cause of Elvis' death. In return, Sellers promised to
withhold such knowledge from the other networks.9 Pursuant to this
agreement, Sellers told Rivera that he thought Presley was killed by his
doctor and bodyguard in either of two ways.' Sellers first suggested
that Elvis' personal doctor and personal bodyguard had replaced Pres-
ley's cortisone, which he had been taking for the past three years, with
placebos." Hypothetically, this deprivation of cortisone caused the
collapse of Presley's cardiovascular system, resulting in his death. Al-
ternatively, Sellers postulated that Presley had been suffocated by
either his physician or bodyguard. 2 Sellers alleged that the motive be-
hind this supposed murder was to prevent Presley from seeking the col-
lection of a $1.3 million loan made by him to the doctor and the
bodyguard for the purpose of constructing a racketball center.'
3
At their meeting, Rivera told Sellers that the story could not be
used until it was verified, and suggested that he investigate further.' 4
In compliance with this suggestion Sellers traveled to Memphis to ob-
tain information.' 5 From there he called Rivera's wife and told her
that he had discovered factual support for his contentions but would
not reveal it over the telephone.' 6 This was the last contact between
Sellers and either Rivera or ABC until the filing of this suit.'7
Approximately nine months after signing the agreement with Sell-
ers, Rivera decided to do a feature story on the Presley death with pro-
ducer Charles Thompson.'8 Following a two month investigation, they
determined that Presley's death was not due to a cardiac arrhythmia as
7. Since New York law requires an idea to be novel before a plaintiff may recover for
misappropriation, plaintiffs second claim was defeated. Id
8. Id at 1208.
9. Id.
10. Id at 1209.
11. Id. at 1207.
12. Id at 1209.
13. Id.
14. Id
15. Id
16. Id
17. Id.
18. Id
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was officially reported.' 9 Instead, it was the result of an interaction of
prescribed drugs, (polypharmacy).2° Subsequently ABC broadcasted
an hour-long special disclosing the facts uncovered by Rivera.2' ABC
also ran several follow-up stories.22 At no time, however, did the net-
work suggest that Presley was murdered by either cortisone withdrawal
or suffocation.23
Sellers brought suit alleging that ABC and Rivera misappropri-
ated his "exclusive story."' 24 Additionally, Sellers claimed that the de-
fendants breached their contract and infringed upon his copyright.25
The district court dismissed Sellers' copyright claim on the ground
that Sellers never copyrighted his story.26 As to Sellers' other two
claims, the district court held that since Rivera and ABC had never
used Sellers' "exclusive story" (that Presley died of withdrawal or suf-
focation) they had neither misappropriated nor breached the written
agreement. 27 In accordance with these findings, the court entered sum-
mary judgment for the defendants.
28
Sellers appealed to the New York Court of Appeals contesting the
summary judgment of his claim for breach of contract on the ground
that a dispute of material fact existed as to the precise scope of his
"exclusive story."1 9 Sellers claimed that he told Rivera that Presley's
death might have been due to an interaction of prescribed drugs and
that his physician had been grossly negligent in prescribing these drugs
along with covering up the circumstances surrounding his death.3" The
court of appeals considered Sellers' contention, and found that even if
Sellers had presented these additional theories to Rivera, they were too
vague and uncertain to be enforceable as a matter of law.3'
According to New York law, a contract will not be enforced if an
19. Id
20. Id.
21. Id
22. Id.
23. The district court dismissed plaintiff's copyright claim after it concluded that Sellers
had not copyrighted this story. Sellers did not challenge this issue on appeal. Id at 1210,
n.6.
24. Id
25. Id
26. Id. at 1210, n.6.
27. Id. at 1209 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 1209.
29. Id.
30. Id at n.3.
31. Id at 1209-10.
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essential element of that contract is vague, indefinite or incomplete.32
The court considered the transcript of the conversation between Sellers
and Rivera and determined that Sellers had failed to provide any de-
tails for his vague allegations.33 Such missing details included Sellers'
failure to identify the name of a specific drug and the lack of clarity as
to whether Presley died from one single drug or a combination of
drugs.34
The court concluded that at most, Sellers' statements were broad
and general accusations of overdose, gross negligence and cover-up.35
Additionally, New York law states3 6 that an idea will not consti-
tute property and will not support the right to recover in contract unless
it is original. 37 The court of appeals indicated that to the extent that
Sellers' "exclusive story" had been publicly disseminated,38 it was not
novel.39 Conversely, the court did suggest that Sellers' cortisone theory
was probably sufficiently detailed and concrete enough to permit recov-
ery for a breach of contract.40 However, the district court previously
held4' that ABC did not use this theory and therefore did not breach
the agreement.42 Pursuant to the aforementioned analysis, the court
held that plaintiffs cause of action for breach of contract could not
stand.43
Finally the court addressed Sellers' claim for misappropriation.
44
The court found that in order for this claim to succeed, the following
three conditions must first be met:
1) The idea must be novel;
2) The idea must be in a concrete form; and
32. Brown & Guenther v. North Queensville Homes, Inc., 28 A.D.2d 327, 239 N.Y.S. 2d
482, 484 (1963); 668 F.2d 1207, 1210 (1982).
33. 668 F.2d 1207, 1210 (1982).
34. Id.
35. Id
36. The district court concluded that New York law controls the decision of plaintiffs
contract claim. Id at 1210, n.4.
37. Downey v. Gen. Foods Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 56, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877, 286 N.E.2d 257
(1972); 688 F.2d 1207, 1210 (1982).
38. The court found that the portion of plaintiffs "exclusive story" which stated that
Presley had died from an interaction of drugs, had previously appeared in a number of
newspapers prior to Rivera's discussion with him. 688 F.2d 1207, 1210, n.5. (1982).
39. Id at n.5.
40. Id at 1210.
41. Plaintiff did not challenge this holding on appeal. Id at n.7.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id
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3) The defendant must make use of the idea.45
As to plaintifis theory regarding Presley's death from an interaction of
drugs, the court found that it was neither "novel, unique, nor original"
in light of the abundance of local newspapers which carried this theory
prior to Sellers' discussion with Rivera.46 As to Sellers' alternative the-
ories, the court held that they were not concrete enough to pass the
second requirement.47
This case suggests that New York law requires a concrete showing
of the requisite elements for claims of misappropriation and breach of
contract before such a case will be held to survive a summary judg-
ment. In this case, the court concluded that even if Sellers did present
his theory that Presley died from an interaction of drugs to ABC it was
too "vague and uncertain as to be enforceable as a matter of law".48
This conclusion implies that the New York courts are reluctant to per-
mit recovery from a major broadcasting company when the claimant
has done nothing more than suggest an idea for a story. The policy
promoted by this decision is the protection of the entertainment indus-
try from the frivolous claims of individuals who suggest unsubstanti-
ated ideas with the expectation of compensation. Had the court found
otherwise, the entire broadcasting industry could very likely have dis-
continued its use of outside sources to prevent such inequitable results.
The possibility of such a chilling effect upon the creativeness of the
entertainment industry is sufficient reasoning alone for the court of ap-
peals decision in this case.
Kimberly Sloan
c. Notice of Termination Strictly Construed
One of the most controversial cases yet to arise under the new ter-
mination provision of the 1976 Copyright Act was recently decided by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.I In addition to defining "remake
rights," the court held in Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. 2 that
when the right to use literary characters in "all or any" of an author's
45. Galanis v. Procter and Gamble Corp., 153 F. Supp. 34 (1957); 688 F.2d 1207, 1210
(1982).
46. 688 F.2d 1207, 1210 (1982).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1210.
1. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1976).
2. 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aftgd, 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982).
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works is granted, notice of termination of that right must include a
complete list of all such works.
Beginning in 1912, Edgar Rice Burroughs wrote a highly popular
series of books about the adventures of Tarzan, the first of which was
titled Tarzan of theApes. In 1931, for twenty-thousand dollars,3 MGM
purchased the right to use the Tarzan character from ERB Inc. (ERB).
ERB was the corporation Burroughs formed to own, license and con-
trol the rights to his works.4 The Agreement granted MGM the right to
create, for film, an original story based on the character Tarzan and on
"all or any of the other characters used in all or any of the stories here-
tofore written by [Burroughs]."5 MGM was also granted the right to
create "remakes" of the film, as long as the remakes contained a sub-
stantially similar story to that in the first film.6 In 1932, MGM released
"Tarzan the Ape Man, 7 and in 1959 released a remake under the same
3. Under the Agreement, ERB, Inc. was not to receive royalties or additional receipts
for either the original film or any of the remakes.
4. Burroughs transferred the rights to ERB, Inc. in 1923. All stock in ERB, Inc. was
held by the Burroughs family.
5. Paragraph One of the Agreement gave MGM,
"[T]he right to create and write an original story, using as one of the characters
therein, the character of "TARZAN", which character was originally created by
[Burroughs], and including also, at the discretion of [MGM], all or any of the other
characters used in all or any of the stories heretofore written by [Burroughsj."
683 F.2d 610, 614 (2d Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
6. Paragraph 14 of the Agreement stated:
"[MGM] shall have the right to make a photoplay based on said story; and after
the production of the first photoplay based on said story, shall thereafter have the
right to reissue said first photoplay, and likewise to remake said first photoplay
. . . .[MGM] agrees, however, that all "remakes" of the first photoplay produced
by it hereunder. . . shall be based substantially upon the same story as that used by
[MGM] in connection with the first photoplay and that in such subsequent remakes
• ..there will be no material changes or material departures from the story used in
connection with said first photoplay."
Id at 614-15 (emphasis added). The Agreement further provided that MGM could use any
title for its film except a title already used in one of Burroughs' then extant fourteen works.
A list of these fourteen works was attached to the Agreement as an exhibit.
7. In accordance with Paragraph Three of the Agreement Burroughs reviewed a copy
of the original script to make certain that MGM did not infringe any material from his
books. After carefully reviewing the script, Burroughs noted similarities in the names of
some of the characters. As a result, MGM changed the offending names. Id at 615. Other
similarities noted by Burroughs included Tarzan's inability to understand spoken English;
Tarzan's seeing white people for the first time; and Tarzan's negative reaction to the killing
of an ape. It is unclear whether MGM made any changes in response to these findings, or
whether, if no changes were made, Burroughs either voluntarily or involuntarily dropped
the matter. In any event, the Second Circuit Court ruled in the case presently under discus-
sion that Burroughs' claimed similarities were not actually significant enough to constitute
infringement. See infra note 26. In the book, for example, Tarzan saw white people for the
first time and although he could not speak, he was able to read and write. In the movie,
however, Tarzan was unable to communicate by spoken or written language and whether
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title.
Section 304(c) of the 1976 Copyright Act, effective January 1,
1978, grants authors or their heirs the right to terminate a copyright
grant fifty-six years after the original copyright was secured.8 This
newly created right of termination enables authors or their heirs to re-
capture the additional nineteen-year renewal term afforded by the Act.'
To activate the termination right, advance written notice of termination
must be served on the grantee whose rights are being terminated no less
than two but no more than ten years before the effective termination
date.'0 The termination notice must also comply in "form, content and
manner of service" with U.S. Copyright Office regulations. " I These reg-
ulations require inclusion of the title of each work to which the notice
applies and a brief statement reasonably identifying the nature of the
grant being terminated. 2
On December 16, 1977, two weeks before the 1976 Copyright Act's
effective date, Burroughs' heirs attempted to exercise their Section 304
termination rights by serving ERB with a two year advance notice of
termination. Only thirty-five of Burroughs' forty Tarzan books were
listed on the notice, including Tarzan of the Apes. 13 Although that no-
tice was recorded in the Copyright Office in March, 1978, no notice was
served on MGM.
In January, 1980, MGM announced plans to produce a second re-
Tarzan had ever seen white people was left open to question. Also, in the book, Tarzan in
great anguish stalks and savagely kills the native responsible for the death of Tarzan's foster
mother Kala, a "huge" and "powerful" ape, whereas in the movie a safari member shoots a
small, unidentified ape and Tarzan is upset but seeks no vengeance. 683 F.2d 610, 624-26
(2d Cir. 1982).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) applies only to contractual grants of a transfer or license of copy-
right executed before January 1, 1978. The corollary to § 304(c) is 17 U.S.C. § 203 which
applies to grants of copyright executed on or after January 1, 1978.
9. 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(c) (West 1977) citing Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, H.R.
94-1476.
10. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4) and (4)(A) (1976). See infra note 31 for a discussion of the
grantee upon whom notice should be served.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4)(B) (1976).
12. The relevant portion of the Copyright Office Regulations reads as follows:
A notice of termination must include a clear identification of each of the following:
(i) The name of each grantee whose rights are being terminated, or the grantee's
successor in title ...
(ii) The title and the name of at least one author of, and the date copyright was
originally secured in, each work to which the notice of termination applies. ..
(iii) A brief statement reasonably identifying the grant to which the notice of ter-
mination applies. ..
37 C.F.R. § 201.10(b)(i)-(iii) (1977).
13. The five books omitted from the notice were among the fourteen books listed in the
exhibit to the original 1931 Agreement between ERB, Inc. and MGM.
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make of "Tarzan the Ape Man," starring Bo Derek as Jane. Bur-
roughs' heirs subsequently filed suit in federal district court to enjoin
the production of the film. The heirs claimed ERB's underlying copy-
right interest was now terminated and MGM's character license from
ERB was thus "null and void."'
' 4
District court Judge Werker denied the injunction' 5 finding that
(1) the character license originally granted did not convey a copyright
interest and was therefore not subject to the termination provision; 6
and (2) even if a copyright interest was conveyed, the notice of termina-
tion was a nullity because it was served prematurely,' 7 it was never
properly served on MGM, 8 and it omitted five titles from the notice
and thus did not "reasonably identify" the grant being terminated.'9
Both the heirs and MGM then moved for partial summary judg-
ment. The heirs amended their complaint to allege that the 1981 film
departed from the original film's story, thereby breaching the 1931
Agreement's requirement that remakes be based on "substantially the
same story" as the original film. On July 10, 1981, the district court
granted MGM summary judgment.20
This time Judge Werker held that the Tarzan character was copy-
rightable and therefore subject to the termination provisions of Section
304(c).2 ' However, the judge again ruled that the termination notice
14. After serving ERB with the termination notice, the heirs later regranted to ERB the
copyright interest in all of Burroughs' works. The notice of termination was apparently thus
a strategic attempt to extinguish only MGM's rights.
15. The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction without ruling
on the merits. 636 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1980).
16. The court did not rule on whether the Tarzan characters were copyrightable, but
rather on whether the 1931 Agreement purported to grant MGM a copyright interest. The
court held that no copyright interest was granted because the last paragraph of the 1981
Agreement provided that the term of MGM's rights to use the character would be measured
by the "full duration of the copyright and renewal copyright of MGM's film." 491 F. Supp.
1320, 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
17. The heirs' notice was served on December 12, 1977. The 1976 Copyright Act did not
take effect until January 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 102, 90 Stat. 2541, 2598 (1976).
18. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
20. 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The case was apparently decided on summary
judgment because the issues involved were viewed as being legal and not factual. However,
the contract was arguably ambiguous, in which case parol evidence should have been en-
tered. If parol evidence was entered, the issue could not have been tried by a judge on
summary judgment. K. Kress, Tarzan Meets the Second Circuit.- Reflections on Burroughs v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 7 J. of Art & The Law, 336, 341-45 (1982).
21. In an apparent shift of position, Judge Werker now seemed to believe that whether
the character Tarzan was subject to the termination provisions of § 304(c) did not depend on
whether the Agreement intended to convey a copyright interest. Rather, it depended on
whether the interest conveyed, whatever its nature, was protectible by rights arising under
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was invalid.22 As to the heirs' claim that the 1981 film breached the
1931 Agreement, the court screened both the 1981 and 1932 films and
found no breach because both films were based on substantially the
same story.2 3 This finding was made only after MGM followed the
court's suggestion to cut out portions of the film which might be in
breach of the Agreement.24
After the film's release, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling.25 The circuit court held that because the heirs had not
complied with the regulations for the content of a termination notice,
the court need not decide whether the manner of service had been
proper.26 The court also held that the 1981 film was in fact a "remake"
of the 1932 film and therefore not in breach of the 1932 Agreement.27
The circuit court found that the termination notice's incomplete
list of titles violated Copyright Office regulations that a termination no-
tice include a list of each work and "reasonably identify" the nature of
copyright. Judge Werker concluded that the interest was in fact protectible because Tarzan
was a sufficiently well-delineated character to be copyrightable. 519 F. Supp. 388, 391
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). See generally infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
22. 519 F. Supp. 388, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
23. Id. at 392-94. See also Kress, supra at note 20, who suggests that questions of simi-
larity between art works are factual in nature and should not be decided by a judge on
summary judgment.
24. 519 F. Supp. 388, 392-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). For a discussion of the appropriateness of
this action see infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
25. 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982).
26. Id at 62 1. The court also held that it need not decide whether Tarzan was a copy-
rightable character. See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
An issue decided by the court but not within the scope of this Note regarded the heirs'
alternative claim that the 1932 film infringed Burroughs' original book, Tarzan of the Apes.
The heirs argued that even if the termination notice left MGM's character license intact, the
1981 film, if a faithful remake of the 1932 film, infringed the book, and if not a faithful
remake of the 1932 film, breached the 1931 Agreement.
To determine if the 1932 film infringed the book Tarzan of the Apes, the court engaged
in an extensive and detailed comparison of the book and the film. The similarities which
Burroughs had originally noted were found not to be significant enough to constitute in-
fringement. (See supra note 7 for a discussion of these purported similarities.) As to other
possible similarities, the court concluded that "as a matter of law" no infringement had
occurred since "no reasonable jury could find the two works substantially similar beyond the
level of generalized ideas or themes." 683 F.2d 610, 624 (2d Cir. 1982). The court discussed
almost fifteen similarities which it viewed as too general and abstract to be protected by
copyright. For example, although both works were set in sub-Sahara Africa, one was set
mostly on an ocean beach while the other was set far inland on a river. Another example
was that both works portrayed Jane as having two suitors but in the movie, unlike the book,
Jane chose Tarzan, and even if she had not, said the court, the "story of a woman choosing
between two suitors is at least as old as literature." Id at 627.
27. Id at 628-31.
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the grant being terminated.28 The notice of termination was thus held
ineffective to terminate MGM's interest in the five works omitted from
the notice.2 9 The court reasoned that since MGM's original grant en-
compassed the right to use the Tarzan character as it appeared in "any"
of Burroughs' works, MGM retained its right to use the Tarzan charac-
ter because the character appeared in the five works not terminated.3 °
In a concurring opinion, Judge Newman disagreed that the heirs'
omission of the five titles rendered MGM's interest in the Tarzan char-
acter intact. However, he still viewed the notice as ineffective because
it was never served on MGM.3 In analyzing the effect of the heirs'
omission of five titles, Judge Newman noted that a copyright protects
only original works of authorship.32 According to Judge Newman, a
character exploited in a series of works is an original work of author-
ship only with respect to the first work and not thereafter.33 Because
the Tarzan character was not an "original work of authorship" in the
five works omitted from the notice, Judge Newman concluded that
ERB had lost the right to license, and thus to convey to MGM, the use
of the Tarzan character independent of the five stories in which ERB
retained an interest.34
The majority did not dispute that the Tarzan character, if copy-
rightable at all, was copyrightable only in its first appearance. But
according to the majority, a grant of rights to the use of a work implic-
itly licenses the use of all material from that work regardless of whether
that material is protected by an earlier copyright.3 6 Thus, claimed the
majority, ERB's rights in the "Surviving Five" titles included the im-
28. Id at 622.
29. Id
30. Id
31. The Copyright Act requires that a notice of termination be served on the "grantee or
the grantee's successor in title." 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4) (1976). Judge Newman stated that it
was not technically necessary to serve MGM in their capacity as successor in title. 683 F.2d
610, 633-35 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J., dissenting). Technicalities notwithstanding, how-
ever, Judge Newman believed that MGM should still have been served. The existence of
MGM's right was well known to the heirs. Further, ERB was a corporation owned by the
Burroughs family. Because of these circumstances, by serving ERB the heirs were essen-
tially "serving themselves." Id at 635 (Newman, J., dissenting). Therefore, claimed Judge
Newman, ERB could not fairly be considered the "realistic grantee" upon whom notice
should be served. Id (Newman, J., dissenting).
32. Id at 631 (Newman, J., dissenting).
33. Id at 632 (Newman, J., dissenting).
34. Id (Newman, J., dissenting).
35. The court left open the question of whether the Tarzan character was even copy-
rightable. For a fuller discussion of the issue see infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
36. Id at 622.
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plicit authority to license to MGM the use of the Tarzan character de-
picted therein.37
The majority's result appears correct, although perhaps not for the
reasons stated. Undoubtedly, as Judge Newman noted in his concur-
rence, if characters are copyrightable only in their original appearance,
holders of copyrights in later works in a series would not have the right
to exploit the characters independent of the stories. 38 This principal of
law would undercut the majority's suggestion that as a matter of copy-
right, MGM could exploit the Tarzan character merely by virtue of
MGM's remaining interest in five Tarzan works.39
It appears that the reason MGM retained the right to exploit the
Tarzan character was because MGM still owned the right under con-
tract law. A license to use a literary work exists as a contract right,
independent of the underlying copyright interest from which the right
originated.' Therefore, extinguishing an underlying copyright interest
in a character will not automatically terminate existing contractual
rights to use the character. From this it follows that the only way to
have extinguished MGM's right to use the characters from "any and
all" Tarzan books would have been to terminate MGM's interest in
each and every one of the forty books. As the majority thus appropri-
ately held, the termination notice's omission of five works did not ex-
tinguish MGM's interest in the Tarzan character as it appeared in forty
books.4 It only extinguished MGM's interest in the Tarzan character
as it appeared in thirty-five books.
Unquestionably then, the heirs did not technically comply with the
Copyright Office regulations. It should be noted, however, that accord-
ing to these regulations, "[hlarmless errors . . . that do not materially
affect the adequacy of the information required to serve the purpose of
[the termination provision] . ..shall not render the notice invalid."42
The omission of the five titles was arguably the type of "harmless er-
ror" contemplated by the Copyright Office. The notice of termination
was extensive in scope, and there would seem to be no reason for the
37. Id Under the majority's view, ERB would still have had the implicit authority to
grant MGM a license for the use of the character Tarzan even if in 1923 Burroughs had only
granted ERB the rights to the "Surviving Five" titles. Id
38. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 37.
40. By implication, the majority in fact alluded to this concept when distinguishing
rights to the use of a work from the fact that a work may be protected by an earlier copy-
right. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
42. 37 C.F.R. § 201.10(e)(l) (1977).
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heirs to have purposefully excluded the five titles. A party upon whom
the notice was served would probably have considered the omissions an
oversight. The court itself stated that the omission was "undoubtedly
inadvertant. ' '43 The court's insistence that the heirs' omission neverthe-
less invalidated the notice perhaps suggests that only the most trivial of
errors in a notice of termination will be tolerated.
In addition to holding the termination notice invalid, the circuit
court held that the 1981 film did not breach the 1931 Agreement be-
cause the film contained a story substantially similar to the 1932 film
and thus constituted a "remake."'  The 1931 Agreement stated that a
remake of the original film45 could not materially depart from the orig-
inal "story. '46 According to the court, the stories in both films were the
same because they were comprised of the same major incidents.47 The
1981 film's differences in characterization, setting and effect, although
substantial, were considered dismissable as they were either subsumed
under the right to "update, modernize and adapt"4 8 or were differences
which had no impact on the "story.
' 4 9
By this broad interpretation of "story," the court was able to gloss
over major and disturbing differences between the 1932 and the 1981
films. In the earlier film, Tarzan, although ignorant of civilized ways,
43. 683 F.2d 610, 622 (2d Cir. 1982).
44. Id at 628-31.
45. Because the court did not consider whether the meaning of the remake clause was
ambiguous, it did not look to parol evidence or attempt to analyze the meaning of the con-
tract as a whole. The court's failure to consider ambiguity in the contract terms may have
been inappropriate. See Kress, supra note 20, at 341-43.
46. The court ruled that to qualify as a "remake", the contract only required there be
similarities with regard to the story itself. 683 F.2d 610, 628 (2d Cir. 1982). A "story", said
the court, was definable in its "broadest sense" as "any account ... of actions in a time
sequence; any narrative of events in a sequential arrangement..." Id (quoting C. Hugh
Holman, A Handbook to Literature 428 [4th ed. 1980]). But see, Kress, supra note 20, at 347
(a story is a "comprehensive literary entity").
47. 683 F.2d 610, 628-31 (2d Cir. 1982). As with the issue of whether the 1982 film
infringed the original Tarzan book, (supra, note 26) the court engaged in an extensive com-
parison of the two stories.
48. 683 F.2d 610, 628 (2d Cir. 1982). The court cited the 1959 case of Edgar Rice Bur-
roughs, Inc. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 205 Cal.App.2d 441, 23 Cal.Rptr. 14 (1962). In
the 1959 case the heirs unsuccessfully sued MGM for breach of contract over MGM's 1959
remake of "Tarzan the Ape Man." As with the case presently under discussion, the heirs
claimed that MGM's remake materially departed from the 1932 film. The California Court
of Appeals found that " 'the right to update, modernize and adapt the story to life in today's
generation' was inherent in the remake right." Id at 447, 18 [quoted in Burroughs v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. 683 F.2d 610, 628 (2d Cir. 1982)].
49. Id at 628-3 1. For example, the court found that the 1981 film's nudity, "[i]f any-
thing. . . contribute[d] to the story, [by] adding some degree of modern-day realism to an
otherwise highly improbable scene." Id at 630.
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had the ability to read and write, and was a sensitive, intelligent and
heroic man whom Jane came to love.5° The "civilized" characters in
the story were generally portrayed as far less human than Tarzan.5'
Although the predominant theme of the earlier film was undoubtedly,
to the uncritical eye, a love story, the true literary theme was to depict
man in his pure state as having an innate humanity which civilization
corrupts.5 2 In the 1981 film, Tarzan was essentially a sexual beast, illit-
erate and without intellect.53 The theme of the second film was a sex-
ual fantasy of unrestrained erotica in the jungle.
54
While the court's conclusion that the stories were substantially
similar is certainly supportable under an extremely broad definition of
"story," the 1981 film indisputably distorts Burroughs' literary concep-
tualization of Tarzan and Jane. Some countries protect an author's
right to prevent others from making deforming changes in his works
under the principle of "droit moral" or, moral rights.55 Droit moral is
not recognized by the Copyright Act.5 6 However, a few cases of which
the court could not have been unaware support recognition of droit
moral.57 The court's allowance of MGM's flagrant distortion of the
50. See Kress, supra note 20, at 347.
51. Id at 348.
52. Id
53. Id at 347.
54. Id at 349.
55. 2 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 8.21[A], at 8-247 (1983).
56. Id at § 8.211B], at 8-248.
57. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
See also Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F.Supp. 533, 207 U.S.P.Q. 1005
(W.D. Tex. 1980) citing Gilliam with approval. Although some prior cases had made state-
ments that an author has a right to prevent deforming changes in his work, Gil/iam was the
first case to officially recognize the moral rights doctrine. 2 M. Nimmer, supra note 55, at
§ 8.211C], at 8-249. In the Gilliam case, Monty Python wrote a series of television programs
for broadcast by British Broadcasting Corporation. American Broadcasting Corporation
(ABC) attempted to broadcast edited versions of the programs. The court upheld an au-
thor's moral right to prevent deforming changes in his work, and stated,
"seek[ing] redress for deformation of an artist's work, finds its roots in the conti-
nental concept of droit moral...
American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or
provide a cause of action for their violation . . . . Thus courts have long granted
relief for misrepresentation of an artist's work by relying on theories outside the
statutory law of copyright, such as contract law, Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d
Cir. 1952) (substantial cutting of original work constitutes misrepresentation), or
the tort of unfair competition, Prouty v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 26 F.Supp. 265
(D.Mass. 1939) . . . .Although such decisions are clothed in terms of proprietary
right in one's creation, they also properly vindicate the author's personal right to
prevent the presentation of his work to the public in a distorted form ...
538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976). To grant relief to plaintiffs, the Gilliam court invoked the
1946 Lanham Act. This Act prohibits using false descriptions or false representations which
may injure a person's business or personal reputation. The court found that ABC's unau-
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Tarzan character can only reflect a judicial stance that notwithstanding
these cases, droit moral is not a recognizable right under American
copyright law.
A number of interesting issues raised but not decided in the court's
opinion regarded the copyrightability of characters and the appropri-
ateness of the district court's participation in the film editing process.
After Burroughs' heirs filed their appeal, MGM fied a cross-ap-
peal asking the circuit court to hold that the character Tarzan was in-
sufficiently delineated in Burroughs' books to be copyrightable. The
circuit court did not rule on this issue because the issue was moot: if the
character Tarzan was not copyrightable, MGM's interest was not a
copyright interest subject to termination under Section 304; if the char-
acter Tarzan was copyrightable, MGM's rights would still remain in-
tact because the notice of termination was insufficient to extinguish
MGM's interest. 8
Tarzan's copyrightability would become relevant if MGM should
desire to produce a third remake of "Tarzan the Ape Man" before
1987, when the first Tarzan book and thus the Tarzan character enters
the public domain.59 Because the heirs served a second termination
notice which MGM conceded was in full compliance with the regula-
tions, MGM has no right to use the character Tarzan before 1987 un-
less it can be shown that the character is not a copyright interest subject
to termination.6 °
Whether the Second Circuit would have held Tarzan copyright-
able is open to question. Most courts agree that "distinctively deline-
ated" characters are copyrightable, but disagree as to what constitutes
"distinctive delineation" of literary characters. 6' Under the Ninth Cir-
cuit's restrictive view, the character must "constitute the story being
told."62 In 1954 the Ninth Circuit held that this standard was not met
by Dashiell Hammett's detective character Sam Spade in the famous
film "The Maltese Falcon.
'63
thorized changes in the television program "mutilated" the author's work, "impair[ing] the
integrity of [the author's work] and represent[ing] to the public as the product of [the author]
what was actually a mere caricature of [the author's] talents." Id at 25. The court thus held
that plaintiff's claim created a valid cause of action under the Lanham Act.
58. 683 F.2d 610, 621 n.ll (2d Cir. 1982).
59. Id
60. Id
61. See generally 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 55, at § 2.12, at 2-169-174.3.
62. Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir.
1954). ("[I]f the character is only a chessman in the game of telling the story he is not within
the area of the protection afforded by the copyright." Id)
63. Id
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Since 1954, only courts lower than the circuit court level have di-
rectly addressed the copyrightability of literary characters (as distinct
from cartoon-like or computer-style characters).64 Many of these
courts have purported to adopt the Sam Spade test.65 But the only
characters since 1954 found not to be "distinctively delineated" were
general character types far more ordinary and far less publicly known
than Tarzan or even Sam Spade.66 If the Tarzan character could not be
distinguished from characters too general in "type" to meet the "suffi-
ciently delineated" test, it would seem no literary character could meet
the test.67 If this were the case, no literary character would be copy-
rightable, a result even the Ninth Circuit could hardly have intended.
Another interesting issue raised by the case was the propriety of
the district court's "suggestion" that MGM cut out portions of the 1981
film to assure compliance with the 1931 Agreement. The circuit court
noted that "the district court normally should not assume the role of
film editor. ' 68 Though originally objected to by all parties, the issue
was not raised on appeal and therefore not ruled on by the court.69
64. Cartoon-like and computer-style characters are universally recognized as being dis-
tinctively delineated. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods., v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.
1978); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th
Cir. 1977); Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607
(7th Cir. 1982); Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications, Inc. 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.
1940).
65. See infra note 66.
66. See, e.g., Fuld v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 390 F.Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (a group
of gangsters); Tralins v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 160 F.Supp. 511 (D.C. Md. 1958)
(serviceman trying to "fake" his way through the "psycho" ward) (citing with approval Co-
lumbia Pictures Corp. v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 137 F.Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Columbia
Pictures supra (numerous general character types in a burlesque version of "From Here to
Eternity" titled "From Here to Obscurity") (citing with approval Warner supra note 62);
Miller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. 502 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (an ex-convict
who studied law and passed the bar while in prison). Compare Filmvideo Releasing Corp.
v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Werker., J., holding that the western-style,
quick-tempered but kind and sentimental character "Hopalong Cassidy" is sufficiently de-
lineated, developed and well-known to the public to be copyrightable) aff'don other grounds,
668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981) and Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Werker, J. holding that the Tarzan character is sufficiently well-delineated
to be copyrightable) (quotedinfra note 67) aft'don other grounds 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982).
67. Judge Werker characterized Tarzan as follows: "Tarzan is the ape-man. He is an
individual closely in tune with his jungle environment, able to communicate with animals
yet able to experience human emotions. He is athletic, innocent, youthful, gentle and strong.
He is Tarzan." 519 F.Supp. 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also generaly Edgar Rice Bur-
roughs, Inc. v. Mann Theaters, 195 U.S.P.Q. 159 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (Tarzan characters are
distinctively delineated and were infringed by the unauthorized production and distribution
of the film "Tarz and Jane and Boy and Cheeta").
68. 683 F.2d 610, 620 n.9 (2d Cir. 1982).
69. Id
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One argument against allowing a judge to "assume the role of film
editor" is that it may create a dangerous precedent of censorship and
intrusion into the artistic process.7" Whether Judge Werker's actions
can fairly be characterized as censoring and intrusive is questionable.
The changes were not orders but suggestions which MGM could argua-
bly have rejected.
However, a serious issue raised by Judge Werker's actions is
whether judicially prompted alterations in a work should be permitted
when the work being changed forms the very basis of a litigation. Does
a judge have the power to arbitrarily change that basis, thereby al-
lowing a defendant to avoid an unfavorable ruling? Is it not the re-
sponsibility of a judge to decide cases on their merits as presented, and
then either grant or deny the requested legal or equitable remedy? It
seems fundamentally unfair for a party to spend considerable time and
money litigating a case, only to have those merits judicially orchestrat-
ed out of the case.
The Second Circuit's ruling that the heirs' notice of termination
failed may reflect an unreasonably strict interpretation of termination
notice regulations. It is evident, however, that even had the content of
the termination notice been ruled sufficient, the notice would probably
have still failed, either for untimely service or for service on the wrong
party. It is less clear that MGM's 1981 film was in compliance with the
1932 Agreement.
The court's ruling may suggest a judicial attitude of resistance, or
at the very least hesitance, to enforce termination rights unless abso-
lutely necessary. The purpose of the 1976 Copyright Act termination
provision was to offer a second chance for authors and their heirs to
market previously sold copyright interests. 7' This greater economic
protection was felt justified because works of authorship, unlike other
forms of property, are often incapable of accurate economic evaluation
until after a work has been exploited.72 Under traditional American
contract law, a party who contracts to sell property is not offered a
"second chance" to market that property.73 Rather, the seller is bound
to his bargain, even if his estimation of the property's value later proves
to be incorrect. For courts accustomed to viewing freely negotiated
70. See generaly Kress, supra note 20, at 352-53.
71. 2 M. Nimmer, supra note 55, at § 9.02, at 9-23.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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contracts as binding instruments, the newly created right to terminate a
contractual grant of copyright may be a bitter pill to swallow.
Shelley Berger
5. Satellite Retransmission
a. Program Retransmission Via Satellite
Recent developments in the cable television (CATV) industry pose
a perplexing question to the legal community-how do the copyright
laws affect the transmission of television shows by licensed communi-
cation carriers? Two federal circuit courts of appeal addressed varia-
tions of this issue at length.
In Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc. ,' the Second
Circuit, construing the language of 17 U.S.C.A. Section 111 (a)(3),2
held that the licensed communication common carrier, EMI, was enti-
tled to the passive carrier exemption as Eastern Microwave (EMI) had
not exerted control over the content and selection of the primary trans-
mission or the recipients of EMI's secondary transmission.3 EMI
merely provided wires, cables or other communications channels for
the use of others.4
In this case, the satellite resale carrier, EMI, brought a declaratory
judgment action against Doubleday Sports, Inc., owner of the New
York Mets. EMI sought a ruling that its retransmission of the New
York Mets games without the consent of Doubleday did not infringe
upon Doubleday's copyright of Mets broadcasts.5 At that time, EMI's
services included the retransmission of the television signals of broad-
cast stations to markets outside the service areas of the broadcast sta-
tions. EMI converted these broadcast signals into microwave signals
via satellite or a string of line-of sight terrestrial microwave repeater
stations. These microwave signals were delivered to the headends of
the customers of its transmitting services, usually the CATV systems,
1. 691 F.2d 125 (2nd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1232 (1983).
2. 17 U.S.C.A. § IIl(a)(3) states in part:
(a) CERTAIN SECONDARY TRANSMISSION EXEMPTED.-The secon-
dary transmission of a primary transmission embodying a performance or display
of a work is not an infringement of copyright if:
(3) The secondary transmission is made by any carrier who has no direct or indi-
rect control over the content or selection of the primary transmission or over the
particular recipients of the secondary transmission, and whose activities with re-
spect to the secondary transmission consist solely of providing wires, cables, and
other communication channels for the use of others.
3. 691 F.2d at 130-31.
4. Id at 131.
5. Id at 126-27.
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who convert the microwave signals to television signals for distribution
to, and viewing by, the CATV subscribers.6
EMI supplied its customers, the CATV stations, with a choice of
various television signals. One of these signals, WOR-TV, carried the
New York Mets baseball games which EMI retransmitted, without al-
teration to approximately six hundred CATV systems across the coun-
try.7 Prior to selecting WOR-TV for satellite retransmission, EMI had
conducted a marketing survey among cable television systems to deter-
mine the marketability of the WOR signal. Based on the demand for
WOR-TV, demonstrated by EMI's survey, EMI selected the WOR
signal.'
The district court held that the retransmission did not fall within
the common carrier exemption of the Act.9 The district court first
noted that EMI had control over the selection of the primary transmis-
sion. The court opined:
It was EMI which selected WOR's signal to be retransmitted
to the public. The decision to retransmit WOR by satellite
relay was made after EMI had conducted a survey to deter-
mine the marketability of WOR signal. Originally, EMI had
planned to transmit two television signals via satellite, WOR
and WSBK, broadcast from Boston. EMI was only able to
contract for one channel over the satellite, therefore, it had to
select between the two already selected for the one signal to
be retransmitted. Based on the demand for WOR-TV
demonstrated by EMI's survey, EMI selected the WOR sig-
nal. It is clear that EMI selected the primary transmission.' °
The district court noted that EMI also exercised control over the recipi-
ents of the secondary transmission. The district court posited:
It is EMI which chooses the customers with which it will deal
... . [and] the recipients of the secondary transmission car-
ried by EMI are the CATV systems, not their subscribing
members. "
The district court finally noted that EMI did not limit its activities to
6. Id at 126.
7. 534 F. Supp. 533, 535 (N.D.N.Y. 1982). For example, two hotels and a casino in Las
Vegas were recipients of these signals. 691 F.2d at 126, n. 1.
8. 534 F. Supp. at 537.
9. Id at 538. The district court also held that EMI's service constituted a "public per-
formance" of the audiovisual works retransmitted. This issue was, however, moot on ap-
peal. See, 691 F.2d at 127 n.5.
10. 534 F. Supp. at 537.
11. Id at 538.
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providing wires, cables, or other communication channels for the use of
others. The district court remarked:
It is true that EMI makes its service available by providing
these avenues of communication. It does not, however, pro-
vide them solely for the use of others. Rather, they are used
to make available the product it is marketing, WOR-TV
... . In its brief, EMI likens itself to carriers such as AT&T,
which do provide wires, etc., for the use of others ....
There is, however, at least one major difference between
AT&T and EMI. AT&T markets its service; EMI markets a
product. The advertisement (by EMI) demonstrates that EMI
is doing more than providing cables, etc., for the use of others.
It is selling a product, the signals of WOR-TV.'
2
Based on these reasons, the district court held that EMI was not enti-
tled to the passive carrier exemption enumerated under 17 U.S.C.A.
Section 111 (a)(3).
The Second Circuit reversed the holding and rejected the reasons
given by the district court. The Second Circuit accepted EMI's argu-
ment that the satellite resale carrier did not exercise control over the
selection of the primary transmission. In rejecting the district court's
position that EMI chose between WSBK and WOR-TV, the Second
Circuit noted that there are technical restrictions that force EMI to
make this determination on which station's signals it chooses to trans-
mit. The Second Circuit concluded that the initial one-time determina-
tion to retransmit a particular station did not evidence the control over
the content and selection of the primary transmission intended to be
precluded under Section 111 (a)(3):
When the communication service is technologically limited to
one sender, however, a type of "selection" is impelled. That
type of forced selection cannot be the type precluded by the
statute. . . for to so hold would be to require that exemption
be denied to any carrier that did not retransmit every televi-
sion broadcast of every television station in the country. 3
The Second Circuit next ruled that EMI did not exert direct or
indirect control over the particular recipients of the transmission. Be-
cause EMI had been licensed by the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) as a common carrier,' 4 the Second Circuit gave great
12. 1d.
13. 691 F.2d at 130.
14. In re Application of Eastern Microwave Inc., 70 F.C.C. 2d 2195, 2201-03 (1979).
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deference to the judgment of the licensing procedure of this administra-
tive agency. In rejecting the district court's analysis, the Second Circuit
posited:
EMI is subject to FCC regulation and has been granted au-
thority under 47 U.S.C. Section 214 to operate as a common
carrier. . . . That EMI operates under FCC-approved tariffs
which a particular CATV system might not be able to meet
does not mean that EMI exercises control over its recipient
CATV customers. The record indicates that no reasonable re-
quest for its services was ever refused by EMI. 5
The Second Circuit finally held that EMI merely provided wires,
cables or other communication channels for the use of others. Earlier,
the district court had adopted Doubleday's position that EMI was, in
effect, selling the Mets games. The district court noted that the resale
carrier was advertising, inter alia, WOR-TV's broadcasting of the Mets
games. The appellate court, however, saw the facts in a different light.
The Second Circuit was quick to point out that EMI is merely selling
its transmission services. Furthermore, EMI transmitted nothing of its
own creation. The Second Circuit remarked:
[EMI] transmits only to the headends of its customers who
employ its services in lieu of obtaining their own wires,
cables, etc . . . . That it transmits particular signals in re-
sponse to contracts with its customers specifying those signals,
and that it announces to potential customers its ability to
transmit those signals, are actions not in conflict with an ex-
empt carrier status.'
6
The appellate court took note of the legislative pronouncements
concerning the district court's ruling. Although these later pronounce-
ments were not viewed as congressional intent, the justices sided with
Congressional judgment regarding the application of Section III (a)(3)
on resale carriers. The Congressional report in part stated:
In the course of Committee deliberations on this legislation, a
decision was issued in a case involving the interpretation of
Section 111 (a)(3), Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday
Sports, Inc., 534 F. supp. 533 (N.D. N.Y. 1982), which leaves
the cable industry in a state of turmoil. The holding of that
case was that the carrier, Eastern Microwave, Inc., failed to
qualify for the Section 111 (a)(3) exemption. In the Commit-
15. 691 F.2d at 131.
16. Id.
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tee's view, the decision incorrectly construed the carrier ex-
emption. If the decision is applied to other parties, all satellite
resale carriers could be liable for copyright infringement
when they deliver distant signals to cable systems ....
There has never been any doubt by this Committee that carri-
ers are exempt from copyright liability when retransmitting
television signals to cable systems via terrestrial microwave or
satellite facilities. '
In the interest of uniformity with legislative intent, the Second Cir-
cuit held that EMI's retransmission of WOR-TV's signals did not vio-
late Doubleday's interest in the Mets games.'
8
Thompson Ong
b. Vertical Blanking Interval on Retransmission
In WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc. , 9 the
Seventh Circuit held that where the satellite carrier deletes a copy-
righted portion of the retransmitted broadcast signals, the vertical
blanking interval,20 the carrier is not entitled to the passive carrier ex-
emption under 17 U.S.C.A. Section 111 (a)(3).
In WGN, an independent broadcasting station in Chicago, WGN-
TV, brought an action to enjoin the satellite resale carrier, United
Video (UVI), from retransmitting WGN's copyrighted television pro-
gramming, the nine o'clock news. UVI was stripping the vertical
blanking interval of teletext information generated by WGN and sub-
stituting a Dow Jones news service.2' Specifically, WGN contended
that UVI's deletion of the teletext information in WGN's vertical
blanking interval and substitution of a Dow Jones news service is evi-
17. H.R. Rep. No. 559, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 4 (1982), cited in 691 F.2d at 129-31, n.ll.
18. 691 F.2d at 133.
19. 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982).
20. 1d. at 623-24. The Seventh Circuit explained:
Each picture that flashes on a television screen is generated by an electron gun
behind the screen that moves rapidly back and forth from the top to the bottom of
the screen. When the gun reaches the bottom it shuts off and returns to the top of
the screen to begin again. The interval in which the gun is shut off-an interval too
brief for the viewer to be aware of-is the vertical blanking interval. It has tradi-
tionally been used to carry certain signals that "tell" the television set how to set up
the next picture on the screen, but the time required for this function is only a
fraction of the interval, and the rest is available, and increasingly is used, to carry
other information. Subtitles for deaf people are the most common use. . . But all
sorts of other information can be encoded the unused portion of the vertical blank-
ing interval-news bulletin, weather reports, ballgame scores, station announce-
ments, the stock ticker, etc.
21. 523 F. Supp. 403, 404 (N.D. Ill. 1981), reversed, 693 F.2d 622.
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dence of copyright infringement.22 As the WGN experts testified:
To an engineer [the vertical blanking interval] is all one part
of the same signal. One cannot exist without the other. It is
an integral part of the signal.
2 3
UVI, on the other hand, urged that WGN's vertical blanking interval
signals are not essential to UVI's retransmission of the TV signals to its
customers. UVI, as a microwave and satellite common carrier, did not
directly transmit to the ultimate television viewers. Further, vertical
blanking was not integral to a television program's transmission. Fi-
nally, it was more efficient and economical for UVI to strip the vertical
blanking interval from WGN's TV signals before transmitting the sig-
nal to the satellite.2 4 The lower court had held 25 inter alia that UVI's
activities in stripping WGN's vertical blanking interval did not consti-
tute control over or selection of WGN's news program.26
The district court reasoned that activity which changes the content
of a copyrighted work clearly has a copyright significance. However,
the mere alteration of the signal which does not affect the retransmis-
sion of the broadcaster's copyrighted work has no copyright signifi-
cance. The district court adopted UVI's position that the copyright
laws are designed to protect intellectual property, not methods of com-
munication. 27 The court further opined that the news program, plus its
teletext transmission, did not constitute one copyrighted work. The
district court adopted the test which mandated that in order for the
teletext transmission to be part of the nine o'clock news program, it
must be part of the same "series of related images" which made up
WGN's regular news program. 28 Based on these two reasons, the dis-
22. Id. at 408.
23. Id. at 406.
24. Id.
25. The district court also held that:
(a) television company's news program, plus teletext transmission of a program,
did not constitute one copyrighted "audio-visual work" under copyright law;
(b) carrier was not guilty of copyright infringement in their rebroadcast of news
program on the basis that its secondary transmissions were made to the public;
and,
(c) counts of complaint alleging that carrier's stripping of its teletext program
constituted tortious interference with company's contract or expectancy rights with
one of its subsidiaries failed to state a cause of action.
The Seventh Circuit, however, incorporated or summarily dismissed these issues and chose
to only discuss the effects of the stripping of vertical blanking intervals. 691 F.2d at 623.
26. 523 F. Supp. at 413.
27. Id. at 411.
28. Id at 412. The district court was persuaded by I Nimmer on Copyright, § 209[A]
(1980) which lists three required elements for an audiovisual work: It must consist of
(1) "images"; (2) such images must be sequential, that is, they must be "related" and
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trict court concluded that UVI was entitled to the benefits of the pas-
sive carrier exemption of Section II1 (a)(3) because the vertical
blanking interval was not part of the copyrighted work and was not of
copyright significance. Hence, stripping the vertical blanking interval
did not constitute control over, or selection of, WGN's nine o'clock
news program.
The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected the district court's position.
The appellate court acknowledged the exemptions enumerated under
Section I 11 (a)(3). 29 The Seventh Circuit then noted that UVI did not
fall within the passive carrier exemption of Section 11 1 (a)(3) because it
had altered WGN's programming.30 The circuit court refuted the dis-
trict court's rationale through a series of comparisons with other forms
of communication methods:
[T]hough WGN chooses not to use the vertical blanking inter-
val to overlap additional images on those in the nine o'clock
news, it is clear that United Video may not use it for that
purpose without WGN's permission, any more than if the
publisher of a book leaves the inside covers blank the book
seller (or book wholesaler, to make the analogy more precise)
may inscribe the Lord's Prayer on them in order to broaden
the book's appeal.3
The appellate court was quick to point out that each frame in a motion
picture is covered by the copyright on the motion picture even though
the frames are not intended to be viewed simultaneously. The circuit
court adhered only to the "related image" test and rejected that such
images must be viewed sequentially to be copyrightable.32 Citing ex-
amples given in Nimmer's treatise, the court noted that a television
frame is no different than entries in dictionaries, fold-out maps on his-
tory books or pages in a book.33 Thus, the appellate court concluded
presented in a "series"; (3) such images must be capable of being shown by a machine or
device.
29. 693 F.2d at 624.
30. Id at 628. The Seventh Circuit did admit that "[t]he copyright is in the program-
ming rather than in the method which it was transmitted." In doing so, WGN did not own
the vertical blanking interval that it has allegedly copyrighted.
31. Id. at 626. See, National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533,
543-44 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
32. Id. at 626.
33. Id. at 626-27. See, also, I Nimmer, supra, at § 2.08 [A][2]. The court remarked:
The pages of books are also usually read sequentially, but this has never been
thought a condition of copyright protection. A dictionary can be copyrighted al-
though its pages, and the entries on each page, are not intended to be read in
sequence . . . . a history book includes a fold out map as an endpaper for the
reader to consult from time to time while reading the text, the copyright on the
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that WGN's nine o'clock news is an audiovisual work, a work that con-
sists of a series of "related images" which are intrinsically intended to
be shown by the use of machine or devices such as projectors, viewers,
or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds.3 4 The
court further noted that there is no question that WGN's teletext was
intended to be viewed in conjunction with the nine o'clock news.
Based on these reasons, the Seventh Circuit enjoined UVI's stripping of
WGN's vertical blanking intervals and held that such stripping in-
fringed on the copyrighted programming of WGN's nine o'clock
news.
35
The cases herein analyzed have particular significance to the
CATV industry. The EMI decision has broad implications. First,
technical necessity now requires a one-time determination by the resale
carrier to transmit to its customers the most preferred signal. 36 Second,
so long as the satellite resale carrier does not alter the original signal,
passive carrier exemption will be granted.37 Third, a passive carrier
status would be granted to the intermediate carrier so long as it trans-
mits "nothing of its own creation."38 Fourth, the intermediate carrier's
advertisement will not affect its status as a passive carrier.39
The WGN opinion, however, has much narrower implications.
The court noted that UVI "cannot avail itself of the passive carrier
exemption, because it was not passive-it did not retransmit WGN's
signal intact."4 Admittedly, the Seventh Circuit did not say whether
UVI's retransmission of WGN's signal intact would have availed UVI
to the passive carrier exemption. However, one may imply the con-
verse of the circuit court's statement. In fact, the EMI court has noted
this implication as a basis for its decision.4
Thompson Ong
book includes the map although the map is not intended to be read either simulta-
neously with the text or in same prescribed sequence with it.
34. Id at 626.
35. Id at 628.
36. 693 F.2d at 130.
37. Id at 128.
38. Id at 131.
39. Id at 131-32.
40. 693 F.2d at 625.
41. 691 F.2d at 132, n.16.
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B. Antitrust
1. "'All Rights" Acting Contracts Preclude Future Royalties
Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. ,' is an example of a
type of lawsuit that may become very common in the next few years, as
the legal profession begins to adapt to the presence of the ever-growing
pay television/home entertainment industry. As new markets for en-
tertainment products emerge, a new generation of attorneys will at-
tempt to apportion the royalty windfall between labor and
management.
In Rooney v. Columbia Pictures, actor Mickey Rooney attempted
to profit from the pay television/home entertainment industry by es-
caping the confines of several pre-1960 film contracts, in which he sur-
rendered all rights to future royalties. Understandably, Rooney did not
anticipate the future profits of home entertainment. He brought an
action on behalf of himself and a class of motion picture performers
who appeared in films produced by the defendants and affiliated par-
ties prior to February 1, 1960. He claimed that contracts between him-
self and many major studios, as well as similar contracts signed by
thousands of other performers, were invalid because of the alleged par-
ticipation of these studios in a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.
Defendants Columbia Pictures and seven other motion picture
producers and distributors moved to have the action dismissed, alleging
that Rooney failed to state a claim, in violation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). They alternatively petitioned for a ruling of sum-
mary judgment.
The U.S. District Court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment, holding that the disputed agreements were enforceable even
if a conspiracy between the various studios existed because no action in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act was required to execute the
agreement. The court also ruled that the contract rights Rooney at-
tempted to assert did not exist, and therefore, a charge of deprivation of
these rights was impossible.
Sometime before 1930, eight major producers and distributors of
motion pictures: Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., Paramount Pictures Corp., United Artists Corp., RKO
General, Inc., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., United Artists
Corp., Universal Studios, Inc., and Warner Brothers, Inc., allegedly en-
1. Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 538 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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gaged in a conspiracy to retain all rights to the proceeds coming from
their films. After the formation of this alleged conspiracy, and up until
1960, innumerable performance contracts were signed between the de-
fendant studios and the plaintiffs in this class action. Most of these
contracts were "all rights" contracts, in which the studios retained all
rights to the proceeds earned by these films, while the performers were
paid a flat fee for their work. Rooney claimed that as alternative mar-
kets for films began developing, the defendants again conspired-this
time to refuse to deal with Rooney regarding his "publicity rights" in
these pre-1960 films. Publicity rights are the rights a performer has
with respect to the use of his name in connection with a product. These
rights are worth money to the performer, as he can charge a fee for the
use of his name.
The complaint was in four counts. The first count alleged a con-
spiracy between the defendant studios which began sometime before
July 1, 1977 to not deal with Rooney regarding the disputed publicity
rights. The purpose of the conspiracy, according to plaintiffs, was to
exploit alternative markets without compensating Rooney and the
other members of his class. The second count alleged wrongful receipt
of all profits gained by the studios from this exploitation. Count three
alleged a violation of the Lanham Act 3 by the studios who purportedly
represented that (1) the films in question could be commercially ex-
ploited in alternative markets, and (2) Rooney and his class sponsored,
endorsed, or approved the use of these films in alternative markets.
Count four alleged that defendants misappropriated the names, like-
nesses, and valuable property rights of Rooney and his class due to this
unfair competition.
The court held that the common assumption behind all four
counts was that although the studios secured the rights to the proceeds
of the films if exhibited in movie theaters, they did not secure the rights
to the proceeds of the films if exhibited in alternative markets. It is by
rejecting this contention that the court effortlessly resolved this issue,
and ruled in defendants' favor.
The court then moved its attention to Rooney's claim that the con-
tracts in question were invalid because they were the product of an
illegal conspiracy. Judge Conner of the Rooney court said that defend-
ants' argument that plaintiffs offered no evidence of the alleged con-
spiracy was unnecessary, as it would not affect the enforceability of the
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). Briefly, this section of the Lanham Act proscribes the
false labeling of any goods, services, or containers of goods, with respect to designations of
origin or descriptions of the goods or services.
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contract, even if proved. Citing Kelly v. Kosuga,4 the court stated that
if a contract is legal on its face and does not require activity in violation
of antitrust laws, it is not voidable simply because it is the result of an
antitrust conspiracy. The court then said that the contracts in question
were legal on their faces, and that the enforcement of "all rights" con-
tracts does not require any conduct violative of antitrust laws.
In concluding, the court held that the contracts in question here
granted defendants the right to use and exploit in alterative markets the
pre-19 60 films in which Rooney and the rest of the class appeared. As
a result, the court granted summary judgment on each count in this
fashion: (1) As Rooney had no publicity rights in pre-1960 films, there
could be no conspiracy to not deal with the plaintiffs regarding their
publicity rights;' (2) since the contracts were valid, no wrongful receipt
of profits under them could accrue; (3) because defendants had all the
rights with respect to the films, representations made regarding the po-
tential uses of the films were not false and; (4) any so-called "rights of
publicity" claimed by Rooney with respect to the pre-1960 films were
waived by him in the contracts.
This lawsuit appeared to be a vain attempt to recover money to
which Rooney was not legally entitled. Because the court recognized
that Rooney was looking for any angle that would favor him, its deci-
sion will have limited impact on future cases. The first implication that
can be drawn from this case is that courts will not tolerate frivolous
suits, even in cases where the "little" performer squares off against the
"big" studios. This decision conveyed the message that past conspira-
cies, substantiated or not, will have no effect on the validity of present
contracts if they do not require activity in violation of antitrust laws.
This eliminates one method of escaping the confines of an unfavorable
contract. Also reiterated by the court is the idea that in order to use the
antitrust charge successfully, a plaintiff must prove an injury of the
type antitrust laws were intended to prevent.6
With regard to the circumstances which created this lawsuit in the
first place (the eruption of alternative sources of revenue) early indica-
tions are that "all rights" contracts mean "all rights". If this case is any
indication of the trend of the law, courts will be viewing these after-the-
4. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 518 (1959). The court inKelly stressed that unless its
decision would force conduct made unlawful by the Sherman Antitrust Act, the contract
would be upheld.
5. Herrin v. Collins & Associates, 483 F. Supp. 288 (W.D. Pa. 1980), held that where
plaintiff had no property to lose, allegations of conspiracy to deprive him of his property
rights must fail.
6. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
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fact attempts to get out from under what looks to be an increasingly
raw deal for performers as an effort to get something for nothing. A
major consideration in the court's decision was that Rooney and the
studios had bargained for the contract in good faith. Rooney had os-
tensibly received a larger lump sum than he normally would have re-
ceived in exchange for surrender of his future interest in the films. The
court did not feel it was proper to allow Rooney, who surrendered his
future interest in the films for a greater lump sum, to turn around and
make a royalty deal twenty-plus years later.7 Another obvious implica-
tion of the summary resolution of this case is the probable extinction of
"all rights" contracts in the entertainment industry.
The court's decision was the proper resolution of the case for sev-
eral reasons. First, as discussed above, there are sound policy reasons
for rejecting Rooney's attempt to get something for nothing. Any in-
dustry will suffer severe economic hardship if its members are allowed
to renege on contracts because the other party winds up with a better
deal. Second, one of Rooney's major rationales for the invalidity of the
contracts was the alleged conspiracy between the major Hollywood
film studios. Unfortunately for Rooney, he never offered any evidence
(alleged or otherwise) that would have made it even debatable as to
whether or not any such conspiracy existed. Finally, there is ample
precedent to show that, even if a conspiracy existed, that fact alone
would have no effect on the contracts in question. Therefore, in issuing
a summary judgment against Rooney on all four counts, the court
properly disposed of a case that never should have been filed in the first
place.
Michael Leventhal
2. Particip ation in Split Agreements Constitutes Unlawful
Price-Fixing
Since the dawn of the film industry many theatre owners and film
distributors have engaged in a practice known as "splits." In a split
agreement, participating theatre owners divide among themselves
upcoming films to be released, allocate to a single theatre owner a first
right of negotiation, and refrain from competing against the designee
while its right to negotiate continues. In the case of General Cinema
7. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959), in which the Court relied on general policy
grounds stated by Mr. Justice Holmes of "preventing people from getting other people's
property for nothing when they purport to be buying it." Continental Wall Paper Co. v.
Voight, 212 U.S. 227, 271 (1909).
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Corp. v. Buena Vista Distribution Co., Inc.,' the distributor (Buena
Vista) counterclaimed, asserting that the theatre owner's (General Cin-
ema Corporation, hereinafter referred to as GCC) participation in split
agreements constituted unlawful price fixing. The district court
granted Buena Vista's motion for a partial summary judgment on this
issue,2 and held that split agreements constituted per se violations of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.3
In September, 1978, Buena Vista filed a counterclaim' against
GCC asserting that the latter's participation in split agreements consti-
tuted unlawful price fixing under the Sherman Antitrust Act.5 Buena
Vista sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as treble damages
for the splits involving GCC.6 In May, 1980, Buena Vista's motion for
a partial summary judgment on its counterclaim was denied. Approxi-
mately one year later Buena Vista renewed its motion for a partial
summary judgment as to the issue of liability.
Buena Vista argued that the split agreements in question should be
declared per se illegal price fixing, because the purpose and effect of
such agreements is to reduce price competition. In essence, Buena
Vista argued that under the Sherman Act, the licensing of films prop-
erly occurs only under competitive conditions.7
In response, GCC argued that the motion for partial summary
judgment should be denied because splits are properly evaluated under
the rule of reason,' not the per se rule. Furthermore, GCC contended
that splits result in only minimal restraint on competition, and that they
have significant benefits for distributors and exhibitors. Thus, GCC
argued that the proper standard for review was the rule of reason, since
the legality of splits can only be determined on a case-by-case basis at
trial.
The court's opinion was divided into five parts. In the first part,
the court addressed the propriety of granting a motion for summary
judgment in antitrust cases. The next two parts contained an analysis
1. 532 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
2. "Liability" for price fixing was the issue.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1975).
4. The original claim was filed by GCC against Buena Vista in August, 1978.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1975).
6. For splits occurring during and after the four year statute of limitations period prior
to the date of the suit.
7. Examples include competitive bidding and competitive negotiations.
8. Two methods of antitrust analysis have developed. Under the rule of reason, the
courts weigh the pro- and anti-competitive effects of a challenged restraint to determine if it
is reasonable. The second method is the per se rule, which applies to practices that facially
appear to always restrict competition.
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of the asserted anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects of splits
under the relevant case law. Part four addressed GCC's assertion that
distributor participation or consent is material to the legality of splits.
The final part of the opinion dealt with GCC's argument that splits
should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
The court concluded that partial summary judgment was proper
here for two reasons. First, to withstand a motion for summary judg-
ment it simply is not enough to refer to disputed factual issues. Rather,
the factual issues must be material. Here, the court concluded that
although many of the factual issues raised by GCC may be material to
the issue of damages, the present motion concerned only the issue of
liability. Secondly, the court noted that case law supports the granting
of partial summary judgment where the per se rule applies. In a 1963
case, the Supreme Court stated, "[P]rice-fixing arrangements, both ver-
tical and horizontal, have . . . been held to be per se violations of the
antitrust laws; and a trial to show their nature, extent, and degree is no
longer necessary." 9
Next, the court examined the anti-competitive nature of splits.
Buena Vista argued that it was not necessary to examine evidence of
anti-competitive effects, in this case, in view of the obvious nature and
effect of splits. Although the court agreed that Buena Vista's argument
was valid, it decided to analyze the evidence in the record since splits
had never before been held to be per se illegal price fixing. In a three-
pronged analysis, the court concluded that the effect of splits is to block
the free flow of price information and competitive offers, and thus in-
terfere with the price mechanism on which our society depends.' °
Furthermore, the court concluded that prior precedents (on splits)
and the position of the Justice Department highlighted the anti-com-
petitive nature of splits, and offered additional support for applying the
per se rule." In Cinema-Tex Enterprises, Inc. v. Santikos Theatres,
Inc. , splits were found to be per se violations of the antitrust laws.
The anti-competitive nature of splits was also recognized by the court
inAdmiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co. '" Likewise, the Justice
Department, since April 1, 1977, has taken the position that splits are
uniformly illegal per se because they are severely anti-competitive.' 4
9. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
10. 532 F. Supp. at 1262.
11. Id. at 1264.
12. 414 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Tex. 1975).
13. 585 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1978).
14. 532 F. Supp. at 1266.
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GCC set forth six justifications which it contended were pro-com-
petitive benefits that required analysis under the rule of reason.' 5 The
court stated that based on the record establishing the manifestly anti-
competitive nature of splits, it was difficult to imagine any pro-competi-
tive benefits of sufficient importance to outweigh the anti-competitive
aspects of splits under the rule of reason. On the other hand, the court
noted that the law is not entirely clear as to how far a court must go
before it properly characterizes a practice as falling within the per se
rule. 6 The court recognized that there is some authority that both the
asserted pro-competitive and anti-competitive aspects of a challenged
practice should be evaluated in determining whether it should be char-
acterized as price fixing.'7 In its desire to be convinced that splits have
no redeeming competitive virtue, the court, before applying the per se
rule, decided to examine GCC's asserted justifications.
Upon examination of each of the asserted pro-competitive bene-
fits, the court concluded that none of them justified the resulting sup-
pression of competition. As authority, the court cited a Supreme Court
decision which stated that restraints on price competition never inure to
the public benefit.' 8
The court next evaluated GCC's argument for the rule of reason
based on acquiescence, consent, and participation in splits by distribu-
tors.' 9 The court agreed with Buena Vista's argument, however, that
evidence of acquiescence was not material to the question of GCC's
liability under the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, the court examined
GCC's four part argument 20 because of the rigorous standards for sum-
mary judgment. The court concluded, however, that none of GCC's
arguments were persuasive enough to justify application of the rule of
reason, because all that GCC had offered were conclusionary assertions
that Buena Vista's alleged participation yielded pro-competitive bene-
15. 1) greater lead time for advertising and other methods of exploiting the pictures;
2) greater flexibility in scheduling runs; 3) less paperwork, time and effort; 4) less risk that an
exhibitor will be without a picture and a distributor will be without a theater in which to
play it; 5) assurance to distributors of the outlets and play times of their choice; and 6) pro-
tection of smaller, independent exhibitors.
16. 532 F. Supp. at 1267.
17. State of Ariz. v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980).
18. Nat'l Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-94 (1978).
19. Including Buena Vista.
20. 1) If Buena Vista has participated in or consented to splits, it has no standing to sue
because it cannot have been damaged; 2) participation or consent by distributors converts
splits into vertical agreements; 3) Buena Vista's participation in splits amounted to "com-
plete involvement"; and 4) prior precedents regarding splits have considered similar
evidence.
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fits to splits. In fact, many practices that have openly and widely oc-
curred for many years have later been held to be unlawful per se.2'
In the final portion of its opinion, the court firmly stated that splits
need not be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.22 The record showed
that all splits involve an agreement not to interfere with the split desig-
nee's initial opportunity to negotiate. Therefore, all splits, including
the ones at issue, have the purpose and effect of suppressing competi-
tion, and thus, are per se illegal.23 When the per se rule applies, as it
does here, all splits are conclusively presumed illegal without a burden-
some inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused. The per se rule
in this manner serves to make the types of restraints proscribed by the
Sherman Act more certain, to the benefit of all concerned.24
Based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Catalano, Inc. v.
Target Sales, Inc. ,25 the decision in this case appears sound. In Cata-
lano, retailers of beer in California brought an action alleging that cer-
tain wholesalers of beer had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act
when they abandoned their prior practice of extending credit to their
retailers without interest, and thereafter refused to sell to retailers un-
less payments were made in advance or upon delivery. The district
court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed that a
horizontal agreement among competitors to fix credit terms does not
contravene antitrust laws.26 The United States Supreme Court re-
versed and held that the horizontal agreement was plainly anti-compet-
itive and constituted price fixing that is illegal per se under the
Sherman Act. The Court noted that horizontal agreements to fix prices
were archetypal examples of practices that were plainly anti-competi-
tive. The Court stated that it has long been settled that an agreement to
fix prices is illegal per se.27
The court here relied heavily on Catalano, holding for the first
time that splits are per se illegal price fixing. The court reasoned that
splits fell into the category of plainly anti-competitive practices that the
Supreme Court recognized in Catalano. Moreover, in its zeal to be ab-
solutely certain of its decision, the court here engaged in a more de-
tailed analysis than did the Supreme Court in Catalano, while reaching
21. 532 F. Supp. at 1278.
22. Id at 1273.
23. Id at 1279.
24. Id
25. 446 U.S. 643 (1979).
26. Id. at 644.
27. Id. at 647.
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the same conclusion. Thus, the court's decision appears reasonable and
well-founded.
Since splits have been taking place for years, this decision, if it is
widely followed, could have a profound effect on the film industry.
The question arises: will film exhibitors and distributors abide by the
holding in this case or will they continue to "wheel and deal" as has
been their practice for years? There is no conclusive answer to this
inquiry now. All we can do is keep our eyes focused on this skittish
industry and on the cases that will undoubtedly arise in the future.
Randy Berg
C. Breach of Contract
1. Director's Right to Receive Sole Film Credit
In Nuchtern v. Vanderbes,' the United States District Court,
Southern District of New York, granted a preliminary injunction
against defendant producer to enjoin him from releasing, marketing, or
publicizing the film, "New York Nights," in any manner which would
fail to give plaintiff director sole credit as director of the film.2 Juris-
diction was premised on the Lanham Act.3 Plaintiff's cause of action
for breach of contract was adjudicated on pendent jurisdiction.4
Vanderbes began working on his film project in 1979, planning on
writing and producing the film himself. He hired Nuchtern as director
at $35,000 and released publicity for the film which named Nuchtern as
director. However, prior to any production, the project was set aside
for a period. Vanderbes reactivated the project in 1981 with funds re-
ceived from another film. Vanderbes approached Nuchtern with a reit-
eration of his offer of the director position but at a lower compensation
of $25,000. The reason for a reduction in the salary was that
Vanderbes wished to recoup his individual investment.6
The movie was filmed between October 1981 and December 1981
with Nuchtern acting as director. During the entire filming of the pic-
ture, Vanderbes introduced Nuchtern as the director of the film at par-
ties and budget meetings. Nuchtern was recognized by the crew as
director during daily filming activities.7
1. Nuchtern v. Vanderbes, No. 82 Civ. 6182, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1982).
2. Id. slip op. at 6.
3. 15 U.S.C. 1051 et. seq. (1976).
4. Nuchtern at 6.
5. Id at 2.
6. Id
7. Id at 4.
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Plaintiff first noticed changes regarding his director's credit in the
spring of 1982 when a publicity poster was issued which listed
Vanderbes as producer "in association with" Nuchtern. Also,
Vanderbes gave an interview in which he named himself as director.
8
When the film was released with Vanderbes and Nuchtern billed as co-
directors, Nuchtern filed suit for sole director's credit.
Vanderbes first contended that he had renegotiated Nuchtern's
status when the film was reactivated. Secondly, he claimed that since
he had done so much work on the film and had put so much of his life
into it that he deserved the director's credit.
The court found as a matter of fact that Nuchtern's status as direc-
tor was never renegotiated as evidenced by the incidences in which
Vanderbes held Nuchtern out as director.9 The court also dismissed
Vanderbes second contention, that he deserved the credit, as "without
legal significance."'" The court found Vanderbes had contracted with
Nuchtern to be the director and receive the credit due. Nuchtern had
fully performed his contract and, even though he had been assisted to
some extent by Vanderbes as producer, Nuchtern was entitled to sole
credit.
Further, the court held that Nuchtern had suffered irreparable
harm and loss to his reputation due to the failure to receive credit for
his work after he had held himself out to the film world as the director
of "New York Nights." Monetary damages alone would be insufficient
to remediate the damage caused by the lack of proper billing. There-
fore, the court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting release of
the film until Nuchtern was given his sole director's credit.'"
This case reflects the importance of compliance with contracts for
credit in the entertainment field. Credit for work done provides a re-
sume for artists and enhances their reputation and public recognition. 1
2
Breach of contracts in this area require remedies quite specific to the
entertainment business.
The importance of credit for a director is reflected by the many
requirements set out in the Directors Guild of America, Inc., Basic
Agreement for 1981, as to size, position, amount and quality of credit
8. Id at 3.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 5.
11. Id. at6.
12. See In re Arbitration between Directors Guild of America, Inc., and Metro Gold-
wyn-Mayer Film Co., re: "Poltergeist", (DGA) (June 15 and June 22, 1982) (Mosk, Arb.)
[hereinafter cited as DGA Arbitration].
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to be given. 3 Failure to comply with these regulations leaves the court
or arbitrator with the task of ordering an appropriate remedy for the
breach. In Nuchtern, the court ordered a temporary injunction on the
showing of the film until proper credit was given Nuchtern. However,
under a different situation, injunction might cause more harm than the
breach of contract and not provide a feasible remedy. The money lost
because of failure to meet contracts or because of further production
costs may equitably dictate that an injunction would be improper. In-
junction, again, would also have been ineffective if the film had already
been widely circulated, and damage already done to the claimant's
career.
However, other remedies are available where appropriate. In
1982, an arbitration between the Directors Guild Association and
Metro Goldwyn-Mayer concerning "Poltergeist," the provisions of Di-
rectors Guild of America, Inc. Basic Agreement of 1981 section 8-200,
were interpreted as they related specifically to director's credit on
trailer advertising. After concluding that MGM had violated these sec-
tions, in credit given to Director Tobe Hooper, the arbitrator ordered
that: 1) MGM immediately fix credits on trailers released in Los Ange-
les County and New York City to comply with the DGA Basic Agree-
ment regulations; 2) MGM publish a full page advertisement in three
trade magazines, "containing an appropriate expression of regret for
13. Directors Guild of America, Inc., Basic Agreement of 1981, § 8-200, sets out the
following provisions, under "Credit for Directors of Theatrical Motion Pictures."
§ 8-201 Screen Credit. The Director shall be given credit on all positive prints in
size of type not less than 50% of the size of which the title of the motion picture is
displayed or of the largest size in which credit is accorded to any other person,
whichever is greater, and no other credit shall appear on such card, which shall be
the last title card appearing prior to principal photography. If more than one Di-
rector is given such credit, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 8-101,
then such 50% may be reduced to 30% for each. The Employer shall furnish to the
Guild copies of the main and end titles as soon as the same are prepared in final
form but before the prints are made, for the purpose of checking compliance with
the credit provisions of this BA. After such copies are furnished, there can be no
changes relating to the term Director, Direction or any derivation thereof, without
first giving the Guild notice of such proposed changes or elimination.
§ 8-202 Visibility of Director's Name. Because the Employer pledges to use its best
efforts to improve the visibility of the Director's name in publicity, the Guild
agrees to the following provision in Paragraph 8-203 relating to paid
advertising ...
§ 8-203 Credits on Paid Advertising. The foregoing obligations of Employer are
subject to the following:
a. Size and Location of Credit
Except as states otherwise in the Section 8-200, the location of the Director's
credit shall be discretionary with the Employer, and the size of type of the Direc-
tor's credit shall be no less than 15% of the size of type used for the title of the
motion picture, but in no event less than the size and style of type for any credit
accorded any persons other than actors."
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the breach of the Basic Agreement;" and 3) a $15,000 award for dam-
ages be paid.'
4
The DGA Basic Agreement appears to grant broad remedial au-
thority to arbitrators in these cases.15 But, whatever the reasoning of
the judge or arbitrator, it is obvious that orders in this area will vary
widely depending on the particular facts of the case, the damage which
may already have occurred and the damage which may be prevented.
Karen D. Honeyman
2. Restrictive, Covenant Protects a Television Station's
Image
Although restrictive covenants are generally disfavored at law be-
cause of their restraint of trade effect, in Beckman v. Cox Broadcasting
Corp., the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed a lower court's opinion
which held a restrictive covenant valid.' The court held the Cox televi-
sion station's image, which had been created by promoting its
weatherman's personality, was an interest entitled to protection. Thus,
the court upheld the contract between Cox Broadcasting Corp. and its
weatherman, Johnny Beckman, which required that Beckman be ab-
sent for six months from any television appearances if he ever left the
Cox station.'
Johnny Beckman, appellant, was employed by Cox Broadcasting
14. DGA Arbitration at 13-14 (June 15, 1982). The arbitrator stated that the DGA Basic
Agreement intentionally provides for special import to be given to the Los Angeles and New
York markets and trade papers. Id at 11. See DGA Basic Agreement, § 8-203(0.
Reflecting this importance, the arbitrator ordered that all advertising trailers in use in
the Los Angeles County and New York City areas should conform to the decision within
fifteen days. Respondent was allowed to "continue to utilize existing trailers in the remain-
der of the country except that no new trailers including the offending titles shall be printed."
(DGA Arbitration at 13). The arbitrator required the ads to be placed in Daily Variety,
Hollywood Reporter, and Weekly Variety. Id at 13.
15. DGA Basic Agreement of 1981, § 2-500 Arbitral Remedies-
2-501 Authority of Abritrator. The Arbitrator shall have the authority to grant or
award one or more of money damages, orders to withdraw, cancel, change or re-do
advertising material already issued or prepared, or to require Employer to change
or re-do any film titles, or to order back pay or reinstatement, or to order any other
reasonable relief the Arbitrator deems appropriate in the circumstances ...
2-502 Consideration for Determining Remedies. In determining the appropriate
remedy, the Arbitrator shall take into account such evidence as may be adduced by
the claimant of similar prior violations by the respondent. The Arbitrator shall
also take into account evidence of failure on the part of the claimant to notify the
respondent promptly of the violation, and evidence of inadvertent breach."
1. Beckman v. Cox Broadcasting Corp., 250 Ga. 127, 296 S.E.2d 566 (1982).
2. 296 S.E.2d at 566.
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Corp., appellee, from 1962 until 1982 as a weatherman and "television
personality". During this employment period, Cox allegedly spent over
a million dollars promoting "Beckman's name, voice and image as an
individual television personality as part of an 'Action News Team'.'
In 1982, as Beckman neared the end of his contract with Cox, Beckman
contracted with a competing television station to commence immediate
employment in the same capacity.4
Cox filed a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of the
covenant not to compete contained in Beckman's contract. However,
the proceeding was dismissed for lack of evidence that Beckman actu-
ally would violate the agreement.5 Later, Beckman demanded that
Cox release him from the covenant but Cox refused. Similarly, a de-
claratory judgment action was filed, this time by Beckman. Beckman
sought determination whether his new employment contract would vio-
late the covenant contained in his old contract with Cox.6 The trial
court held that the restrictive covenant was valid and enforceable since
Cox would be injured by Beckman's competition and Beckman would
not be substantially injured by the restriction. Beckman appealed the
trial court's decision.
The Supreme Court of Georgia found the trial court decision cor-
rect. The court reasoned that although a covenant not to compete is
not favored due to its effect as a restraint on trade,7 such a covenant
may be upheld when it is strictly limited in time, in territorial effect, in
the capacity in which the employee is prohibited from competing, and
when reasonable.8 In determining whether the limitations in the cove-
nant were reasonable, the court balanced the interest the employer
sought to protect against the impact the covenant would have on the
employee, and factored in the public's interest in promoting competi-
tion and the freedom of individuals to contract.9
The court held that Cox sought to protect a large investment which
it had made promoting Beckman. Cox alleged television viewers se-
lected the local newscast to some extent by the personalities appearing
3. Id at 567.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 568. See also, Georgia Annotated Code § 20-504. Contracts against public
policy-
(a) A contract which is against the policy of the law cannot be enforced. Con-
tracts deemed contrary to public policy include but are not limited to:
* . . (2) Contracts in general restraint of trade; ..
8. Id
9. Id
1984]
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
on the newscast and thus stations were largely identified by the viewers
through the personalities that appeared which was why Cox wanted to
restrain Beckman's appearances.'
Therefore, the court found the restraint on Beckman's career did
not outweigh the interest sought to be protected by Cox. Furthermore,
the court recognized that Beckman had already secured a new contract
of employment, which indicated that Beckman was and would remain
in demand. In addition, expert witnesses testified that Beckman would
not suffer substantial damage or loss to his reputation or recognition by
restraining his appearances for six months. "
The court also held that no unreasonable restrictions in time and
territory were included in the covenant. The time period was only six
months and the applicable territory was limited solely to stations which
had transmission towers located within a radius of 35 miles from Cox
(unless it was a national broadcast). 2
In opposition, Beckman argued that the television personality of
Johnny Beckman was his own, developed solely through his own skills
and resources. Although the court held that Beckman had a right to
take his skills with him, it further held that Cox had the right to restrict
the use of the popularity Beckman's character had attained. The court
concluded that Beckman's character had been promoted through Cox'
publicity efforts and thus was a part of Cox' television station's image
which was an interest entitled to protection.'
3
It appears this decision, determining the validity of a covenant not
to compete, was based on using a reasonableness standard. For exam-
ple, all of the cases cited by the court as supporting their decision dealt
with restrictions on the use of trade secrets and customer lists in a new
job. The applicable test for cases involving trade secrets and customer
lists, is the "reasonableness test." '4 However, in Beckman, there was a
transfer of unique services and thus it appears the issues should have
been analyzed in terms of uniqueness of service.
The uniqueness of an employee's services has emerged in several
courts as an alternative analysis to test the validity of covenants not to
10. Id. at 567.
11. Id. at 568.
12. Id at 567.
13. Id. at 568.
14. Howard Schultz & Assoc. v. Broniec, 239 Ga. 181, 236 S.E.2d 265 (1977); Rollins
Protective Services, Co. v. Palermo, 249 Ga. 138 287 S.E.2d 546 (1982); Uni-Worth Enter-
prises v. Wilson, 244 Ga. 636, 269 S.E.2d 572 (1979).
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compete.' 5 In Purchasing Associates, Inc. v. Weitz, the New York
Court of Appeals held a covenant not to compete, which was based on
an employee's services, was enforceable if the employee's services were
"special, unique, or extraordinary."' 6 In addition, the New York court
held that "more must be shown to establish such a quality than that the
employee excels at his work or that his performance is of high value to
his employer. It must also appear that his services are of such character
as to make his replacement impossible or that the loss of such services
would cause the employer irreparable injury."' 7
Therefore, it appears the question that should have been presented
in Beckman was whether the service performed by Beckman was of
such character as to make his replacement impossible. Furthermore,
the court should have considered whether the loss of Beckman's serv-
ices would have caused Cox irreparable injury. Under the "unique
services" reasoning, as used in Purchasing Associates, Cox may not
have been successful.' 8 For example, Cox admitted that a new person
would gradually be substituted for Beckman; thus, Beckman's replace-
ment was not impossible. In addition, Cox would have had to prove
that the loss of Beckman's services would have caused the station irrep-
arable injury, an extremely difficult injury to prove.
In conclusion, it appears the court in Beckman used an incorrect
analysis in arriving at their decision to uphold the validity of the afore-
mentioned restrictive covenant. When the court decided to rely on the
"reasonableness test", Cox should have been required to prove its right
to Beckman's services as part of its business, as this has traditionally
been the applicable test in cases dealing with trade secrets and cus-
tomer lists. Moreover, it is possible that if the "unique services" test
had been used, Beckman would have encountered no obstacle to his
thriving career in Georgia and the restrictive covenant contained in his
contract would have been held invalid.
Karen Honeyman
3. Actor's Right to Receive Credit
Screen credits have long been an important consideration in con-
tract negotiations between talent and producers as the size, sequences
15. Kniffin, Employee Noncompetition Covenants. The Perils of Performing Unique Serv-
ices, 10 Rutgers-Camden Law Journal 25 (1978).
16. Purchasing Associates v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 196 N.E.2d 245 (1963).
17. Id at 249.
18. Kniffin at 47.
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and timing of credits have significant meaning and value within the
entertainment industry. The importance of screen credit and relative
billing to an actor's career and earning potential has now been recog-
nized and affirmed in Smithers v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.,
Further, Smithers extended the tort of bad faith breach of contract be-
yond insurance contracts and employee discharge cases.2
Plaintiff, William Smithers, entered into negotiations with defend-
ant, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. in January of 1976. Metro-
Golwyn-Mayer (MGM) wanted to cast Smithers, a professional actor,
in the role of Anderson Galt in the television series "Executive Suite".
Smithers was offered a "Most-Favored-Nations" billing status by the
casting director for MGM, where no more than three actors were to
receive more prominent billing than Smithers and no other artists
would receive better billing.3 Smithers accepted the role for less than
his usual salary because of this agreed upon billing arrangement. An
Outline Deal Memo was signed by the casting director and Smithers'
agent. The memo was to be binding pending the execution of a long
form contract.
MGM breached the billing arrangement commencing with the
pilot film by giving a fourth actor "upfront" star billing. Smithers'
credit was relegated to an "end-of-show-name-only billing". Eventu-
ally ten or eleven actors were given "upfront" billing ahead of Smith-
ers. In November of 1976, after the show began broadcasting over the
CBS television network, Smithers complained about the billing
changes and examined the still unsigned long-form contract. Smithers
found that the most-favored-nations provision had been left out of the
long-form contract.4
1. Smithers v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 643, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 20 (1983).
2. See Louderback and Jurika, Standards/or Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of
Contract, 16 U.S.F.L. Rev. 187 (1982).
3. "Most-Favored-Nations" agreement read as follows:
Except for the parts of DON WALLING, HELEN WALLING, and HOW-
ARD RUTLEDGE, this is on a Most Favored Nations basis, i.e. if any other per-
former receives greater compensation than Artist, Artist shall receive that
compensation.
Additionally, no other performer shall receive more prominent billing or a
better billing provision than Artist (except with respect to where his name is placed
alphabetically on the crawl).
Smithers, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 647, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
4. MGM's attorney in charge of drafting the contracts testified concerning the change:
"There were only two plausible explanations. Either I made a mistake or someone told me
to do it." and "Generally somebody who had more authority than I told me to change it" Id
at 648, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
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MGM's response to Smithers' complaint was that the prior agree-
ment regarding the most-favored-nations provision, had been a mis-
take. MGM told Smithers he should accept the change and waive the
provision. When Smithers refused to agree to the change, Smithers was
threatened by Harris Katleman, president of MGM Television at the
time. Katleman essentially told Smithers he would be blacklisted from
television if he did not forego his contractual rights.5 Smithers again
refused to go along with the change and MGM continued. to breach the
agreement.
As a result of MGM's action, Smithers instituted suit against
MGM and two of its officers for breach of contract, tortious breach of
contract (covenant of good faith and dealing), and fraud. The jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of Smithers and damages were awarded as
follows: $500,000.00 for breach of contract, $300,000.00 for tortious
breach of contract, and $200,000.00 for fraud. Further, punitive dam-
ages of two million were awarded. However, the trial court reduced the
jury award for punitive damages from two million to one million. The
court saw this as a more reasonable award, and reduced the jury award
for fraud damages from $200,000.00 to $1.00. The court ruled the
fraud award constituted a duplication of the awards for breach of con-
tract and tortious breach of contract.
MGM appealed the trial court's decision contending that Smithers
had no cause of action for tortious breach of contract and no evidence
of fraud. Thus, MGM claimed there was no basis for punitive dam-
ages. Further, MGM contended that Smithers had not shown actual
damages resulting from the change in credits. Smithers cross-appealed
contending that the fraud damages were not duplicative and the puni-
tive damages should not have been reduced.
The court of appeal found the threat of blacklisting by MGM fit
the definition of the tort of breaching an implied covenant of good faith
which was enunciated in Sawyer v. Bank of America. 6 The aforemen-
tioned tort consists of "bad faith action, extraneous to the contract, with
the motive intentionally to frustrate the obligee's enjoyment of contract
5. The threat communicated to Smithers through his agent went as follows:
[Ihf he didn't, that he (Katleman) would be hard pressed to use Mr. Smithers
again on any shows that he (Katleman) was involved with, and that if he
(Katleman) were to tell this to Bud Grant, who was then the head of CBS program-
ming, if he (Katleman) were to tell him (Grant) this, that he (Katleman) was cer-
tain he (Grant) would go along as well with not using Mr. Smithers.
Id. at 648, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
6. Sawyer v. Bank of America, 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 145 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978).
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rights."'
The appeals court did not accept MGM's position that the tort of
bad faith breach of contract8 was limited to insurance contracts and
contracts of adhesion. The court based its extension of the tort on the
holding in Cleary v. American Airlines.' "Cleary noted that the doctrine
was first formulated in insurance contracts, but applies to all
contracts."'o
As for the issue of fraud, the court saw ample evidence that there
was fraud and deceit in MGM's offer of a most-favored-nations provi-
sion to induce Smithers to work for less than his usual rate of compen-
sation. Smithers detrimentally relied on the provision and MGM,
according to the evidence, never had any intention of living up to the
provision." MGM's position that damages were improperly allowed
for emotional distress based upon a fraud theory was answered by
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. ,2 which held there could be actual damages
for emotional distress.
While MGM conceded that its contract with Smithers was
breached, they refused to admit that the change in billing status re-
sulted in any actual damages. The jury heard considerable testimony
on the importance of billing to an actor's future career and billing was
recognized to have a definite impact on an actor's compensation in
present and future roles. The court held that this testimony constituted
a sufficient and reasonable basis upon which to calculate damages,
even though no precise formula for computation was presented.'
3
As to Smithers' cross-appeal, the court found the trial court to be
correct in determining that the fraud theory was too similar to the theo-
ries of breach of contract and the tort of bad faith breach of contract to
be distinguished. The trial court was preventing double recovery and
was acting well within its discretion in reducing fraud damages to a
7. Id a 139, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
8. Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When If at all Should it be
Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions, 64 Marq. L. Rev. 425, 428 (1981). This article
suggests the use of the "tort of bad faith breach of contract" as an appropriate name for this
new tort of breaching an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contract.
9. Cleary v. American Airlines, I I I Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728
(1980). (a wrongful discharge case).
10. Smithers, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 649, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
11. Id at 650, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
12. "[Mlental suffering constitutes an aggravation of damages when it naturally en-
sues from the act complained of, and in this connection mental suffering includes
nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shock, humiliation and indignity as well as
physical pain."
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
13. Smithers, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 650, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
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$1.00 nominal award. 14
Similarly, the court affirmed the trial court's reduction of punitive
damages to $1 million. While noting that MGM's conduct was extreme
and outrageous, the threat was not carried out and did not cause any
perceived economic loss. Punitive damages were awarded for the emo-
tional distress caused and one million seemed reasonable to the court in
view of MGM's size, wealth, and superior bargaining position. ' 5 Since
the trial court's exercise of discretion in lowerng the damages award
was sound, the court was obliged to presume the correctness of that
order. 16
The Smithers case highlights the importance and value of credits
to an artist. The courts in California now recognize the advantages of
star billing to the professional future of an actor. Actual damages were
assessed by a jury and affirmed on appeal for the loss of bargained for
billing. The court held that there was a direct connection between the
billing Smithers received and his status in the profession, the quality of
roles he could expect in the future, and thus his ability to practice his
craft and earn a living.' 7
An actor renders his services to a production in return for compen-
sation. This compensation goes beyond the salary received by the ac-
tor. The credit received can now be considered as part of an actor's
compensation. Further, since credits now have a recognizable value
they can be considered as a property interest for actors and other art-
ists. The more "good" credits an actor accumulates, the more they add
to the worth of services rendered.
During the course of a thirty year career as an actor Smithers had
accumulated credits in motion pictures, theater, radio productions, and
television series. On television, he had been accustomed to guest star
billing usually with his name and picture appearing alone on the
screen.' 8 Smithers collection of credits was his equity in his career and
provided a means for valuing the worth of his professional services.
MGM's billing of Smithers on "Executive Suite" reduced the value of
those prior credits and thus damaged his equity.
MGM clearly breached its contract with Smithers by relegating his
14. Id. at 652, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25.
15. Id at 653, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
16. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 21 Cal. 3d 910, 923-33, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr.
389 (1978).
17. Cf Ericson v. Playgirl, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 850, 856, 140 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1977) (loss
of publicity is compensable to an actor when it grows out of his profession and directly
affects his earning power).
18. Smithers, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 647, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
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credit to a rapid crawl at the end of the show while placing additional
actors at the head of the show with star billing. It is less clear when a
breach of contract can be considered a tortious breach. The courts in
California have now expanded the scope for the tort of bad faith
breach of contract to cover employment contracts.
California recognizes that there is an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in every contract. However, not every breach of
that covenant should give rise to an action in tort. The courts wish to
protect members of society from unreasonable conduct while ensuring
the rights of parties to freely contract and define their activities by the
terms of the contract itself. For an action in tort to be valid, the courts
will look for more than a simple breach of contract because a tort ac-
tion involves extracontractural damages. In order to maintain the in-
tegrity of contract law and its remedies, the breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be distinguished from
the tort of bad faith breach of contract.' 9
If Smithers were only able to show a bad faith breach of contract
he would not have received punitive damages. Even in insurance cases
(where the tort originated) the insurer must be guilty of malice, fraud,
or oppression for punitive damages to be awarded.2" The court in
Smithers found MGM's conduct to be "extreme and outrageous."'"
The court also found MGM guilty of fraud. The threat of blacklisting
by a company in MGM's strong bargaining position coupled with its
fraudulent use of a contractual provision forced the court to make an
example and award punitive damages.
The court reached a fair decision in Smithers. MGM's conduct
was unjustified and the court saw a clear need to eliminate the threat of
blacklisting from contract disputes. MGM could have lived up to its
end of the contract with little effort or cost, but instead it chose to use
its superior position and ability to punish as a means to coerce an actor
to waive his contracted rights.
Finally, the Smithers decision is important in that it shows that the
courts in California are willing to protect legitimate bargained for
credit. Thus, producers and studios should be careful about induce-
ments made to actors with whom they wish to enter into an agreement
19. Louderback and Jurika, Standardsfor Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Con-
tract, 16 U.S.F.L. Rev. 187, 190-91 (1982).
20. Sibberg v. California Life Ins. Co., II Cal. 3d 452, 462, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr.
711 (1974).
21. Smithers, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 652, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
[Vol. 4
MO VIES AND TELEVISION
and should bargain in good faith. Clearly, it is unwise for studios or
producers to attempt to threaten a party to acquiesce their contractual
rights in favor of the studios as the damage award in this case indicates.
Frank Lupo
4. First Right of Refusal Provision
The importance of including exclusive negotiation and first refusal
right provisions in agreements to televise sports events has long been
recognized by the networks. These provisions insure that a network
who has a present right to broadcast an event will have a preference
over other networks bargaining for those rights in the future. In CBS v.
French Tennis Federation,' a New York supreme court granted CBS a
preliminary injunction after the network made a prima facie showing
that the exclusive negotiation and first refusal rights provisions of its
1980 agreement with the French Tennis Federation ("FTF") had been
breached.2 Specifically, the court enjoined FTF from entering into or
enforcing any contract with NBC concerning the televising or publiciz-
ing of the 1983 French Tennis Open ("French Open").3
During the years of 1980 to 1982, CBS had the United States tele-
vision broadcast rights to the French Open. These broadcast rights
were embodied in a 1980 agreement executed between CBS and FTF's
agent, ProServ.4 Section 61 of that agreement set forth the exclusive
1. N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1983 at 5, col. 3 (N.Y. Cty., Special Term, Jan. 24, 1983).
2. Id
3. Id, The French Open Tennis Tournament is the first of four world class tennis tour-
naments referred to as the "Grand Slam." The Grand Slam consist of Wimbledon, the
United States Open and the Australian Open as well as the French Open.
4. CBS, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1983 at 5, col. 3.
5. Id, Section 6 of the 1980 agreement entered into between CBS and ProServ states
the following:
6. If CBS exercises the applicable option as set forth in subdivision 5(a)(iii)
hereof, then for a period of forty-five (45) days following completion of the 1982
Event (the "Negotiating Period") Licensor shall negotiate exclusively with CBS in
good faith with respect to the acquisition by CBS of broadcasting rights to subse-
quent Events. At no time prior to the Negotiating Period shall Licensor negotiate
with any third party with respect to the television broadcast rights to any subse-
quent Event. If the parties fail to reach agreement by the conclusion of the Negoti-
ating Period, Licensor will not enter into any agreement with any third party for
the exclusive television broadcasting rights in and to subsequent Event(s) for a
period of one (I) year from the date of the last Event broadcast hereunder without
according CBS a final refusal on a five business day turnaround as to outside offers
which are equal to or less favorable to Licensor than Licensor's last offer to CBS,
which offer Licensor shall submit to CBS in writing at the end of said Negotiating
Period. It is understood that CBS has to meet only those terms and conditions
contained in such offer which shall readily be reducible to a payment of a determi-
nable sum of money.
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negotiation and first refusal right provisions that were in issue in the
case. In addition, Section 6 provided that CBS and FTF would engage
in exclusive good-faith negotiations for 45 days after the 1982 Open.
At the end of these negotiations, FTF was to submit its final offer for
the 1983 French Open to CBS in writing. After the offer was submit-
ted, FTF was not to accept another offer from a third party equal to or
less than its final offer to CBS without giving CBS a right to match the
third party's offer. Further, CBS was only required to match those
terms in the third party's offer which were "readily reducible" to a sum
of money.
The exclusive negotiation period ran from June 6, 1982 to July 21,
1982.6 With only three days left in the negotiation period, CBS telexed
ProServ to request a thirty-day extension.7 Although ProServ rejected
CBS's request for an extension, it did propose the immediate schedul-
ing of further negotiation sessions with CBS personnel.' At this point,
no final offer had been presented to CBS by FTF. In the months that
followed, negotiations between the parties continued though no agree-
ment was reached. During these same months, however, ProServ was
negotiating with NBC.9
By mid-October of 1982, ProServ advised CBS that its last propo-
sal to FTF was unacceptable and that FTF was presenting its final offer
in compliance with section 6.10 FTF's final offer to CBS began with the
initial sum of $390,000 for the television rights to the French Open.
However, FTF's inclusion of two terms in its final offer to CBS sub-
stantially raised the sum CBS would have ultimately paid for those
rights. The first term was that CBS televise the French Open live or
pay $300,000." The second term was that CBS agree to a special pro-
motional tie-in with Wimbledon which was going to be aired by NBC
or pay $250,000.2 In short, CBS's failure to comply with those two
terms would have cost CBS an additional $550,000 on top of the
$390,000 for the broadcast rights.
CBS immediately refused to accept FTF's offer as being bo-
nafide. 13 In particular, CBS viewed FTF's inclusion of the "televise
live" and "Wimbledon tie-in" terms as being an attempt to circumvent
6. CBS, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1983 at 5, col. 3.
7. Id.
8. Id
9. Id
10. Id
11. Id. at 6.
12. Id
13. Id
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CBS's right of first refusal.' 4 On the day CBS made its view of the offer
known to ProServ, it concurrently sent NBC a warning not to interfere
with the contractual rights existing between itself and FTF.'
5
Despite CBS's warning, FTF and NBC entered into an agreement
on October 25, 1982 to televise the French Open.'6 The NBC-FTF
agreement appeared to be basically the same as FTF's offer to CBS
except that it provided for NBC to pay $475,000 for the television
rights.' 7 However, NBC's true cost was actually $165,000 less than
what FTF offered to CBS because NBC could easily comply with the
Wimbledon tie-in term.'8
When CBS learned of the NBC-FTF agreement, it filed a com-
plaint for a permanent injunction and moved for an injunctionpendente
lite.'9 NBC responded by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment
on the grounds that it did not have knowledge of the specific terms
between FTF and CBS.
20
CBS offered two arguments in support of its request for injunctive
relief. First, CBS argued that since FTF had failed to provide its final
offer until October of 1982, FTF, by its own actions had extended the
exclusive negotiation period. Thus, any negotiations conducted with
NBC before the October offer violated CBS's exclusive rights.2 ' Since
this argument presupposed that the breach occurred during the exclu-
sive negotiation period, it did not mention CBS's right of first refusal.
In CBS's second argument, it asserted that even if the exclusive
negotiation period did end on July 21, 1982, FTF frustrated CBS's
right of first refusal by not presenting CBS with its final offer until Oc-
tober.22 In other words, if FTF had presented its final offer at the end
of the negotiation period instead of after ProServ had negotiated with
14. Id.
15. Affidavit of Craig Foster filed with Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause for a Preliminary
Injunction at 12 (supra at n.5).
16. CBS, N.Y.L.J. at 6, col. 1.
17. Id
18. Id. NBC was to pay $475,000 for the French Open television rights without being
subject to the $250,000 'penalty' for not promoting Wimbledon. On the other hand, CBS
was to pay $390,000 for those rights plus the additional $250,000 for not promoting Wimble-
don. Thus, CBS was going to have to pay $640,000 for the same rights NBC acquired for
$475,000. The difference between their costs equals $165,000.
19. CBS, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1983 at 5, col. 3.
20. Id
21. Id. at 6, See also Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed in Support
of the Preliminary Injunction.
22. See supra note 21.
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NBC, the term relating to the Wimbledon tie-in probably would not
have been included.
The court adopted CBS's second line of reasoning. In so doing,
the court took a common-sense approach to the case by questioning
FTF's assertions that the Wimbledon tie-in would greatly enhance the
prestige of the French Open. The court stated that a promotional tie-in
to the U.S. Open, which CBS already had the rights to air, would have
equally enhanced the prestige of the French Open.23 In short, the court
found that FTF had frustrated CBS's first refusal rights by including
the Wimbledon tie-in term and that CBS did have a likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits.
Moreover, the court found that CBS did not have an adequate
remedy at law.24 The court reasoned that placing a value on CBS's loss
of the French Open's viewing audience would be too difficult to calcu-
late, even though such a loss would be real.
25
The court concluded that an injunction in CBS's favor should be
issued in order to maintain the status quo until the merits of the case
could be heard.26 It further concluded that NBC's motion for summary
judgment should be denied on the grounds that CBS's warning to NBC
put NBC on notice of the FTF-CBS agreement terms.
27
The significance of this case is the court's recognition of the di-
lemma faced by the holder of a first refusal right when a third party is
able to offer the seller something which the holder is incapable or pre-
cluded from matching. The facts of the CBS case illustrate this di-
lemma. FTF as the licensor or seller of the televising fights effectively
precluded CBS from exercising its first refusal fights, by incorporating
the Wimbledon tie-in term in its final offer. The Wimbledon tie-in
term was an intangible; an intangible being a term in an offer which
can not be readily reducible to a sum of money.28 Since NBC already
had the broadcast fights to Wimbledon and CBS was not about to pro-
mote an NBC program, CBS was incapable of matching the NBC offer.
Ironically, it appears that CBS included the "readily reducible" to a
sum of money language in Section 6 to protect itself from being faced
with just such a dilemma.29 Yet, even with CBS's careful drafting,
23. CBS, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1893 at 6, col. I.
24. Id at 6.
25. Id
26. Id
27. Id
28. Affidavit of Craig Foster filed with Plaintiffs Order to Show Cause for a Preliminary
Injunction, at 10.
29. Id at 11-12.
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FTF manuvered around the language by giving CBS the choice of pro-
moting Wimbledon or paying an additional $250,000 which FTF arbi-
trarily set as the term's monetary equivalent.
Despite the above, the court in CBS found both the French Open
and Wimbledon to be of unique and extraordinary value.3 0 In effect,
the court not only impliedly recognized FTF's $250,000 alternative to
promoting Wimbledon as being arbitrary, but also recognized CBS's
inability to match a term which entailed promoting an event aired by a
competing network.3'
The fact remains, however, that CBS's first refusal rights were cir-
cumvented even though CBS took care in drafting its agreement with
FTF. A possible solution for CBS may have been for it to have ex-
panded the "readily reducible" to a sum of money language contained
in Section 6. For instance, CBS could have provided for an independ-
ent appraisal of the fair market value of any intangible terms which
appeared in FTF's final offer. This approach has been taken in collec-
tive bargaining agreements between sports associations and their play-
ers.32 Another approach suggested by at least one commentator was to
abandon the use of the exclusive negotiation and right of first refusal
provisions altogether. Instead of using these provisions, it was sug-
gested that an automatic renewal option clause be used in their place.33
A further complication in this area is the type of relief a court will
grant should the aforementioned provisions be breached. In the recent
case of American Broadcasting Co. v. Wolf,34 the New York Court of
Appeals denied injunctive relief to a network which sought to exercise
the first refusal rights contained in its employment contract with a well-
known sportscaster. 3' The Court of Appeals concluded that ABC
should pursue its legal rather than equitable remedies.36 As it stands,
CBS settled with FTF and the 1983 French Open was televised by
30. CBS, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1983 at 6 col. 2.
31. Id
32. P. Hochberg, Representing Professional and College Sports Teams and Leagues 189,
215-217 app.II-7 (1976).
33. Note, Has the Right of First Refusal Been Thrown to the Wolves? American Broad-
casting Co. v. Wolf, I Cardozo Arts & Entertainment L.J. 137 (1982).
34. 52 N.Y. 2d 394, 420 N.E. 2d 363, 438 N.Y.S. 2d 482 (1981).
35. Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d at 392 (1981).
36. Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d at 405-406 (1981). Although the Wolf case focuses upon personal
service employment contracts and the public policy against having someone enjoined from
earning a livelihood, the Court's decision concerning good-faith negotiation and right of first
refusal provisions should be noted as a trend which could influence the use of such provi-
sions in contracts similar to the one used by CBS.
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NBC.3 7 Thus, the question of whether the court would have issued a
permanent injunction to enforce CBS's right of first refusal is left to
speculation.
In sum, it is evident that the purpose behind the continued use of
the right of first refusal and exclusive negotiation provisions is to pro-
tect a network from losing a viewing audience which it has attracted
after acquiring, publicizing, and televising a sports event like the
French Open. The court in CBS recognized the purpose behind these
provisions and by its decision offered a temporary remedy. However, it
is equally evident that the holder of a first refusal right can have that
right circumvented or frustrated when a third party can offer an intan-
gible which can not be matched. In this regard, the dilemma of what
such a holder of the right should do to protect himself is still
unresolved.
Cecelia Reid
D. Constitutional Law
1. Adult Entertainment Zoning Ordinances
Local governments may use zoning ordinances to restrict the location
of "adult entertainment" establishments so long as those ordinances do
not constitute a complete ban on such forms of expression. l The court in
Castner v. City of Oakland2 sustained this use of zoning in California
where a number of municipalities had enacted such ordinances.3
Richard A. Castner, plaintiff and appellant, was the owner of an
"adult bookstore entertainment" facility in the city of Oakland.
Castner's bookstore was equipped with motion picture machines and
was located within 600 feet of a residential zone. The City of Oakland,
defendant and respondent, passed a zoning ordinance which banned
"adult entertainment" activity within 1000 feet of a residential zone.4
37. Telephone conversation with Plaintiffs attorney, Barbara L. Wartelle, in October of
1983.
1. Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
2. Castner v. City of Oakland, 129 Cal. App. 3d 94, 180 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1982).
3. Other cities which have passed zoning ordinances regulating the "adult entertain-
ment" business include Los Angeles, Covina, Santa Maria, Long Beach, and Whittier.
4. Castner, 129 Cal. App. 3d at 97, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 683; The Oakland ordinance de-
fined adult entertainment activities as:
Any commercial activity, whether conducted intermittently or full time, which pri-
marily involves the sale, display, exhibition, or viewing of books, magazines, films,
photographs or other materials, distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on
matter depicting, describing, or relating to human sex acts, or by an emphasis on
male or female genitals, buttocks, or female breasts.
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The passage of the ordinance made Castner's bookstore a noncon-
forming activity. Under the ordinance, Castner had a one year grace
period for amortization.' Castner sought to obtain a major conditional
use permit to continue operation beyond the one year period. The ap-
plication for the permit was denied by the city. Castner challenged the
validity of the statute and petitioned the superior court for a peremp-
tory writ of mandate to compel the granting of a conditional use per-
mit. The superior court denied Castner's request and he appealed.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the
superior court. The appeals court rejected Castner's contention of un-
constitutional denial of a vested right to operate his "adult entertain-
ment" business and held that since the ordinance provided for an
amortization period commensurate with the investment involved, the
termination of the nonconforming activity was valid and reasonable.6
Castner did not offer any evidence that the one year amortization pe-
riod was unreasonable.7 In its determination denying the conditional
use permit, the court noted the close proximity (one block) of another
bookstore owned by Castner which did conform to the zoning
ordinance.
In answer to Castner's contention that the Oakland ordinance con-
stituted a prior restraint on his freedom of speech, the court relied on
the United States Supreme Court holding in Young v. American Mini
Theaters.8 In Young, a similar challenge was made to a Detroit zoning
ordinance.9 The Supreme Court held that the zoning of adult theaters
by local government is not proscribed by the First Amendment and
that the public policy of preserving the quality of urban life must be
accorded high respect.' 0
The court in Castner noted the similarity between the Oakland
and Detroit ordinances which both regulated the location of "adult en-
Oakland, Ca., Planning Code § 2110(e) (1976).
5. [Aill nonconforming adult entertainment establishments are allowed one year to ter-
minate operation or conform to the law. In addition, those operations obligated by a written
lease exceeding one year from the effective date of the ordinance, or whose activity involves
investment of money in leasehold or improvements such that a longer period is necessary to
prevent undue financial hardship, are eligible for up to two additional years grace period.
Castner, 129 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
6. National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, I Cal. 3d 875, 878, 464 P.2d 33, 83
Cal. Rptr. 577 (1970).
7. United Business Comm. v. City of San Diego, 91 Cal. App. 3d 156, 181, 154 Cal.
Rptr. 263, 280 (1979).
8. Young, 427 U.S. at 50.
9. Detroit, Mich. Official Zoning Ordinance §§ 66.0000, 66.0101, 66.0103 (1972).
10. Young, 427 U.S. at 71-72.
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tertainment" activities with no total suppression of or even limit on the
number of such activities permitted in the city." The fact that Castner
still had three similar facilities operating in the City of Oakland was
seen as proof that his freedom of expression was not impaired. Here, as
in Young, the market for "adult entertainment" was essentially
unrestrained. 12
The court in Castner also held that the categorization of Castner's
business as "adult entertainment" and subsequent regulation of that
entertainment, was a proper function of the zoning ordinance as had
been previously decided in Walnut Properties Inc. v. City Council.'3 In
Walnut, the California Court of Appeal followed the Young decision
which allowed the classification of theaters according to the content of
the films exhibited, if such classification had a reasonable basis. The
Young court held that the classification of "adult entertainment" was
within a city's power so long as the classification had a reasonable
basis. '
The court also held that Castner lacked standing to challenge the
vagueness of the definition of "adult entertainment"' 5 since there was
no doubt that Castner was involved in "adult entertainment activity",
thus the element of vagueness had not affected Castner. Similarly, the
court held since the ordinance in question would have little or no effect
on legitimate expression on the part of persons not before the court,
there was no need to grant Castner standing on this issue. Again this
holding follows the Young decision.' 6
The Castner opinion reflects the growing concern over the spread
of "adult entertainment activities" into areas where people work and
live. Since efforts to directly suppress and censor such activities have
failed due to a direct conflict with First Amendment rights and privi-
leges, alternative methods such as land use controls have been imple-
mented. By carefully following the Supreme Court decision in Young,
local governments have been able to control the spread and clustering
of "adult entertainment" business without infringing upon First
11. Castner, 129 Cal. App. 3d at 98, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
12. Young, 427 U.S. at 62.
13. Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City Council, 100 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 161 Cal. Rptr. 411
(1980).
14. Id at 1023, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
15. See supra note 4.
16. "[I1f the statute's deterrent effect on legitimate expression is not 'both real and sub-
stantial,' and if the statute is 'readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts,
. . . the litigant is not permitted to assert the rights of third parties.' " (citation omitted).
Young, 427 U.S. at 60.
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Amendment rights. The ordinance that was challenged in Casiner, is
just one of many similar ordinances that have been passed in Califor-
nia and throughout the nation.' 7
However, the Young decision did not sanction the use of land-use
controls to zone "adult entertainment" out of existence. The court in
Casiner properly recognized that a total ban on "adult entertainment"
would not be constitutional, while reasonable regulations as to the lo-
cation of such activities are. The effect of the ordinance upon freedom
of expression protected by the First Amendment was minimal since ac-
cess to and volume of adult entertainment activity was essentially
undiminished.
The court in Castner did not address the issue of why the zoning
ordinance was needed. The court did not seem to feel the need to jus-
tify the use of the ordinance in terms of the public policy of preventing
demonstrable damage to neighborhoods and the quality of life which
were addressed in the Young decision.'" Perhaps the court did not feel
the need to address the policy issue because that policy is now taken for
granted.
The decision in Castner is a product of the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Young which was narrow and yet has caused significant impact.
The use of narrowly construed zoning ordinances to regulate "adult
entertainment activity" is acceptable after Young, so long as it does not
create a total suppression of such activities. Such laws can be compati-
ble with the freedoms guaranteed under the constitution.
In conclusion, as long as the motive for the aforementioned zoning
ordinances is regulation, as opposed to suppression, the ordinances ap-
pear to be acceptable. However, the division between sex and politics
is considered artificial by many'9 and the idea that expression on the
subject of sex is less deserving of protection than expression on political
matters,2° is a dangerous one. For example, there could be a danger
that local governments would attempt to suppress sexual expression in
artistic forms; consequently, artistically recognized films and plays
could be affected. Regulations of expression should be content neu-
17. Similar ordinances have been passed in Boston, Chicago, and Dallas among other
places.
18. Young, 427 U.S. at 71-72.
19. "For some groups, notably the women's movement, sex is itself part of a political
message." Note, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech, Press and Association. Zoning
Regulation of Adult Theaters, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 196, 200 n.31 (1976).
20. Young, 427 U.S. at 70.
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tral.2 Therefore, a regulation to control an activity should be proper
only where it is shown that the activity causes some demonstrable harm
on the quality of life. Thus, the policy aspect of regulation is impera-
tive to the analysis and should not be left out of judicial decisions on a
Castner type zoning ordinance case. Where the policy analysis is left
out, as it was in Castner, regulations based on suppressive motives may
be improperly upheld.
Frank Lupo
2. Viewer's Right to Compel TV Broadcast
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an unin-
hibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of the
market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private
licensee. . . . It is the right of the public to receive suitable
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences which is crucial here. That right may not consti-
tutionally be abridged. . ..
The First Amendment protects both the right to send and the right
to receive2 information. This constitutional guarantee means that the
government should not be able to justify restrictions on free expression
merely because certain information, when broadcasted, may produce
adverse consequences.' Ultimately, the choice between the dangers of
suppressing information and the dangers of allowing information to
enter the realm of discussion and awareness is a choice that the First
Amendment makes for us.4
21. [Blut, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its
content. . . To permit the continued building of our politics and our culture, and
to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to
express any thought free from government censorship. The essence of this forbid-
den censorship is content control.
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
1. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
2. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (holding a Postal service require-
ment that the Postmaster General detain foreign mailings of "communist political propa-
ganda" was unconstitutional and abridged the addressees' First Amendment rights to
receive the publications).
3. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 580-84 (1978).
4. Va. State Bd. Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(holding that a statute prohibiting advertisement of drug prices by pharmacists was invalid
because the state's goals of maintaining professional standards among pharmacists was
achieved by "keeping people in ignorance").
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The Supreme Court has unanimously held that "it is the right of
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount."5  However, in Muir v. Alabama Educational Television
Commission,6 viewers' rights became secondary to broadcasters' rights.
The national television broadcast of "Death of a Princess," a film
depicting the 1977 public execution of a Saudi Arabian princess and
her commoner lover for adultery, created controversy as well as litiga-
tion. Prior to the broadcast, which was scheduled to air May 12, 1980,
the Alabama Educational Television Commission (AETC) received
numerous complaints from Alabama residents protesting the broadcast
of the film and expressing fear for the personal safety of Alabama citi-
zens in the Middle East.7 In Texas, KUHT-TV, a public television sta-
tion licensed by the University of Houston, received similar complaints
and protests.8 In California, a suit seeking twenty billion dollars in
damages, claiming that all Muslims were defamed by the broadcast of
the film, 9 was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
On May 10, 1980, AETC announced that it would not broadcast
"Death of a Princess" as previously scheduled. Donald E. Muir and
several other Alabama residents who had planned to watch the pro-
gram brought suit under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United State Constitution and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,' ° seeking to
compel broadcast of the film. They also requested preliminary and
permanent injunctions against AETC's "political" programming
decisions.
The district court denied the viewers' motion and granted sum-
mary judgment for AETC. On appeal, the decision was affirmed," and
the court held that (1) plaintiffs had no constitutional right to compel a
broadcast and (2) AETC's refusal to broadcast was a legitimate exer-
cise of its authority and was protected by the First Amendment.
5. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
6. 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S. Mar. 8,
1983).
7. Id. at 1036.
8. Barnstone v. Univ. of Houston KUHT-TV, 514 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Tex. 1980), rev'd
on appeal 660 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1981).
9. Faissal Fahd Al Talai v. Fanning, 506 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any state or territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and its laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
11. (Muir II) Muir v. Ala. Educ. Television Comm'n, 656 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Meanwhile, in Texas, a different result was unfolding in Barnstone
v. University of Houston KUHT-TV, 12 where the district court granted
a viewer's request for an injunction and ordered KUHT-TV to broad-
cast "Death of a Princess." A University Vice President made the deci-
sion to cancel the broadcast based on "strong and understandable
objections by the government of Saudi Arabia."'"3 Ms. Gertrude Barn-
stone, a subscriber and regular viewer of KUHT-TV, argued success-
fully that her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by
the decision to cancel. On appeal, 4 the court found that the decision in
Muir required that the district court judgment be reversed and the in-
junction dissolved.
Finally, the United States Court of Appeals directed that both
Muir and Barnstone be consolidated and reheard en banc. The court,
with two concurring and three dissenting opinions, affirmed the Muir
decision and reversed Barnstone. Therefore, the broadcaster's right
to cancel was not a violation of plaintiffs' rights, according to the fed-
eral court of appeals.
The court articulated three major reasons for concluding that the
cancellation did not violate plaintiffs' rights: 1) Although public broad-
cast licensees are without First Amendment protection, they still pos-
sess the same rights to make programming decisions as their private
counterparts; 16 2) the public television stations involved were not "pub-
lic forums;" and 3) the broadcaster's editorial decision did not consti-
tute government censorship.' 7
On the first issue, the court acknowledged that the government is
without First Amendment protection under Columbia Broadcasting
Systems, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, (CBS), 8 yet it further
established a distinction between protection and rights' 9 by stating: "To
find that the government is without First Amendment protection is not
to find that government is prohibited from speaking or that private in-
dividuals have the right to limit or control the expression of
government.
'"20
12. 514 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
13. Id. at 674.
14. (Barnstone 11), 660 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1981).
15. (Muir III), 688 F.2d 1033, 1036 (5th Cir. 1982).
16. Id at 1041.
17. Id at 1041-1047.
18. 412 U.S. 94, 139 (1973). CBS, (Stewart J. Concurring) held that, "The First Amend-
ment protects the press from government interference; it confers no analogous protection on
the government."
19. 688 F.2d 1033, 1038 (5th Cir. 1982).
20. Id
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In classifying the programming decisions as government expres-
sion, the court was able to short circuit the issue of whether the public
stations had a right to make content-based programming decisions. In-
stead, the court focused on whether the decision to cancel violated any
statutory or constitutional requirements and concluded that it did not.2'
In analyzing the regulatory scheme adopted by Congress," the
Muir court found that "[u]nder the existing statutes public licensees
such as AETC and the University of Houston possess the same rights
and obligations to make free programming decisions as their private
counterparts. . . however, as state instrumentalities, these public licen-
sees are without the protection of the First Amendment. '' 23 Thus, the
government could impose certain restrictions on those licensees, but it
"does not result in individual viewers gaining any greater right to influ-
ence the programming discretion of the public licensees." 24
This analysis by the Muir court gravely misses the issue raised by
plaintiffs who urged that the decision to cancel was made on the basis
of content and thus was an infringement of the right to receive infor-
mation, a right which is guaranteed by the First Amendment. Plaintiffs
never claimed they had a right to influence programming discretion.
The court's second major reason for holding that the cancellation
did not violate plaintiffs' rights was that the stations are not public fo-
rums and that "Congress did not deem it necessary for viewers to be
accorded a right of access to television broadcast stations in order for
the public's First Amendment interests in this medium to be fully real-
ized."' 25 Citing United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh
Civil Associations ,26 the court held that a facility is a public forum only
if it is designed to provide a "general public right of access to its use, or
if such public access has historically existed and is not incompatible
with the facility's primary activity."27 The court then interpreted this
right of access to exclude the right to schedule or compel broadcasts
and to include only the right to watch or to decline watching what is
offered.28
Using circular reasoning the court found that a right of access is
21. Id.
22. Specifically, the Communication Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq. (1934), succes-
sor to the Radio Act of 1927.
23. 688 F.2d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir. 1982).
24. Id
25. Id
26. 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
27. Muir, 688 F.2d 1033, 1042 (5th Cir. 1982).
28. Id at 1043.
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necessary for a facility to be deemed a "public forum" and that a public
forum is necessary to a right of access (i.e., to challenge a programming
decision based on communication impact). One wonders what station
could qualify as a public forum under this analysis.
The third reason the court gave for holding that cancellation of the
broadcast was not a violation of plaintiffs' rights was that the decision
to cancel did not constitute government censorship. The court gets
around the established rule that government may not restrict expres-
sion due to its message or content, 29 by distinguishing among media.
Here, the court says that television "pose[s] unique and special
problems not present in the traditional free speech case."3 The unfor-
tunate consequence of this is that it creates an exception which allows
government broadcasters to make editorial decisions on the basis of
content where a government agency in another medium or context
would not have this power.3' The court rejects plaintiffs' argument that
there is a distinction between scheduling and cancelling an already
scheduled program.32  However, in Board of Education v. Pico,3 the
Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, found that a school board's re-
moval of several books from the district's school libraries was an
abridgement of the First Amendment rights of students if the purpose
was to deny access to ideas.
An unfortunate consequence of the Muir decision is that it grants
state authorities unlimited discretion to influence the content of public
television. By finding that government "expressions" of editorial deci-
sions are constitutionally protected and federally regulated, it has
placed the Communication Act above the Constitution. As the dissent
in Muir points out, "The fact that state operated television stations are
entitled to exercise editorial discretion, however, does not absolve [the
viewers] of their First Amendment responsibilities. 34
The majority suggests that review of programming decisions is a
remedy provided by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
29. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
30. Muir, 688 F.2d 1033, 1043 (5th Cir. 1982) citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973).
31. Judge Rubins' concurring opinion states: "If the state is conducting an activity that
functions as a marketplace of ideas, the constitution requires content neutrality." Muir, 688
F.2d at 1050.
32. Muir, 688 F.2d at 1045 (stating that "The decision to cancel a scheduled program is
no less editorial in nature than an initial decision to schedule the program").
33. The Muir court concluded that "Pico is of no precedential value as to the application
of the First Amendment to these issues." Muir, 688 F.2d at 1045, n.30 (5th Cir. 1982).
34. 688 F.2d at 1056 (Johnson J. dissenting).
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However, reliance on the FCC is inadequate to insure viewers' First
Amendment rights. Further, the FCC does not distinguish between
private and public broadcasting in its regulation, and thus cannot pro-
tect against the censorship alleged by plaintiffs in the Muir case. Given
that selection of programming is a necessary and inevitable part of tele-
vision broadcasting, the need to provide viewers with some remedy
against abridgement of their First Amendment rights is now greater
than ever.
A/isa Freundlich
E. Blind Bidding
1. Ohio Film Trade Regulation Challenge
In AlliedArtists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes,' motion picture producers
and distributors2 challenged an Ohio trade regulation statute which
placed certain restrictions on marketing of films to Ohio exhibitors.
The Ohio statute prohibits blind bidding, provides competitive bidding
guidelines and restricts distributors from charging theatres advance
and guarantee payments in addition to charging a percentage of box
office receipts.3 The plaintiff distributors contended that the provisions
of the regulation abridge free speech and violate the commerce clause,
antitrust and copyright laws.
The Ohio statute prohibits blind bidding, a distribution procedure
which requires that motion picture exhibitors enter into licensing
agreements for a film before a trade screening of the motion picture.4
The Ohio regulation compels the distributors to screen their films to
potential exhibitors prior to entering into a bidding process.
Distributors argued that the prohibition of blind bidding violated
their first amendment rights of free expression. Plaintiffs contended
that since motion pictures are protected forms of expression,5 and that
the Ohio statute has a direct impact on their films,6 strict judicial scru-
1. 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
2. Plaintiff-appellants in AlliedArtists are the country's nine major producers and dis-
tributors of films, who account for approximately ninety percent of film industry revenues.
Id at 659.
3. Id at 658-59 n.l.
4. Id
5. Allied Artists Picture Corp., v. Rhodes 496 F. Supp. 408, 432 (S.D. Ohio, E.D. 1981)
(holding plaintiffs films were protected forms of expression under the first amendment, cit-
ing Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 682 (1968) and United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948)). The parties stipulated that none of the films was
obscene. 496 F. Supp. at 432 n. 12.
6. Plaintiff distributors argued that the Ohio statute would delay opening dates, fore-
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tiny was the appropriate standard of review. Relying on the Supreme
Court decision in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,7 the court
stated that strict judicial scrutiny was not the appropriate test. The
court noted that the provision was content neutral under the first
amendment; the provision operates on all distributors and exhibitors
regardless of the subject matter of the film involved. The court found
that the provision was of a general regulatory nature, not one intended
to control content of speech.'
Employing the balancing test established by the Supreme Court in
United States v. O'Brien ,' the court upheld the blind bidding prohibi-
tion provision concluding that it did not impose undue burdens on pro-
ducers and distributors under the first amendment.' ° The appellate
court approved the district court's finding that Ohio has a legitimate
interest in preventing blind bidding because of the potential abuses
which arise from a practice inhibiting the flow of accurate information
regarding marketing films." The court found that a mandatory trade
screening was an acceptable remedy.
[Bly permitting Ohio exhibitors to view the film before bid-
ding, it permits the exhibitors to use their own business judg-
ment in determining whether and on what terms, to bid for a
picture license. It effectively removes the unfairness inherent
in the blind bidding process exhibitors described as 'buying a
pig in a poke'.
12
The court found that the mandatory trade screening requirement
did not impose undue burdens on distributors under the first amend-
ment. The appellate court upheld the district court finding that the
only conceivable effect of the provision on free expression would be the
delays in film release caused by the trade screening requirement. The
court further approved the district court's conclusion that these delays,
although possible, would be infrequent and relatively minor in nature,
and thus the state's legitimate interest in restraining deceptive trade
close access to certain theaters, reduce the quantity, quality and diversity of films, and inter-
fere with planning and promotional efforts. 496 F. Supp. at 432-33.
7. 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961).
8. 679 F.2d at 661.
9. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (stating that governmental regulation is sufficiently justified
if it furthers an important governmental function and if the interest is unrelated to freedom
of expression. The O'Brien court weighed the legitimate governmental interest against the
impact on the protected expression).
10. 679 F.2d at 661-62.
11. d.
12. Id. at 661 (quoting Allied Artists v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 431).
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practices by encouraging the flow of accurate information prior to con-
tracting, clearly outweighs such incidental restriction on expression.' 3
Plaintiff distributors also claimed that the trade screening require-
ment violates the commerce clause because the statute favors exhibitors
in Ohio and places distributors, the vast majority of whom have their
principal places of business outside of Ohio and operate in interstate
commerce, at a disadvantage. 4 The court noted that the trade screen-
ing requirement was facially neutral and did not distinquish between
in-state and out-of-state distributors. Having determined that the regu-
lation operates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public in-
terest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, the
district court then examined whether the burden imposed on commerce
was clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.' 5 The
district court justice concluded:
[T]he burden of delay is slight in relation to the state's stated
objective to establish a framework for the exercise of an in-
formed business judgment by Ohio theater owners in selecting
films for their theaters. I cannot find that the burdens on in-
terstate commerce occasioned by the Ohio Act are undue. 6
The appellate court, while upholding the district court's ruling,
recognized that the impact of the statute falls on out-of-state distribu-
tors since there were no in-state producers and distributors, and thus
applied a "more penetrating [standard of] review." 7  The appellate
court, however, agreed with the district court dicta that no less restric-
tive alternative was presented to effectuate the same purpose.' 8
The court summarily dismissed plaintiffs' claims that the trade
screening requirement violated federal antitrust laws. The court
opined that "[t]he anti-competitive effects that may be incidental to
trade screening-that exhibitors willing to blind bid are now forbidden
to do so-are not the types of restraints the antitrust laws were
designed to prohibit."' 9 The court, quoting the Supreme Court in Ex-
13. 679 F.2d at 661.
14. The district court rejected plaintiffs' claim that their product is not amenable to local
regulation because of the need for uniformity. The court held the lack of uniformity would
not impede the flow of goods at the state borders. 496 F. Supp. at 435-37.
15. Id at 438, 441.
16. Id at 441.
17. 679 F.2d at 662.
18. Id
19. Id
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xon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,z° noted, "if an adverse effect on
competition were, in and of itself, enough to render a state statute inva-
lid, the State's power to engage in economic regulation would effec-
tively be destroyed."' 2' Moreover, the Allied court asserted that Ohio's
regulation of motion picture licensing falls within the state action ex-
emption to the antitrust laws.22 The court held that the self-executing
nature of the statute plus judicial enforcement satisfies the active state
supervision requirement of California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 
23
Plaintiffs alleged that the Ohio Act, on its face and in its applica-
tion, will deprive them of their rights under the Federal Copyright
Act, 4 and is therefore preempted. The plaintiffs claimed that the blind
bidding prohibition interferes with distributors' objective to perform
their motion pictures under optimum circumstances.2 Plaintiffs fur-
ther contended that the Ohio Act so restricts the exercise of federally
created rights that it otherwise " 'stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.' "26
The district court noted that the fundamental purpose of the con-
stitutional grant of copyright is to promote the progress of sciences and
useful arts, 27 and not to reward the copyright owner by confering upon
her the right to dispose of its subject matter on the optimum terms.
28
The district court added that "Congress carefully and expressly
limited preemption to laws governing all rights equivalent to those
within the scope of copyright, and excluded from preemption all other
legal and equitable rights."' 29 The appellate court explicitly approved
the district court's analysis of the law and its holding that the Ohio Act
neither creates rights equivalent to those within the scope of the Fed-
eral Copyright Act nor deprives copyright owners of the protections
afforded by the Federal Copyright Act."
In addition, the appellate court implicitly accepted the district
20. 437 U.S 117 (1978) (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117,
133 (1978)).
21. 679 F.2d at 662.
22. 679 F.2d at 662.
23. 444 U.S. 97 (1980).
24. 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq. (1976).
25. 496 F. Supp. at 445.
26. Id. at 443.
27. Id at 442, 446.
28. Id at 446.
29. Id. at 444.
30. 679 F.2d at 663.
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court's rejection of plaintiffs' assertions that the Ohio trade screening
requirement interferes with a copyright owner's rights of performance
by compelling him to perform his product in front of a group of people
as a condition to licensing it in Ohio.3 The district court reasoned that
the trade screening requirement only affects copyright holders who
wish to license their films in Ohio: it does not compel performance in
any other circumstances.32 The district court opined:
Thus they [copyright owners] retain complete control over the
rights granted by the Copyright Act: to prohibit display, per-
formance, reproduction and distribution. It is only after the
copyright owner has made the decision to perform the work-
to release the motion picture-in Ohio that the Ohio Act steps
in and compels a performance before exhibitors as a condi-
tion to the distribution of films in Ohio.33
The district court further concluded that blind bidding "does noth-
ing to encourage the creative excellence the copyright laws are designed
to foster."3
The Ohio bidding guidelines set standards for distributors who
choose to sell their films through a bidding process in lieu of negotia-
tions. 35 The Ohio guidelines require disclosure of invitation to bid lists
and the bids themselves after they are opened, and if all bids are re-
jected, the distributor must rebid the film rather than negotiate with
exhibitors.36
The court affirmed the district court's decision upholding the com-
petitive bidding guidelines of the Ohio Act. The court applied reason-
ing very similar to that used by the court in upholding the trade
screening requirement. Recognizing the legitimate state interest in
counteracting deceptive and unfair manipulation of the bidding pro-
cess,37 the court found that the guidelines did not place undue burdens
on the right of distributors under the first amendment or the commerce
clause. The court noted that the prevailing bidding process would be
only minimally affected, and any delays because of possible rebidding,
if they could not be avoided, would be rare.38
The district court upon hearing plaintiffs' argument that the prohi-
31. Id.
32. 496 F. Supp. at 447.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 679 F.2d at 658-59 n.I.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 663.
38. Id.
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bition of negotiations subsequent to an unsuccessful bidding will tend
to diminish copyright owners' abilities to license their creations on the
best available terms, reiterated that the Copyright Act does not confer
upon a copyright owner the right to dispose of his protected work pur-
suant to optimum terms.39
The appellate court succinctly stated that the bidding procedures,
like the trade screening requirements, do not interfere with any of the
rights of the producers and distributors under the copyright statutes.4
Lastly, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the chal-
lenged bidding requirements survive federal antitrust analysis as the
Ohio Act does not sanction illegal activity feared by film distributors:
the misuse of price information and collusion among exhibitors.
4'
Such activity, the court noted, would still be subject to punishment
under federal antitrust laws.42
The Allied court rejected the district court's decision to uphold
Ohio's prohibition of advance and guarantee payments.4 3 The district
court upheld the provision using reasoning analogous to that it used to
uphold the Ohio trade screening requirement and the bidding guide-
lines." The appellate court found that the trade screening and bidding
requirements foster disclosure of information and fair business prac-
tices which validity effectuate the legitimate state interest of restraining
misleading, fraudulent or otherwise unfair trade practices. The court,
however, asserted that the price provision may not be regulatory means
to achieve the valid state interest of fostering fair business practices.45
The court stated that outlawing advance and guarantee payments when
box office receipts are used as a measure of payment seems to be simply
a restriction on price, not necessarily supporting any valid state inter-
est.46 The court noted that the provision appears to be primarily a risk
shifting device, 47 taking the risks from the in state exhibitors to the dis-
tributors. The appellate court rejected the district court's assertion that
this was a valid state interest. The appellate court concluded that, "a
state's interest in righting a bargaining imbalance, standing alone, is
39. 496 F. Supp. at 447.
40. 679 F.2d at 663.
41. Id
42. Id
43. Id
44. The district court found the valid state interest in promoting fair business dealings
outweighed the minimal burdens on distributors. 496 F. Supp. at 434.
45. 679 F.2d at 663.
46. Id at 664.
47. Id The district court noted that the prohibition against guarantee payments is a risk
shifting device. The court did not identify any other state interest. 496 F. Supp. at 413.
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not sufficient under the commerce clause to permit direct interference
with pricing where it burdens interstate commerce. '"48
The court remanded the decision on the issue of prohibition of
guarantee and advance payments to the district court, instructing the
court to evaluate the provision according to the test in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc. ,9 and thereby determine the extent of the burden on in-
terstate commerce, and whether any other legitimate local public inter-
est is present to support the pricing provisions of the Ohio statute under
the commerce clause.
50
Deborah Kaplan
2. Pennsylvania Film Trade Regulation Challenge
In Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh,' thirteen mo-
tion picture distributors and producers challenged a Pennsylvania trade
regulation statute aimed at the film distribution industry. The Penn-
sylvania statute is similar, but somewhat more comprehensive than the
Ohio statute examined by the Sixth Circuit in Allied Artists Picture
Corp. v. Rhodes.2 The Pennsylvania trade regulation prohibits blind
bidding, regulates the bidding process and prohibits advance and some
guarantee payments.' Plaintiffs in Associated Film made arguments
similar to those made by plaintiffs in AlliedArtists: The statute abridg-
es their rights under the first and fourteenth amendments, and violates
the commerce clause as well as federal copyright and antitrust laws.4
The district court granted summary judgment to the producer-dis-
tributor plaintiffs in Associated Film, holding that the Pennsylvania
statute violated the first and fourteenth amendments and was pre-
empted by federal copyright law.5 The district court held that the
Pennsylvania act on its face "creates the risk of a delay in licensing and
of shifting financial burdens and uncertainties [from the exhibitors to
the distributors.]
' '6
The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment and
48. 679 F.2d at 664.
49. Id.
50. Id See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
1. 683 F.2d 808 (3d. Cir. 1982).
2. 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
3. 683 F.2d at 809-11 n.2.
4. 683 F.2d at 809.
5. Id at 812.
6. Id (quoting Assoc. Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971, 983
(E.D. Pa. 1981).
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remanded the case to the district court. The court cited with approval
the analytical framework established by the Ohio district court in Allied
Artists7 to address similar challenges to statutes analogous to the Penn-
sylvania statute. The Ohio district court, having established that the
Ohio regulation was not designed to regulate the content of expression,
proceeded to balance the state's legitimate interests against the impact
on the protected forms of expression.8 The Third Circuit further noted
that the district court's grant of summary judgment in Associated Film
precluded the application of the Allied Artists analyses leaving vital
questions of fact unanswered. 9
The district court also ruled that the Pennsylvania regulation on its
face is preempted by the Federal Copyright Act.' ° The regulation is
therefore unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause because it lim-
its the exercise of federally created rights and "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.""
The Third Circuit again turned to the analyses of the district and
appellate courts in Allied Films,'2 and held that the district court in
Associated Film was premature in granting summary judgment on the
copyright preemption issue. The court opined:
The question of whether and to what extent the Pennsylvania
Act interferes with attaining the "purposes and objectives of
Congress" is one which must be resolved before the trial court
can decide, as a matter of law, whether the interference (if
any) is such as to require invalidation of all or part of the
Pennsylvania Act on preemption grounds.' 3
The appellate court remanded the decision to the district court,
instructing the court to use the standards set by the Sixth Circuit in
Allied Artists. 
14
Deborah Kaplan
7. 683 F.2d at 812.
8. Id at 813.
9. Id at 813-14.
10. Id at 814.
11. Id at 816 (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977)).
12. 683 F.2d at 815-16.
13. Id at 816.
14. Id at 816-17.
[Vol. 4
MO VIES AND TELEVISION
F. Television Regulation
1. Repeal of Three- Year Trafficking Rule
Effective December 14, 1982, the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) repealed what was commonly known as the "three-year
trafficking' or holding rule."2 This rule required that an assignment or
transfer of a license submitted prior to the expiration of a three-year
holding period had to be set down for hearing unless specified extenu-
ating circumstances were present or a waiver petition was granted.3 In
the same action, the FCC established a one-year holding period from
the start of operations under construction permits granted following a
comparative hearing.
4
The three-year rule was adopted by the FCC in 1962,1 as a result
of the Commission's concern that the yearly turnover of a substantial
number of broadcast licenses reflected trafficking in broadcast interests,
and the fear that frequent station sales might lead to deterioration in
6programming.
At the time the rule was proposed, the majority of comments re-
ceived by the Commission were opposed to its adoption.7 The opposi-
tion alleged: (1) a lack of legal authority to adopt such a rule; (2) that
the hearings required under the rule were inconsistent with Commis-
sion policy to expedite transfer applications because of business exigen-
cies; (3) business practicalities rendered hearings meaningless; (4) no
basis existed for the three-year period; and (5) the Commission's con-
cern with trafficking was not backed up by available statistics.'
Most of these comments were dealt with in an off-hand manner,
and dismissed as having little merit. As to the business exigencies, the
Commission concluded that broadcasters had dealt with hearings on
other matters and knew how to contract around delays. Legal author-
ity was founded on section 309(e), under which the Commission stated
that it had "not only a right, but a duty . . . to require any questions
reasonably related to the public interest which cannot be resolved on
1. Trafficking is defined as the "speculation, barter, or trade in licenses to the detriment
of the public interest." 32 F.C.C. 689 (1962).
2. Applications for Voluntary Assignments or Transfers of Control, 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.3597 (1982).
3. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3597 (a) - .3957(d).
4. 47 Fed. Reg. 55924, 55929, codified at 47 C.F.R. 73.3597 § (c)(l)(i) (1982).
5. Procedures on Transfer and Assignment Applications, 32 F.C.C. 689 (1962).
6. 1d at 690.
7. Id. at 693.
8. Id at 694-95.
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the information in the application itself, to be explored through the
hearing process."9 The three year-period was justified by the Commis-
sion's concern with short-term sales, and as three years was the term of
a license, this was a reasonable length of time.' °
The Commission relied heavily on the public interest standard in
adopting the three-year rule. For example, the Report and Order
stated:
The Commission must subordinate these private concerns [of
broadcasters] to more paramount public interest factors.
These contentions ignore the fact that the broadcast industry
is one affected with a public interest. We would be remiss in
our responsibilities in administering the Communications Act
if we did not effectuate the new procedure here adopted."
The Commission did acknowledge that the three year time factor
in and of itself would not effectively deal with the trafficking problem,
but added subsection (d) 2 to address the problem of trafficking beyond
the three year period.' 3
These objections and responses by the FCC have been described
in order to provide some understanding of the reasoning which led to
the rule. The rationale voiced in the 1962 Order contrasts sharply with
the current Commission's reasoning in repealing the rule.
The move to repeal the three-year rule took official shape in Janu-
ary, 1982, when the FCC issued its Notice of Proposed Rule Making.' 4
In support of the repeal, the Notice stated that "the rule has outlived
whatever validity and utility it may have had . . . [I]ts continuance in
effect would not serve the public interest."' 5
The Notice stressed the change in the broadcasting business in the
twenty years since the rule's adoption, noting that the number of oper-
ating stations had almost doubled and that broadcasting was now an
established and profitable business.' 6 Based upon this observation, the
Commission concluded "that it will be the rare case in which sale of a
station held less than three years leads to a deterioration of service."' 7
9. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1976).
10. 32 F.C.C. 689 at 696.
11. Id at 697.
12. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3597(d).
13. Id
14. Applications for Voluntary Assignments or Transfers of Control, 47 Fed. Reg. 985
(January 8, 1982).
15. Id at 986.
16. Id
17. Id.
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Indeed, the Commission went on to state: "Continuing the rule in ef-
fect is more likely to have such an impact [deterioration of service].
This is because the 'three-year rule' artificially restricts a station from
going to its 'higher valued use.' ",8 As an illustration of 'higher valued
use,' the Notice stated: "A buyer ready and willing to utilize its re-
sources to pay the required price for a given property is more likely to
provide the service more desired in a community than an unwilling
owner restricted from selling a property it no longer desires only by
Commission fiat."' 19
In the Notice, the FCC proposed that the traditional concern with
trafficking was no longer appropriate, as marketplace factors would
control: a station purchaser who is in the business to turn a quick profit
will be especially attuned to the audience and will have great incentive
to provide quality ownership. The marketplace was also viewed as
controlling overcommercialization and prices for available stations.
The public interest factor was considered last in the Notice of the
proposed repeal: "[W]e believe that allowing the marketplace to oper-
ate as to transactions involving on-air stations will undoubtedly lead to
better broadcasting in the public interest.
20
Thus, "public interest," the front rider in 1962, took a back seat to
the marketplace in 1982.
The legal authority for the repeal was founded on sections 4(i),
303(g) and (r) of the Communications Act, sections dealing with gen-
eral and specific powers of the Commission to regulate as public con-
venience, interest or necessity requires.2'
Following the public response period, the FCC repealed the sec-
tions discussed in its Proposed Order of January 8, 1982.22 It should be
noted that the Commission retained sections 73.3597(e) and (f), which
restrict payment upon transfer of construction permits to reimburse-
ment of expenses, and limit the equity interest which a transferor may
retain in the permittee.
23
However, there was strong statutory authority for retaining these
sections, unlike sections (a) through (d). This authority was found in
sections 301 and 304 of the Communications Act, which prohibit con-
18. Id
19. 47 Fed. Reg. 985 at 986.
20. Id at 987.
21. 47 U.S.C. §§ 4(i), 3 03(g), (r) (1976).
22. The majority of the comments received by the Commission were in favor of repeal
of the three-year rule. 47 Fed. Reg. 55924 at 55925 (December 14, 1982).
23. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3597(e), .3597(0.
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veyance of a property interest in the issuance of a license.2 4 The Pro-
posed Notice of Rulemaking had stated,
to allow a permit to be transferred in a situation in which the
station seller obtains a profit, prior to the time the program
tests have commenced, would appear to violate this prohibi-
tion. The permittee would appear to have nothing to convey
for profit other than the mere expectation of future profits,
which appends to the permit itself.25
The FCC also imposed a one-year holding period on construction
permits granted after a comparative hearing.26 The FCC stressed that
this restraint grew not from any traditional concern over trafficking,
but from its "desire to prevent abuse of the Commission's licensing
process."27
The overall rationale behind the repeal can best be summarized as
"let the marketplace control." The marketplace was heralded as the
answer to the concerns regarding prices of station sale transactions, the
availability of properties for sale, overcommercialization, and specula-
tion in licenses.28
The decision to repeal relied on the FCC's findings in its Deregu-
lation of Radio,29 as to the efficacy of the marketplace to control the
public interest concerns patrolled under the three-year rule.a"
However, one commentator, writing on the legality and the wis-
dom of the Deregulation of Radio, espoused the view that marketplace
control might provide quantity and quality of entertainment broadcast-
ing, but other important values of the Communication Act's charge of
serving the public interest would suffer. 3 ' Given as examples were cov-
erage of public issues, service to minorities, and editorialization by
licensees. 2 While the areas affected may not parallel one another, the
principle that marketplace control does not necessarily guarantee oper-
ation in the public interest should not be lightly dismissed.
The Commission's historical concern with trafficking was also re-
placed with an assurance that the marketplace will effectively control
24. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 304 (1976).
25. 47 Fed. Reg. 985 at 987.
26. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3597.
27. 47 Fed. Reg. 55924 at 55928-29.
28. Note that these were all problems historically thought to be caused by trafficking.
See Procedures on Transfer and Assignment Applications, 32 F.C.C. 689 (1962).
29. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C. 2d 968 (1981).
30. Id.
31. Campbell, The FCCs Proposal to Deregulate Radio, 32 Fed. Com. L. J. 233 (1981).
32. Id at 246-51.
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any of the harms long thought to arise from trafficking.33
The Concurring Statement of Commissioner Henry M. Rivera em-
phasized the weaknesses in the Commission's reasoning. In its rush to
run up the banner of marketplace control, the FCC simply dismissed
the long-standing policy against trafficking, without supplying any par-
ticularly compelling evidence.
As to the majority's claim that purchase for short-term profit will
always further the public interest, Rivera countered:
If anything, practicalities suggest otherwise-that 'profiteers'
will decrease informational programming, which is relatively
expensive to produce, increase contests and other activities to
'hype' a station's ratings, to obtain maximum profit on resale.
Although the majority characterizes this result as the hypo-
thetical worse [sic] case, there is no reason why the prime
mover of our economic system, the profit motive, will not en-
courage such worst cases.34
In sum, the theme of marketplace reigns with the current Commis-
sion.35 The three-year rule, disliked as it was by industry forces, 36 was
a natural to fall by the wayside given the current FCC's emphasis on
deregulation.
Nancy Wagner
2. Super Stations-Local or National Broadcasters?
Media magnate and sport enthusiast Ted Turner was involved in
two separate pieces of litigation in 1982 which focused attention on his
fledgling "Superstation," WTBS-TV of Atlanta. In both cases, ABC
sued to enjoin Turner from broadcasting sporting events the rights to
which he claimed to be entitled. In American Broadcasting Cos. v. At-
33. 47 Fed. Reg. 55924. Trafficking has been the focus of a great number of FCC deci-
sions. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corporation, 60 F.C.C. 2d 1012, 1016 (Rev. Bd. 1976); Prairie-
land Broadcasters, 49 F.C.C. 2d 1377, 1381 (Rev. Bd. 1974); Harriman Broadcasting Co., 9
F.C.C. 2d 731, 733 (1967).
34. 47 Fed. Reg. 55924 at 55931, n.6.
35. Other examples of deregulation under the current Commission are the Deregulation
of Radio, supra note 23; Revision of Application for Renewal of License of Commercial and
Noncommercial AM, FM and Television Licenses, 46 Fed. Reg. 26236 (May II, 1981); Rep-
resentation of Stations by Representatives Owned by Competing Stations in Same Area, 87
F.C.C. 2d 688 (1981).
36. See notes 7 and 22.
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lanta National League Baseball Club, Inc. ,' WTBS was slapped with an
eleventh hour injunction preventing its televising of the 1982 National
League Championship Series (LCS) featuring Turner's own Atlanta
Braves in their quest to reach the World Series. Turner's sports pro-
gramming designs were further curtailed in Cox Broadcasting Co. v.
NCAA ,2 where again, ABC (this time its Atlanta affiliate, WSB-TV)
sued to prevent Turner's televising of NCAA football games in Atlanta.
Although both decisions are significant in their immediate effect
upon Turner's growth objectives for WTBS, greater import lies in their
larger implications. Specifically, a contrast of ABC and Cox reveals
that "superstations" on the whole have sufficient similarities to both
local broadcasters and national cable television channels so as to be
readily classified as either. The problems confronted by Turner
demonstrate the uncertainty that surrounds the superstation
phenomenon.
In ABC v. Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc., ABC was
joined as a plaintiff by the other major league baseball clubs? It was
stipulated that Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn had negotiated a
contract with ABC on behalf of all ballclubs, the terms of which gave
ABC "exclusive rights" to broadcast the National League's LCS in
September, 1982.' Turner's Braves, along with all the other twenty-five
major league teams, had ratified the ABC contract.5 The contract con-
tained one relevant exception to the network's exclusivity which per-
mitted a local "flagship station" to broadcast its team's games to its
hometown market.6
1982 was a good year for the Braves. They won the Western Divi-
sion of the National League and earned the right to meet the St. Louis
Cardinals in the LCS. WTBS-TV, also owned by Ted Turner, had
functioned as the team's flagship station for several years, bringing ap-
proximately 600 television games to Atlanta fans from 1977 through
the 1982 season.7 In 1976, WTBS had become a "superstation, ' 8 which
means although it originated as a free local over-the-air broadcast in
1. American Broadcasting Cos. v. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc., 82 Civ.
6104 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) [hereinafater cited as ABC].
2. Cox Broadcasting Co. v. NCAA, No. C-89120 (Ga. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Cox].
3. ABC at 1.
4. Id. at 4-5. Commissioner Kuhn derived his authority from a document identified as
the "Central Fund Agreement."
5. Id. at 5.
6. Id. at 9.
7. Id. at 6. All the games were simultaneously transmitted to cable systems nationally.
8. In re Southern Satellite Systems, Inc., 62 F.C.C. 2d 153 (1976).
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Atlanta, its signal was picked up and retransmitted by satellite to other
U.S. cities' cable television subscribers.9 This enabled WTBS to reach
a national audience of 22.5 million households in all fifty states, or
about 28 percent of American television homes.' 0
ABC argued that to permit WTBS in Atlanta to broadcast the
Braves' LCS games would in essence sanction competing national tele-
casts in violation of ABC's exclusive rights." ABC further contended
that with such a wide national audience base, WTBS could not possibly
fit within the flagship exception.' 2 U.S. District Court Judge Mary
Johnson Lowe agreed after finding 1) that half of all cable T.V. house-
holds would watch the LCS on WTBS rather than ABC,'3 and 2) that
only five percent of WTBS viewers and not more than ten percent of
WTBS' advertising revenues came from the Atlanta market. 4
Sports and media personalities also testified about the damaging
effects the WTBS broadcasts would have upon major league baseball,
whose honor in conveying exclusive rights was purportedly placed in
issue. '-
The district court found that WTBS was not a flagship station, as
the ABC contract exception contemplated, but rather a national net-
work of a lesser scale.' 6 Judge Lowe therefore enjoined WTBS' broad-
cast of the LCS as a violation of ABC's exclusive national rights. 7
By contrast, Cox v. NCAA held WTBS to the role of a local broad-
caster, despite Turner's claims to the contrary. Here, the stake was col-
lege football and plaintiff, Cox Broadcasting Company, owned WSB-
TV, Atlanta's new ABC-affiliate station. As in the previous case, ABC
had owned exclusive rights to NCAA football games. In fact, for six-
teen years, ABC was the only authorized national broadcaster of
9. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in Dockets 20988 and 21284, 71 F.C.C. 2d 1004,
1006, Fed. Reg. 28347 (1979). This definition appears to be the industry standard. Cable
Television Syndicated Exclusivity Rules; Docket Nos. 20988, 21284, 71 F.C.C. 2d 1004, 1006
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rulemaking].
10. ABC at 12.
11. Id. at 13.
12. Id. at 19.
13. Id. at 12.
14. Id. at 9.
15. Id. at 16-17. Commissioner Kuhn's melodramatic testimony stated in part, ".
your Honor,. . . if we can't back up our exclusives and make them work, we are at sea in
the future in terms of these extremely valuable rights. We lose our credibility as an industry,
not only on a national level but probably broadly that baseball can't deliver, . . . and the
ultimate ones to feel that injury will be the great American public, who have made baseball
the truly American sport." Id. Are superstations un-American?
16. Id. at 19.
17. Id. at 37.
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NCAA games. From 1979 to 1981 these contractual rights cost ABC
120 million dollars.'
8
However in 1982 the NCAA promulgated rule changes which au-
thorized three separate contracts of a non-exclusive nature. ABC and
CBS, as network broadcasters, contracted for the rights to fourteen
games apiece. A third contract, for cable transmission, conveyed the
rights to televise 19 NCAA contests and was referred to as the Supple-
mental Series.' 9
The Turner WTBS Superstation, having bid 17 million dollars,
was awarded the cable contract.2' The CBS contract, which had been
negotiated with knowledge of WTBS' superstation broadcast capabili-
ties and cable contract, contained language which constrained CBS
from challenging its validity.2'
The NCAA-ABC contract however was negotiated in haste at the
last minute and was not fitted with such language.22 Instead, the ABC
contract expressed a clear grant of exclusivity for its games as against
all other free "over-the-air" broadcasts.23
The Georgia superior court held in Cox, as did the court in ABC,
that the cable transmission of WTBS carried nationally were the identi-
cal programs broadcast over-the-air in Atlanta.24 It further found that
although certain changes in FCC tariff application would allow WTBS
to separate its satellite signal from its local broadcasts (and thereby
show different programs to its local and national viewers), WTBS chose
not to do so. 25 Therefore, to fulfill its 1982 cable contract with the
NCAA to broadcast the 19-game Supplemental Series, WTBS had to
first broadcast the game on WTBS live over-the-air in Atlanta.
Plaintiff Cox claimed that these planned over-the-air telecasts of
NCAA games would 1) violate ABC's exclusivity grant as against all
others, and 2) irreparably harm WSB and also ABC.26 WSB would be
18. Cox at 1.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Id. at 8.
21. Id. at 7.
22. Id. On December 6, 1982, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
dissolved the injunction on this point alone. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. National Collegiate
Athletic Assn., 250 Ga. 391 (1982). There the court found that there had never been a
"meeting of the minds" between ABC and the NCAA as to whether the scope of ABC's
exclusivity encompassed Superstation broadcasts. Thus ABC had no contractual rights
upon which to sue.
23. Cox at 10.
24. Id. at 11; ABC at 20.
25. Cox at 6.
26. Id. at 8.
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harmed in that its competitor WTBS would likely experience a jump in
market share from 5 to 40 percent if football games were televised on
Saturday night as intended.27 ABC, it was argued, would be harmed in
that its reputation and relationship with its affiliates, particularly WSB,
would be damaged. Moreover, the value of its contract would be
diminished.2"
The court, however, was keen in balancing the harm to defendants
as well. The NCAA, it was submitted, would be unable to find another
cable supplier at this late juncture, and would absorb a hefty economic
loss. 2 9 Moreover, WTBS had already expended substantial sums in ex-
pectation of the games, and had made commitments to advertisers.3 °
Ultimately, the court fashioned a bit of creative relief by permit-
ting WTBS' 1982 broadcasts while enjoining its broadcasts of NCAA
games the next three seasons. 3' The court further awarded WSB the
right to broadcast two University of Georgia and two Georgia Tech
games.3
As a practical matter, superstation WTBS lost this suit because it
was held to be a telecaster and not a cablecaster13 The ABC contract
forbade all other over-the-air transmissions, which for WTBS and its
national audience, were only in Atlanta.34
So what's left? In ABC, Turner's WTBS baseball programs were
enjoined as a violation of ABC's exclusive rights as against other na-
tional broadcasts. In Cox, Turner's college football series rights were
eroded because WTBS in Atlanta is a free, over-the-air local broadcast
station. The ABC attorneys won the superstation argument on both
sides.
The brief history of superstations is checkered. Definitions are few
but fear and resentment are widespread. 35 Both courts above made
factual findings that neither the term "superstation," nor any functional
equivalent appeared in either of ABC's exclusive rights contracts.36
The District Court in ABC nowhere defines the term "superstation,"
27. Id. Turner's NCAA series was scheduled to go head-to-head against WSB's "Fan-
tasy Island" and "Love Boat."
28. Id.
29. Id. at 10.
30. Id. at 9.
31. Id. at 8.
32. Id. at 13.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 11.
35. Id. at 5.
36. See Proposed Rulemaking (footnote 9 supra) which contains such a petition by the
National Association of Broadcasters.
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but Cox's Georgia court attempts a definition which appears to be the
going standard:37 Superstations are those which originate as local over-
the-air broadcasts in one market but are simultaneously retransmitted
by satellite to cable television viewers across the country. 8 It is there-
fore easy to see how Turner could lose both suits. By enjoying the
fruits of both station-types, superstations enjoy the separate rights of
neither.
Common to the findings of both ABC and Cox was the identifica-
tion of only three U.S. Superstations.39 The other two, WOR-TV of
New York, and WGN-TV of Chicago are not superstations of their
own volition, 4° and WGN actively discourages retransmission of its
signal.4 '
Under Turner's direction, however, WTBS sought superstation
status from the outset.42 In fact, the company which provided WTBS'
RCA satellite link, Southern Satellite Systems, Inc. (SSS), was con-
ceived, owned and operated by Turner before its divestment for a re-
ported one dollar.43 Although control by Turner of SSS could not be
proved, SSS' unwillingness to alter its FCC tariff arrangement even
when faced with programming loss is curious.
For that matter, ABC's roles in the litigation are intriguing. After
all, ABC instituted suits in two courts, each seeking to attack supersta-
tions on a divergent premise, once as a virtual cable network and once
as a local telecaster.
The courts also noted that ABC had been somewhat lax (or at least
inconsistent) in preserving its rights." The ABC court, ruling on base-
ball, found that in fact a prior extra-territorial flagship broadcast of an
LCS had gone unchallenged by ABC.45 And, in a 1978 anti-trust suit
brought against ABC by Warner-Amex Cable, ABC as much as con-
sented to five cable broadcasts of Ohio State games in each of 1978 and
37. ABC at 5; Cox at 3.
38. Cox at 4. Cf. footnote 9 supra.
39. Cox at 4; Proposed Rulemaking at 1006.
40. ABC at 8; Cox at 4.
41. Id.
42. Cox at 4. WGN-TV of Chicago opposes aspects of its superstation status. See
WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F. 2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982)
where plaintiff won a permanent injunction against defendant cable transmitter's alteration
of WGN signals.
43. ABC at 8.
44. Cox at 5.
45. This figured in the balancing of harms in Cox, wherein WTBS' 1982 NCAA broad-
casts were not enjoined. Cox at 12. Although Turner raised laches as one defense in ABC,
the court concluded otherwise. ABC at 13.
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1979 in its settlement terms.4 6 Many analysts question why no other
unfair competition suits have been aimed at the networks in light of
Warner-Amex's success.
47
What then is to be made of the superstation phenomenon? The
temptation exists to examine its early treatment with that of similar
developments.
The arrival of the "community antenna" in the early sixties proba-
bly provides the nearest parallel. There, as documented in Cable Vi-
sion, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc. ,48 these powerful receiving antennae made a
good first impression. In Twin Falls, Idaho, the community antenna
proved very popular because it expanded the number of viewable tele-
vision stations from one to four by adding reception of the Salt Lake
City, Utah stations.49 KLIX was the original station. 0 The conflict
which resulted in the Cable Vision suit arose when one of the Salt Lake
City stations affiliated with the same network as KLIX ran the same
network fare as KLIX. 5' Thereupon, KLIX sued to protect its grant of
programming exclusivity from the network (much the way Cox
brought action against Turner's WTBS).52 In Cable Vision, even
though the court held that a community antenna was not a broadcaster,
it enjoined the antenna's relay of same-network programming on the
ground of unfair competition.53
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal later reversed the trial court's
finding of unfair competition because KLIX enjoyed no copyright pro-
tection of its broadcasts over the public airwaves.54 Therein may lie the
reason why unfair competition suits have not been levied against the
characteristically similar superstation.
Superstations, by virtue of their transmission by satellite, possess
46. ABC at 10.
47. Warner Cable Corporation sued ABC on anti-trust grounds to gain the rights to
broadcast Ohio State football games to its Ohio subscribers. ABC owned the exclusive
broadcast rights to all NCAA games, but did not intend to televise the games in question. In
settling the suit immediately before trial, ABC acceded to Warner's coverage of five OSU
games in each of 1978 an 1979. Warner Cable Corp. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.,
No. C-2-78-592 (S.D. Ohio E.D., filed June 28, 1978). In 1980, however, ABC refused to
renew the agreement and Warner's subsequent suit was unsuccessful. Warner-Amex Cable
Communications, Inc., v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Ohio
1980).
48. L. Sobel, Sports and the Law, 615 (1977).
49. 211 F. Supp. 47 (D. Idaho 1962).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 52.
54. Id. at 55.
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similar characteristics to antennae. And ironically enough, supersta-
tions, like antennae, were initially lauded for their novelty. In granting
the first-ever superstation satellite link to Southern Satellite Systems,
Inc. and WTBS in 1976, the Federal Communications Commission
praised the idea as "an innovative combination of new technology and
established practices."55 The FCC went on to list three principal ad-
vantages of superstations: 1) efficient use of satellites, 2) greater diver-
sity of programming, and 3) better service to the public.
5 6
FCC treatment of both community antennae and cable TV impor-
tation of distant superstation signals has been characterized by a grad-
ual move to action. The impetus to increased cable television
regulation was the desire to protect local broadcasters and struggling
UHF stations.57 The reluctance of the Cable Vision court to enjoin the
Twin Falls antenna was in large measure predicated upon the recogni-
tion that the antenna could indeed provide a useful public service.
58
Perhaps WTBS can be cast in that same light afterABC and Cox: ben-
eficial potential to the public with a highly competitive flair.
Certainly, it was not envisioned this way. In fact, the relative void
of early superstation regulation resulted directly from the FCC's opin-
ion that superstations on the whole represented nothing more than
trouble-frought flash in the plan attempts to erect a fourth network.59
Superstations, it was thought, would not only be largely unprofitable,
but would pose no real threat to established broadcasters.
These views were reflected in the FCC's denial in 1979 of a Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters' (NAB) petition seeking comprehen-
sive superstation regulation. The essense of the NAB complaint was
that FCC policies' practical effect had "opened the door to superstation
development."60 Superstations, the NAB contended, undermined the
success of local broadcasters, the linchpin of FCC policy.6'
The FCC shot back a barrage of statistics, all bolstering its belief
(in sports terminology), "no harm, no foul." Superstation subscribers,
it argued, could only provide WTBS with one-fourth the base of a net-
work and would fail to generate the clout necessary to compete and bid
55. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F. 2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. deniedsub nom
KLIX Corp. v. Cable Vision, Inc. 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
56. 62 F.C.C. 2d 153, 159.
57. Id.
58. Franklin, Marc, Cases and Materials on Mass Media Law, 2d Edition, Foundation
Press, 1982, p. 634.
59. Cable Vision, 211 F. Supp. 47.
60. Proposed Rulemaking at 1050.
61. 1d. at 1051.
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for programming nationally. 62 Moreover, the FCC contended that with
mostly local programming, WTBS would be unable to sustain the
widespread interest necessary to support its operations. As a further
illustration, a comparison between WTBS and WNEW-TV (the largest
New York over-the-air station) yielded figures showing WNEW's over-
all viewership advantage in sheer numbers in its New York market
alone, as compared with Turner's national audience.
63
Concluding that local broadcasters were safe from the superstation
menace, the FCC rejected the NAB's claims, stating that they "fail to
produce any evidence whatsoever that a regulatory problem either now
exists or is being fomented." 6
Any assessment of the future must regard the FCC forecasts of
superstations' inevitable failure with suspicion. In the relatively few
years since the NAB brought its petition, WTBS has made the feared
inroads into local broadcasters' turf. NAB statistics which were swept
under the rug before are now proving true. For example, in 1978,
WTBS reported revenues of $31 million. By 1989, that figure is ex-
pected to rise to $138 million.65
Moreover, the superstation business is booming. The FCC's 1979
figures which calculated WTBS' national audience at three million
66
were adjusted upward in 1980 to five million, thus reflecting a 67% in-
crease over a twelve month period.6 7 Superstations as a group continue
to fare well, too. In 1979, 64% of all Form 3 U.S. cable systems carried
superstations in their channel mix. By 1980, that number had risen to
75% of all cable systems.6 8 In fact, of all new distant signals imported
for use by cable systems in 1980, 63% were superstations.69
Even New York's WOR-TV, the oft-described "involuntary"
62. Sixth Report and Order in Dockets 8736, 8975, 8976 and 9175, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952).
63. Proposed Rulemaking at 1050. This was figured from a maximum market penetra-
tion projection for cable television of 48% of American television homes. It was adduced
that five superstations and the three networks would equally share this market segment
(about 6% each). If the remaining 52%--non-cable homes-is split among the three net-
works equally (17% each), then each network would maintain an overall market share of
23%, compared with each superstation's 6% audience.
64. Id. at 1051. The FCC's 1979 figures found New York's WNEW-TV's city-wide av-
erage weekly audience to number 5,880,500. By contrast, WTBS enjoyed an average weekly
audience of 3 million nationally and 686,900 in Atlanta.
65. Id. at 1044.
66. Id. at 1043.
67. See note 64 supra.
68. Memorandum Opinion and Order in Dockets 20988 and 21284, 79 F.C.C. 652, 786
(1980).
69. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, Docket No. CRT 81-1, 48 Fed. Reg. 9552, March 7,
1980.
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superstation, found it difficult to ignore the new-found success its
superstation status had brought. In a March, 1980, New York Times
article, the president of WOR's parent company, RKO Television,
mused that the station's business was "better than it has been in years"
in part because "WOR-TV is carried by satellite to cable television sys-
tems around the country."7 °
The FCC's argument denying any bidding strength to supersta-
tions seems unsturdy in view of these figures. Perhaps this even under-
lies the injury sued upon in Cox. There, after outbidding its
competition by ten million dollars, WTBS sought to televise NCAA
games on Saturday nights.7' This would have earned WTBS a local
prime time market share of nearly half.
7 2
Other broadcasters have observed Turner's success with the
WTBS venture and also believe in the viability of superstations. Three
stations in New York, two in Boston, and one each in Chicago, Oak-
land and Los Angeles have already either applied for or achieved
superstation status.73 Moreover, with virtually unlimited channel ca-
pacity in a highly-competitive cable television industry, it is likely that
a willing superstation seeking to market itself away from home would
be positively received, especially if it possessed the "flagship station"
designation of the local sports teams. Of the three most widely trans-
mitted superstations, WTBS is the flagship of th Atlanta Braves while
WOR-TV is the flagship of the New York Mets, and WGN fulfills the
same role to the Chicago Cubs.7 4 Flagship signals are the easiest and
least costly to import.75
The WTBS experiment may pave the way for future superstations.
With the operating base of a local telecaster and a national advertising
market, success along the Turner mode seems a fair prospect.
The greatest drawback to a flourish of superstation development
may be a legal one, as evidenced by the holdings in Cox and ABC.
Superstations are encumbered with a broad definition which permits
their classification as both local telecasters and cable networks.76 This
leaves superstations twice unprotected. Cox disallowed WTBS' use of
70. Id.
71. "WOR-TV's Aims to Improve Its Image," New York Times, March 10, 1980, p. C 17.
72. Cox at 8.
73. Id.
74. Proposed Rulemaking at 1051.
75. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, Docket No. CRT 80-4, 47 Fed. Reg. 9879, March 8,
1982, at footnote 106.
76. Id. at footnote 104.
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its national NCAA contract to local advantage." ABC enjoined broad-
cast of its legal entitlement locally to its national audience.7" Despite
the courts' longstanding dislike of network exclusivity contracts, they
are nevertheless common practice.79 Their preemptive nature is also a
major impediment to superstation development.
Further disadvantages appear in the form of unfair competition
claims by local broadcasters against weighty superstations like Turner's
WTBS. 0 Since the NAB's concerns now appear well-founded, suits by
locals to keep them from being bullied may lie on the horizon.
Thus, the future of superstation development depends a good deal
upon its judicial treatment. The FCC may choose to adopt regulations
governing superstation rights, or perhaps the courts will carve out some
ground upon which superstations may thrive. Until either occurs, the
courts in ABC and Cox have jointly leashed the superstations' hydra-
head.8'
James Rosen
G. Personal Injury
1. Producer Not Liable For Injuries Inflicted on Movie
Goer
In Bill v. Superior Court,' a California Court of Appeal held that
producers of a motion picture cannot be held liable for the actions of
persons who the film attracts. To hold the producers liable would have
a chilling effect on their rights of free speech under the first amend-
ment.2 Furthermore, under tort law principles, producers have no duty
of care toward people who see their films.
3
On March 24, 1979, plaintiff Jocelyn Vargas attended the movie
"Boulevard Nights" in a San Francisco movie theater with her
mother.4 As they were leaving the theater and walking down the street
77. Cox at 8.
78. Cox at 13.
79. ABC at 37.
80. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, - S. Ct. -, 87 L. Ed.
1344 (1942). The court stated at 199: "Our conclusion is that the disadvantages resulting
from these exclusive arrangements far outweigh any advantages ......
81. This is the essence of the NAB petition in ProposedRulemaking at 1046.
1. 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1982).
2. Id at 1006-09, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 627-29.
3. Id. at 1009-15, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 629-34.
4. Id at 1004, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
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to catch a bus, Vargas was shot.' Vargas filed suit against Tony Bill,
the executive producer of the film.6 She also named as defendants di-
rector Michael Pressman, producer Bill Benenson, and Eastside Pro-
ductions, a corporation owned by Bill and Benenson which provided
the services of Bill, Pressman, and Benenson to Warner Brothers for
the making of the film.7
Vargas alleged that she had been shot by an individual who was
prone to violence and who had been attracted to the theater by the
showing of the violent movie.8 Through her mother, as guardian, she
sued for damages for medical treatment.9 Her mother was also a plain-
tiff in her own right; she sued for loss of Vargas' services.' 0 In one
cause of action, Vargas alleged that Bill knew or should have known
that his film was likely to attract members of the public who were
prone to violence and whose presence at the theater would create a
danger to other people seeing the movie." Vargas claimed that the
defendants negligently failed to warn her of this danger and negligently
failed to take steps to protect her and others from it. 2 As part of a
separate cause of action, she also alleged that the defendants, by show-
ing the movie to the public, impliedly represented to the public that
their movie could be viewed in safety and that she relied on this fraud-
ulent representation to her detriment.'
3
The superior court denied defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment.' 4 The appellate court reversed and issued a writ of mandate or-
dering summary judgment in accordance with the defendants'
motion. '
5
In making its decision, the court referred to the United States
Supreme Court decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio,'6 which stated that an
individual's freedom of speech is entitled to constitutional protection
except when it is an incitement of imminent lawless action and likely to
produce such action. 17 The court noted that Vargas conceded that
5. Id. at 1004-05, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 626-27.
6. Id at 1005, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 626-27.
7. Id
8. Id
9. Id.
10. Id
11. Id
12. Id
13. Id
14. Id. at 1004, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
15. Id at 1015, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
16. 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).
17. Id
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"Boulevard Nights" did not advocate or encourage such violent acts
and therefore was not an incitement within the meaning of
Brandenburg.'
8
The court also referred to another California case, Olivia N. v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co. , '9 where it was ruled that permitting a negli-
gence action based on the contents of a television broadcast would have
a chilling effect on the right to free speech of the people responsible for
the broadcast.2" Applying Olivia N., the Bill court stated that the plain-
tiff's first cause of action could not be upheld since in seeking to hold
the defendants liable for the actions of the viewers of their film, Vargas
was indirectly seeking to hold the defendants liable for their film's con-
tent.2 ' The court felt that by requiring the defendants to warn the pub-
lic about the types of people that might see their film, many members
of the general public may be deterred from seeing it.22 In addition, the
court felt that requiring the defendants to provide security in the vicin-
ity of every theater where the film was shown would impose substantial
costs on the defendant.23 Both types of liability, according the Bill
court, would have a chilling effect on the defendants' selection of sub-
ject matter for the movies they would make.24
With respect to Vargas' contention that Bill made an implied
fraudulent representation that his movie could be safely attended, the
court stated that such a claim also involved first amendment considera-
tions .2  The court stated that the first amendment did not protect all
forms of speech and that there might be circumstances in which a party
such as Bill could be held responsible for a failure to warn of possible
danger, in spite of the first amendment. 26  The court, therefore, de-
clined to decide this issue on first amendment grounds alone, although
it felt that the movie was within the ambit of protected expression.27
Instead, the court looked at established principles of tort law to deter-
mine whether Bill had violated a duty to warn.28
The court referred to Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. ,29 in which
18. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 1006, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
19. 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981).
20. Id. at 494-95, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
21. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 1007, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
22. Id. at 1008, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 628-29.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id at 1009, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 629-30.
26. Id.
27. Id
28. Id.
29. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36 (1975).
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rock radio station KHJ conducted a contest in which it sent a disc jock-
ey to roam the streets and rewarded the first contestant to locate him.
While two minors were driving in separate automobiles attempting to
follow the disc jockey's automobile, one of them negligently forced a
car off the highway, killing its driver. The radio station was held to
have a duty of care toward the decedent since, in conducting the con-
test, it had committed an affirmative act which created an undue risk of
harm.3" The Bill court ruled that since Vargas had not accused Bill of
being responsible for any conduct which increased the risk of violence
on the part of persons in the vicinity of the theater, as KHJ had been in
Weirum, liability could not be imposed against Bill on this ground.
3'
The court then referred to the general rule that individuals have no
duty to warn of potential danger from third parties unless a special
relationship exists between the individual and the third person requir-
ing the former to control the latter's conduct; or unless a special rela-
tionship exists between the actor and the endangered party which gives
that party the right to protection. 32 No such relationship existed here.
Finally, the court ruled on Vargas' claim that Bill had negligently
failed to provide security protection on the public streets outside the
theaters where "Boulevard Nights" was shown. The court stated that
Bill had no responsibility to take steps to prevent criminal acts of vio-
lence absent a particularized showing of foreseeability and a weighing
of the burden of taking precautionary measures against the apparent
risk of harm.3 3 The court further stated that defendants are not liable
for the defective condition of property which they do not own or con-
trol.34 Although one who has undertaken the obligation of protecting a
party is required to continue to do so, 35 the court held that Bill's recoin-
30. Id. at 47-49, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 473-74, 539 P.2d at 42-43.
31. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 1011, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
32. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965); see Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32
Cal. 3d 197, 203, 649 P.2d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1982). The endangered party must be a
specifically identifiable and foreseeable victim and not merely a member of the general pub-
lic. See Davidson, supra; see also Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d
425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976); Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d
741, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980). In all three of these cases, the existence of public policy
considerations was also a significant factor in the determination of whether a duty to warn
existed. Tarasoff involved a confidential relationship between therapist and client. Thomp-
son involved the functioning of rehabilitative release programs run by a county correctional
institute. Davidson involved the effectiveness of police surveillance on a certain individual.
No such public policy considerations existed in Bill where the defendants were private par-
ties engaged in the making and exhibiting of a film.
33. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 1014, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 633-34.
34. Id
35. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 449 comment a, (1965).
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mendation to Warner Brothers that security guards be posted outside
the theater did not constitute such an undertaking.36
The Bill court's determination that "Boulevard Nights" was enti-
tled to first amendment protection was based entirely on its determina-
tion that the film did not constitute an incitement to violence under
Brandenburg v. Ohio . This was an inadequate analysis of the issue of
whether a party can be held liable for harmful acts resulting from his
communication. Brandenburg involved an individual who had been
convicted for advocating a particular political cause.3 8 As such, it dif-
fered from the situation in Bill which involved an act of violence alleg-
edly resulting from a motion picture and from the allegedly misleading
contents of the advertisements for that motion picture. It is quite possi-
ble that the Brandenburg test is meant to be applied only to cases with a
similar factual context-political activity which incites listeners to un-
lawful action-and not to those involving the content of a non-political
motion picture distributed for entertainment.39
Although motion pictures are a protectable form of free speech
under the first amendment,4" the Constitution gives a lesser protection
to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed forms
of expression.4' Commercial speech may be defined as that speech
which is directed solely to obtaining private profit without additional
political, social, economic, or religious importance.42 A motion picture
made purely for entertainment purposes would surely fall under this
36. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 1014, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
37. Id at 1006-07, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 627-28; see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-
48 (1969) and text accompanying n. 16, supra.
38. The appellant was a Ku Klux Klan leader who had been convicted under an Ohio
statute which forbade the advocating of the propriety of violence or crime as a means of
accomplishing political ends. He had spoken at an outdoor rally on private property. Only
other Klan members and members of the news media were invited to attend. During his
speech, the appellant made a general reference to the possibility that his organization might
need to use violence to achieve its ends in the future. The Court overturned the conviction,
holding that the advocacy of violence to achieve political ends was protected by the first
amendment except where such advocacy was directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and was likely to incite or produce such action. 395 U.S. at 447-48.
39. See Cook, The Censorship of Violent Motion Pictures:. A Constitutional Analysis, 53
Ind. L.J. 381, 394-95 n.70; cf. Kalven, The Meta Physics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup.
Ct. Rev. I (P. Kurland 1960).
40. Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Burton v. Municipal Court, 68
Cal. 2d 684,68 Cal. Rptr. 721 441 P.2d 281 (1968); People v. de Renzy, 275 Cal. App. 2d 380,
79 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1969).
41. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
42. Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 363-64 (1977); Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1, 17 (1979).
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definition of commercial speech.43
On the other hand, it is also arguable that the Brandenburg test
should be applied to all forms of speech (including commercial) and to
the circumstances in which they occur.44 If the Bill court was correct in
applying the Brandenburg test, then it was correct in ruling that
"Boulevard Nights" was entitled to first amendment protection since a
violent movie being shown to a passive audience almost certainly could
not be said to be directed toward inciting or producing imminent law-
less action, even if it could be said to be capable of producing such
action.45 But the Bill court wrongly refused to even deal with the issue
of whether the Brandenburg test could be applied to the contents of a
motion picture.
Even if the Brandenburg test does apply to motion pictures and
even if the test would protect Bill from liability for harmful acts result-
ing from the production of "Boulevard Nights," the test almost cer-
tainly would not apply to motion pictures which are considered to be
undeserving of first amendment protection in the first place. 46 There
are three types of speech which the Supreme Court has held to be un-
protected by the first amendment:
47 obscenity, 48 "fighting words",49
and defamation."
Defamation has been defined as "words which produce any per-
ceptible injury to the reputation of another."5 A movie which did
43. On the other hand, a motion picture which had a significant socio-political message
in it probably would not be commercial speech even if the making of it was motivated
primarily by profit. See supra n.42. There is nothing in the facts of Bill to indicate that
"Boulevard Nights" contained such a message or that its making was motivated by anything
but profit.
44. See Buchanan, Obscenity and Brandenburg. The Missing Link, 11 Hous. L. Rev. 537,
568-73 (1974).
45. Both direction and capability are necessary for a form of speech to lose its constitu-
tional protection under the Brandenburg test. See supra n.38.
46. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). At the time that Beauharnais was
decided, the rule was that speech could be prohibited in spite of the first amendment if it
presented a "clear and present danger" to the public welfare. Schenk v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919). The Beauharnais court ruled that this "clear and present danger" test did not
have to be applied to forms of speech outside the ambit of constitutional protection. Pre-
sumably, the Brandenburg test, which seems different from, and has apparently replaced the
"clear and present danger" test, see supra n.38, 45, also would not be applied to constitution-
ally unprotected forms of speech.
47. Spak, Predictable Harm: Should the Media Be Liable?, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 671, 681-84
(1981).
48. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
49. Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (words "which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace").
50. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 266.
51. Ballentine's Law Dictionary 321 (3d ed. 1969).
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nothing more than depict violent acts would not fall within this
definition.
Nor would the contents of a violent movie fall under the present-
day definition of "obscenity" or "fighting words." The Supreme Court
has defined obscenity as "words which depict or describe sexual con-
duct"52 and has expressly declined to include violence within the cate-
gory of obscenity. 3  Under Cohen v. California5 4 and Cantwell v.
Connecticut," offensive language must be directed to the person of the
hearer in such a manner that he could reasonably hear it as a direct
personal insult, in order for such language to be considered "fighting
words." No movie could fit this requirement.
But there is every likelihood that the United States Supreme Court
would expand the definitions of "obscenity" and/or "fighting words" to
include violent films. 56 One commentator has remarked that with re-
gard to the regulation of obscene material, "the era of judicial permis-
siveness appears to be over. Under the new guidelines laid down by
the Burger Court, a work will not escape the law's condemnation if it
has the slightest 'redeeming social value'; it must be shown to possess,
as a whole, 'serious literary, artistic, political and scientific value.' ""
This makes it likely that the Court is ready to rule that depictions of
certain unique acts of violence are obscene or tend to incite an immedi-
ate breach of the peace and therefore, are not deserving of constitu-
tional protection. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,58 the Burger Court
remarked that:
Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection be-
tween antisocial behavior and obscene material, the legisla-
ture of Georgia could quite reasonably determine that such a
connection does or might exist . . . . From the beginning of
civilized societies, legislators and judges have acted on vari-
ous unprovable assumptions. Such assumptions underlie
much lawful state regulation of commercial and business
affairs. 59
52. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
53. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518 (1948).
54. 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1970).
55. 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940).
56. Another possibility would be to simply make violent expression a fourth category of
non-protected speech. See Cook, supra at n.39, at 382-91.
57. 1 Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts 100, "Legal Developments"
(1983).
58. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
59. Id at 60-61.
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Since the causal link between violent expression in the media and real-
life violence may be even stronger than just an unprovable assump-
tion,60 there seems to be no reason why some forms of violent expres-
sion should not lose their constitutional protection.
If violent expression in movies would not be entitled to constitu-
tional protection, there is no reason why a plaintiff such as Vargas
could not sue for damages resulting from such expression. Even if vio-
lent expression is entitled to protection under the first amendment, it is
possible that one who engages in it could be held liable for the conse-
quences. In cases in which the government regulates certain conduct
for valid and substantial reasons unrelated to the communicative ele-
ments of such conduct, the infringement on protected first amendment
rights will be upheld if it is no greater than necessary to further an
important governmental interest.6 ' This rule can be extended to a situ-
ation such as that in Bill where a private plaintiff seeks to hold a de-
fendant liable for the consequences of the defendant's expression.
Vargas' interest that she and other members of the general public are
protected from physical danger arising from certain people seeing Bill's
movie is an important interest unrelated to the communicative aspects
of the film being shown. Furthermore, the minimum duty that she
seeks to impose on Bill-that he warn the public through his advertise-
ments of the possible dangers resulting from seeing the film-hardly
seems more restrictive than necessary to further that interest. The mo-
tion-picture industry is well-known for the extraordinary degree of self-
regulation it has engaged in.62  The Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) classifies its films into one of four categories: X, R,
PG, and G.63 When the Association classifies a film in the X category,
any person under seventeen is forbidden from seeing the film.' When
it classifies a film in the R category, any minor under the age of 17 is
forbidden from seeing the film unless accompanied by an adult.
65
Spokesmen for the industry have defended the rating system on two
grounds: first, it fulfills their duty to the public to give parents reliable
60. Spak, supra at n.47, at 672-78; Buchanan, supra at n.44, at 570 n. 213.
61. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968); See also, Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 590-94 (1969); NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
393-400 (1950).
62. Friedman, The Motion Picture Rating System of 1968. A Constitutional Ana,ysis of
Self-Regulation by the Film Industry, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 185, 186 (1973).
63. Id at 186.
64. Id
65. Id
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information to enable them to make informed judgments in guiding the
attendance of their children; second, and more importantly for the pur-
poses of this analysis, self-regulation actually has forestalled censorship
by federal and local governments.66 If the industry has seen fit to actu-
ally prohibit some members of the public from seeing their films, the
requirement that members of the industry merely warn the public
about some of the people whom they permit to see their films does not
seem excessively strict. The "chilling effect" of such a warning seems
much warmer than the effect of the duties that the industry has already
taken upon itself.67
The Bill decision contributes nothing to the discussion of the con-
flict between the individual's right to freedom of speech and the pub-
lic's interest in the protection of the public morals or public safety. The
court failed to deal with the issue of whether the Brandenburg test was
properly applicable to violent motion pictures. The court failed to deal
with the issue of whether such motion pictures are entitled to first
amendment protection in the first place by ignoring the possible rele-
vance of obscenity law to violent motion pictures. The court further
failed to deal with the issue of whether there was a sufficiently impor-
tant interest at stake which would outweigh whatever first amendment
protection the film in question might have. Finally, the opinion failed
to take into account the special nature of the motion-picture industry as
an industry which has traditionally engaged in a great deal of self-
regulation.
If violent expression in movies is not entitled to first amendment
protection, is it entitled to the more definite and inclusive protection of
Article I, Section 2 of the California Constitution?68 In 1959, a county
ordinance prohibiting the sale or circulation of crime comic books to
children under the age of 18 was challenged in Katzev v. County of Los
66. Id
67. Even the providing of security protection in the vicinity of the theaters showing the
film would not seem to impose a substantially greater burden that the voluntarily incurred
costs of refusing to allow minors to see certain films. The costs incurred for security could
be passed onto the consumers at any rate.
68. The Bill court noted at p. 1007 n. 1 that article I, § 2 of the state constitution gives
greater protection to the right of free speech than is provided for under the first amendment
of the United States Constitution, citing Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 532 P.2d
116 (1975); Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 592
P.2d 341 (1979). Since the court determined that Bill's first amendment rights were impli-
cated, it reasoned, without examining the issue separately, that his free speech rights under
the state constitution were therefore implicated also. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 1007 n.l, 187 Cal.
Rptr. at 628 n.1.
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Angeles.69 The California Supreme Court ruled that under both the
state and federal constitutions, publications containing pictures and
stories of bloodshed were entitled to the protection of free speech.7"
However, the court's decision was partially based on its opinion
that the record in the case disclosed no close causal connection between
the substantive evil (juvenile delinquency) and the circulation of crime
comic books in general.7 ' Today, the court might well find a close
causal connection between violent films and violent crime.72 The
court's decision was also based on the fact that the ordinance was not
drawn so narrowly as to only prohibit the sale of comic books which
depicted brutality, sadism, gore or horror, or which glorified or made
crime attractive or depicted in detail the manner in which crimes are
committed.73 The court implied that it might have upheld the constitu-
tionality of the ordinance if it had been drawn that narrowly, but ruled
that the depiction of all acts of violence was too broad to withstand
constitutional scrutiny.7 4 It seems that under Katzev, certain accounts
of violence are left unprotected by the state constitution.
Furthermore, California courts have expressly refused to use the
state constitution to give protected status to obscenity.75 Since the
United States Supreme Court seems ready to classify violent films
under the category of "obscenity" and/or "fighting words,"7 6 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court is likely to make the same classification on the
basis of Katzev. The Bill court's failure to use Katzev to analyze the
status of violent films under the state constitution is another flaw which
makes its freedom-of-speech analysis inadequate.
However, the fact that the state and federal constitutions may not
forbid the imposition of liability on Bill for the consequences resulting
from the exhibition of his film, does not imply that such a liability actu-
ally exists under common tort law.
The Bill court felt that no special relationship existed either be-
tween Bill and Vargas or between Bill and her assailant which would
make Bill liable for a failure to warn Vargas of the attendant danger
69. 52 Cal. 2d 360, 391 P.2d 310 (1959).
70. Id at 362-65, 391 P.2d at 312-13.
71. 1d. at 367, 391 P.2d at 315.
72. See supra n.60 and accompanying text.
73. 52 Cal. 2d at 368, 391 P.2d at 315-16.
74. Id.
75. People v. Weiner, 91 Cal. App. 3d 238, 154 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1979); Bloom v. Munici-
pal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 545 P.2d 229, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1976).
76. See supra n.57 and accompanying text.
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involved in seeing his movie.77 In making this decision, the Bill court
correctly applied traditional concepts of tort law to the issue of whether
a duty to control the conduct of third persons exists. The relationships
between an actor and a third person which require the actor to control
the third person's conduct include the parent-child relationship,7" the
master-servant relationship,7 9 the relationship between a possessor of
land or chattels and a licensee, 0 and the relationship between an indi-
vidual with dangerous propensities and one who takes charge of him."'
None of these relationships existed between Bill and Vargas' assailant
since Bill did not control the public street in which the attack took
place or have charge of the assailant.
The relationships between an actor and another which require the
actor to control the conduct of third persons for the protection of the
other include a common carrier's relation to its passengers82 and the
relationship between a custodian and an individual placed in his care.83
Bill had neither of these relationships with Vargas.
As the Bill court correctly noted, however, under Weirum, if an
actor has committed an affirmative act which created a foreseeable risk
of harm through the conduct of another, he is liable to anyone who
suffers harm from that affirmative act regardless of whether a special
relationship existed between the actor and the victim or between the
actor and the criminal.
8 4
At first glance, the Bill court's analysis of whether Bill had com-
mitted such an affirmative act seems strange. The court states, "Nor
are petitioners accused of any additional 'affirmative act . . .which
created an undue risk of harm.' It is not claimed, for example, that
petitioners are responsible for any conduct which increased the risk of
violence on the part of persons in the vicinity of the theater[.]" 85 Surely
what Vargas alleges is that Bill's production and exhibition of the film
itself is the affirmative act which created the risk of harm to Vargas.
One might wonder why the Bill court looks for any other affirmative
77. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 1011, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
78. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316 (1965).
79. Id § 317 (1965).
80. Id. § 318 (1965).
81. Id § 319 (1965). But the duty to control a third person's conduct is owed only to a
foreseeable victim of the danger presented by the third person. And public policy plays a
role in the determination of such a duty as well. See supra n.32.
82. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965).
83. Id § 320 (1965).
84. Id § 302B (1965); Sun N' Sand Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582
P.2d 920 (1978), Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal. App. 3d 206, 164 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1980).
85. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 1011, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
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act. Upon investigation, however, the court's reasoning becomes
clearer.
Not many cases have been litigated over the issue of a movie-
maker's liability for harm to unknown third persons resulting from his
movies. However, such a situation can be analogized to cases in which
a furnisher of intoxicating beverages is sued by an injured party for
damages caused by the intoxication of a person so furnished. Bill, the
executive producer of "Boulevard Nights," is in a position similar to
that of a dispenser of liquor since both parties create definite risks of
injury through the dispensing of their product. Vargas' assailant is in a
position similar to that of the intoxicated party since these parties' con-
sumption or use of the product placed them in a position where they
were more likely to do harm to others. Furthermore, Vargas is in a
position similar to that of a party injured by the intoxicated person.
Under common law, a party injured by an intoxicated person has
no remedy against the dispenser of the intoxicant.86 The reason for this
is that, the drinking of the liquor and not the furnishing of it, is the
proximate cause of the injury; therefore, the furnishing of it is not con-
sidered to be actionable.87 This rule was upheld in California in Brock-
elt v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co. 88 Yet the supplier of intoxicating liquor
in that case was held liable for the injury caused by the intoxicated
person. The distinguishing fact in Brockett was that the defendant did
not merely supply the intoxicated person with liquor; he also guided
him to his automobile, placed him in the car, and directed him to drive
through traffic.89 At this point, the defendant was no longer just a pas-
sive supplier of alcohol, but an active participant in the defendant's
driving while under the influence.90 The placing of the intoxicated per-
son in his car and directing him to drive home was an affirmative act
entirely separated from the serving of the liquor and it was the affirma-
86. Annot., 76 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 1218, 1219 (1977).
87. 45 Am. Jur. 2d § 553 Intoxicating Liquors (1969).
88. 264 Cal. App. 2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1968). In California, however, it is a misde-
meanor to serve liquor to someone who is a habitual or common drunkard. Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code § 25602(a) (West Supp. 1983). California courts had previously imposed civil
liability on a violator of this statute. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 486
P.2d 151 (1971). But in 1978, the Legislature expressly disapproved Vesely, forbidding such
civil liability to be imposed. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 25602(b)(c) (West Supp. 1983). Of
course, a movie producer distributing a film is not in a position to determine which individu-
als are especially likely to be adversely affected by his film and which are not. In this re-
spect, he is unlike a dispenser of alcohol who often has personal contact with his guest or
customer and is better able to tell whether the guest or customer has already had too much
to drink.
89. 264 Cal. 2d at 71, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
90. Id
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tive act which created liability.9'
At this point, the Bill court's search for an affirmative act by Bill
which created a danger to Vargas entirely separate from the production
or exhibition of the film is understandable. Since Bill committed no
other affirmative act which created a danger to Vargas, he, as the film's
producer, is in the same position as the bartender who merely serves
liquor and does nothing else to create a danger to third persons from
the person he serves it to. The Bill court was therefore correct in ruling
that he had no duty to warn Vargas; and the same reasoning justifies a
ruling that he had no duty to provide security outside the theaters in
which the film was being shown. There still exists the question, how-
ever, of whether his recommendation to Warner Brothers that security
be posted outside theaters showing the film constituted an undertaking
of responsibility for Vargas' safety. Such an undertaking would make
Bill responsible for her safety even though he was under no obligation
to provide for her security in the first place.92
According to section 323 of the RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS,
the caveat accompanying the section "leaves open the question whether
a mere promise without in any way entering upon performance is an
undertaking sufficient to make the promissor liable under the rule
stated in this section. '9 3 Traditionally, the mere breach of a promise
was considered actionable only in contract (upon proof of considera-
tion for the promise), and not in tort.94 However, modern law has wit-
nessed a considerable blurring of the distinction between tort and
contract in situations where the plaintiff has relied on a promise to his
detriment.95 However, Bill's recommendation made only to Warner
Brothers, that security be posted outside the theaters, does not even rise
to the level of a promise to Vargas, which is the minimum act necessary
91. Id
92. Hanberry v. Hearst Corporation, 1 Cal. App. 3d 149, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969); Wal-
nut Creek Aggregate Company v. Testing Engineers Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d 690, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 700 (1967); Merill v. Buck, 58 Cal. 2d 552, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456, 375 P.2d 304 (1962). See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 449 comment a; see also id. § 323. Though Vargas relied
on § 449 comment a in her claim that Bill had acted negligently in not performing a task he
had undertaken, § 323 is the rule specifically applicable toward such a situation and is the
rule which will be referred to in the text for the remainder of the discussion on this issue.
93. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 comment d.
94. Id.
95. Id; See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981); Marsalis v. La Salle, 94
So. 2d 120 (La. Ct. App. 1957); Abresch v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 246 Minn. 408,
75 N.W.2d 206 (1956); Ajax Hardware Mfg. v. Industrial Plant Corp., 569 F.2d 181, 185 (2d
Cir. 1977) (negligent performance of a contract may give rise to a claim sounding in tort as
well as one for breach of contract; these two claims could be submitted as alternatives to the
jury).
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to constitute an undertaking. A defendant's liability for failure to fol-
low through on an undertaking is predicated on the plaintiffs reliance
on the defendant's actions.96 Bill's recommendation was almost cer-
tainly communicated privately between himself and Warner Brothers,
and Vargas could not ever have been in a position to rely on it.9 7
Therefore, the court was correct in concluding that Bill had not per-
formed an undertaking in making the recommendation and could not
be held liable for failure to follow through on it.
In summary, the Bill court ignored many relevant considerations
in deciding that Vargas' suit could not withstand the free speech provi-
sions of the state and federal constitutions. It correctly applied existing
tort law in deciding that Vargas had not stated a cause of action in
alleging that Bill had negligently failed to take steps to protect her from
harm resulting from her seeing the movie (though its discussion of the
undertaking issue was inadequate). But clearly, if no constitutional
considerations are involved, there is nothing to prevent a state legisla-
ture from passing a statute to impose liability in a situation where none
existed under common law.98 One legal commentator has drafted a
model statute which would impose total liability on television or mo-
tion-picture producers for harm resulting from the depiction of unique
acts of violence.99 The result of the application of the lenient common
law theories of liability to television and movie producers who depict
violent acts is likely to encourage potential plaintiffs to seek a legisla-
tive remedy for their grievances. However, since the California Legis-
lature has recently expressed approval of the common law theory of
96. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 comment d.
97. If she had somehow learned of the recommendation before seeing the movie, she
could not now claim that she had not been warned of the dangers attendant in seeing it.
98. For instance, Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming all have some sort of
"Dram Shop Act" which imposes liability on dispensers of alcohol for acts committed by a
person intoxicated therefrom. 12 Am. Jur. § 2 Trials, Dram Shop Litigation (1966). These
acts supersede the common law rule that no such liability exists. See supra n.86 and n.87
and accompanying text. Colorado, Delaware, and Washington impose liability only when
intoxicating liquor is served to an habitual drunkard. 12 Am. Jur. § 2 Trials, Dram Shop
Litigation (1966). California courts, through judicial declaration, once imposed this liabil-
ity. See supra n. 88.
99. Spak, supra at n.47, at 679-80. Spak would require clear and convincing evidence
that the act or acts were excessively violent and that plaintiffs injuries were proximately
caused by a reaction by some member of the public to viewing the work. He admits that
causation would be a difficult element to prove. In Bill, there is nothing in the facts which
would indicate that Vargas' assailant was ever identified, much less than he ever saw the
movie.
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liability for dispensers of potentially dangerous products,' o the success
of such attempts in this state is doubtful.' °'
Mark Siegel
100. See supra n.88.
101. Since the legislature so recently declared its intention that dispensers not be civilly
liable for damages caused by the intoxicants they serve, even if served to a habitual or
common drunkard, it seems very unlikely that it would be willing to impose civil liability on
a movie producer for alleged damage caused by his movies.
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